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Introduction
Economists, political scientists and historians have long been debating the
economic benefits and pitfalls of natural resources. Throughout history, there
can be little doubt that resources have played a central role in the various
phases of economic development. They were important for the earliest transi-
tion from hunter-gatherer to agricultural societies; for the creation and dura-
tion of the Egyptian and Roman empires; for the emergence of international
trade between 1000-1500 AD, where manufactured goods from the developed
centers of the early world economy – the Islamic regions and China – were
exchanged against the primary goods of the periphery; and for the rise of
Western Europe from the 16th century onwards, where territorial expansion
was driven in large part by the desire to find new resources to exploit.1
Past research on the historical development phases has often focused on
the importance of natural resources for the country or region seeking them –
be it by trade or by conquest – and less on the countries who themselves pos-
sessed the resources. One of the earliest examples is given by the application
of the “frontier thesis” to the European economic take-off starting in the 16th
century. The boom in Western Europe – and particularly in the metropolitan
countries – essentially began with the discovery of the New World and its vast
new resource stocks. It accelerated with further exploitation of the resources
in Australia, New Zealand and Southern Africa, and lasted until the resource
“frontier” had been exhausted at the end of the 19th century (Webb, 1964).
1 Refer to Barbier (2005a, 2005b: Ch.2) for a more extensive survey of historical deve-
lopment based on natural resources.
1
2 INTRODUCTION
But frontier expansion did not only benefit the Western European colo-
nizing countries, as Frederick Jackson Turner, the originator of the “frontier
thesis”, pointed out when he explained the economic development of the
United States over a century ago (Turner, 1986). The consensus view is that
in the “Golden Age of Resource-Based Development” from 1870-1913, many
countries also profited greatly from their own natural resource wealth, which
they managed to translate into a positive contribution to their overall eco-
nomic performance.2 For example, the economic take-off of the United States
during the 19th and early 20th centuries was aided not only by the abundance
of free land to feed a growing population, as mentioned by Turner, but also
by the presence of rich mineral ores, coal and oil to fuel the rising industries.
Similarly, during this period Canada and many Latin American countries,
the Gold Coast (present-day Ghana) and South Africa, Ceylon (Sri Lanka)
and Indochina benefited economically from the exploitation of their abundant
natural resources, be it plantation crops or minerals (Findlay and Lundahl,
1994; Barbier, 2005a).
Two early theories were developed to explain this “Golden Age”: the
“vent-for-surplus theory” and the “staples theory”. The first suggests that
unused or “surplus” resources in the poorer regions of the world were ex-
ported and brought into productive use thanks to the post-industrial trade
surge (e.g., Myint, 1958; Findlay and Lundahl, 1994). The second, closely
related approach describes how the production and export of staple prod-
ucts set off the economic development of countries rich in land but poor in
labor and capital. The rising income stemming from an expanding primary
sector then generated what today would be termed spillover effects, creating
investment opportunities in other sectors and eventually leading to the diver-
sification of the entire economy. Originally launched by Innis’ (1930, 1940)
historical studies on the economic and social impacts of Canada’s fur trade
and cod fisheries, the staples theory has also been extended to help explain
2 For more on the “Golden Age”, see e.g. Green and Urquhart (1976), Schedvin (1990),
and Findlay and Lundahl (2001).
3the economic performance of colonial settler societies, where land – and in
several cases also minerals – was abundant and the population scarce. As in
the Canadian example, resource endowments (broadly interpreted to include
human resources) played a powerful role in directing the early development
of the colonial economies, with staple dependence giving way to balanced
growth through final demand linkage.3
These approaches were certainly not uncontroversial, as the exchange on
the staples theory spawned by Chambers and Gordon’s critical article in 1966
on the effects of the early-20th century Canadian wheat boom demonstrated.4
At that time, however, the debate was more about the extent of the positive
economic effects of a boom in the primary sector (as well as about the relative
merits of economic theorists and economic historians); the question of whether
the exploitation of natural resources might actually have negative economic
effects was never raised.
In more recent times however, observers have been less inclined to accept
nature’s bounty as an unquestionable blessing. There is now considerable
debate surrounding the extent and the direction of the economic effects of
natural resource wealth for the resource-rich countries, both regarding their
historical impact since the 16th century and over the past few decades.
Some scholars have re-examined the role of natural resources, and factor
endowments more generally, in the economic development of former colonies.
They have linked endowments – including geographical and climatic factors,
mineral resources, and native population density – to the colonization strat-
egy chosen by the metropolitan countries, and therefore to the social and
institutional structures they created, and the economic development paths
3 Refer to Buckley (1958), Watkins (1963) and Southey (1978) for further discussion
of the staples approach, and Baldwin (1956) for a theoretical explanation. See Hirschman
(1958) and North (1961) for early non-Canadian applications, and Schedvin (1990) and
Findlay and Lundahl (1994) for more recent examples.
4 The exchange took place in a series of contributions by Chambers and Gordon (1966,
1967), Dales et al. (1967), and Grant (1974).
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that ensued.5 According to this new “factor endowments” approach, cli-
mates and soils conducive to growing plantation-style crops, abundant pre-
cious metal resources, and a plentiful and cheap native labor force, tended to
lead to the emergence of extractive and unequal social and economic struc-
tures, which persisted well beyond the colonies’ independence. On the other
hand, where factors combined to create settler instead of extractive colonies,
the tendency was towards the emergence of “neo-Europes” (Canada and the
United States, Australia and New Zealand), where institutions resembled
those of the metropolis and ultimately favored positive long-term economic
development even after independence. Several studies have applied this linear
endowments-development hypothesis to the issue of explaining present-day
economic performance in all former colonies (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002)
and in the whole world (Easterly, 2007). However, it is uncertain if an ap-
proach originally designed for (former) New World colonies can be extended
to explain the origins of economic development beyond the Americas.6
Looking at what has happened closer to our times, the experience of nu-
merous countries exporting both fuel and non-fuel minerals during the past
four decades has led many researchers to associate abundant natural resources
with poor economic performance, especially in developing countries. Exam-
ples of the positive effects of resource abundance, even in the context of
mineral resource bounty, certainly exist. Norway has been able to turn its
oil and natural gas discoveries into economic profits, which – thanks to the
government’s long-term investment plans – should last well beyond the day of
the last North Sea rig’s dismantling. Botswana and Malaysia also owe much
of their positive economic development since the 1970s to the exploitation of
their natural capital, in particular mineral resources. However, a glance at
the economic growth and development levels in other primary-export depen-
5 Prominent representatives of this approach include economic historians Stanley En-
german and Kenneth Sokoloff (1997, 2000, 2002), who studied the development paths of
New World economies.
6 See Chapter 1 for a deeper investigation of this point.
5dent countries specializing in plantation-type crops such as coffee or cocoa
does little to dispel the impression of a negative resource effect.
This apparent paradox in recent economic history of abundant resource
endowments – proxied by the primary export share of GDP – coupled with
low economic performance has come to be known as the “curse” of natural
resources (a term popularized by Sachs and Warner, 1995a). The reasons be-
hind the curse have been alternatively identified as the “Dutch disease”, i.e.
the withering of more growth-inducing sectors due to a boom in the primary
sector (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1999); the rent-seeking behavior of politicians
and resource extractors (e.g., Tornell and Lane, 1999; Torvik, 2002); the cor-
ruption of the bureaucratic system and the quality of institutions (e.g., Leite
and Weidmann, 2002); and the collapse of the political system and resulting
civil conflict over the control of the resource base (e.g., Collier and Hoef-
fler, 1998, 2005). Further explanations for low economic performance in the
presence of resource abundance have been found in the under-investment in
human capital in resource-rich countries with respect to others (e.g., Gylfa-
son, 2001), and in the debt overhang caused by excessive borrowing against
future returns from resource exploitation, which were then eradicated by a
market slump (Manzano and Rigobon, 2001).7 Based on these observations,
some scholars and policy-makers have even gone so far as to recommend that
developing countries leave their natural resources unexploited so as not to
condemn their economies to long-term under-performance, a view which must
certainly appear extreme to anyone familiar with positive counter-examples
of resource-driven development.
A substantial body of literature has shown that resource endowments
played an important economic part both in the near and more remote past.
But what of their relevance for economic performance today, and even in
the future? It is clear that many resources which have had a crucial impact
on economic development in the past – be it positive or negative – will not
7 Chapters 2-3 of the present study offer a more extensive examination of the resource
curse.
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last forever, either because of their depletion or threatened over-exploitation.
However, this does not mean that natural resources are no longer necessary
in today’s economy; the reality is quite the opposite.
Of particular concern today for both scholars and policymakers is the sup-
ply of energy resources to satisfy the ever-growing demands of producers and
consumers. The reserves of the world’s main energy resources – oil, gas and
coal – are not inexhaustible. Moreover, while these energy resources are fun-
damental for economic activities, their use has also caused – and will continue
to cause – significant damage to the environment, and to the human beings
living in it. Other, more plentiful and less polluting alternatives already ex-
ist, including renewable energy resources – water, wind, biomass and solar
energy, to name but a few – and the more contested nuclear energy resources.
There is however an ongoing discussion in academic, political and economic
circles regarding the optimal energy mix, the institutional framework needed
for the development and practical implementation of new energy resources,
and the economic effects which their widespread adoption (or lack of it) will
engender. At the very least, the issue demonstrates that natural resources
are far from having lost their central role for economic development; on the
contrary, they may become yet more important as some of the traditional
resources are exhausted and new ones must be found.
As the title suggests, this thesis explores some of the contributions of re-
source endowments to economic performance. It is shaped by the three broad
research areas delineated above: first, the historical importance of resources
for economic performance; second, the economic effects of natural resource en-
dowments in the more recent past; and third, the debate on the consequences
of and solutions to resource depletion in the near future. More specifically, the
study begins by raising the possibility of non-linear effects between colonial
resource endowments – broadly conceived to include also human resources –
and one important facet of economic development, namely income distribu-
tion in former colonies. This is followed by an extensive re-examination of
7the resource curse, which has allegedly – and probably erroneously – charac-
terized the role of natural resources in economic performance over the past
four decades in a broad sample of countries. And finally, the study is com-
pleted by an analysis of the growth effects of alternative energy resources and
the importance of a proper institutional framework for their development in
transition and developing countries, an issue of growing relevance at a time
when demand for energy resources is burgeoning in these regions.
The overall conclusions on the role of resource endowments for economic
performance to be drawn from this thesis can be summed up in a concise
statement: the human element – i.e. the institutional set-up and the policies
that emerge from it – is more important for determining development out-
comes than the mere presence or absence of natural resources. There is no
evidence of a pre-determined “curse” of natural resources; not in the distant
past, nor in the last decades, and hopefully not in the future either. Rather,
it is the interplay of resource endowments and the institutional and economic
structures created by humans to exploit those resources that point down the
development path upon which an economy – be it resource-rich or not – will
embark.
Overview
This section provides a more detailed overview of the chapters that follow.
Chapter 1 explores the main determinants of inequality in former colonies.
Recent research emphasizes that the distribution of income in countries is
not invariant with respect to the underlying characteristics of these coun-
tries. Following seminal work on incentives faced by colonial settlers several
centuries ago (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, 2002), this study examines the
impact of historical factor endowments on current economic outcomes. But
whereas earlier work focused on the effects on modern income levels and the
distribution of world income, the focus here is on the modern distribution of
income within countries.
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The main objective of this paper is to analyze the relationship between
pre-colonial factor endowments (especially population density), incentives for
colonizers, and the resulting patterns of inequality in former colonies. A
new hypothesis is proposed, suggesting that the link between the historical
native population density and inequality is best described by an inverted-U
shaped relationship. It is argued that this result is connected to colonization
patterns and – based on historical accounts – can be explained by the ratio of
land to the indigenous population in these countries on the one hand, and by
the level of (military) technology attained by the European colonizers on the
other. The study shows that it is the interaction of these two factors which has
proved important for the development paths of former colonies. The envisaged
chain of events is a three-step process: (i) the impact of historical population
density on settlement and labor allocation decisions of colonial settlers; (ii) the
impact of historical economic and social structures on modern-day structures;
and (iii) the impact of modern structures on the distribution of income in
modern societies.
The hypothesis is developed theoretically in a conflict model describing
the possible interactions between colonists and natives. It is also tested em-
pirically, using data on population density around 1500, and the Gini index
and the top quintile income share as measures of inequality. The empirical
results are consistent with the theory, highlighting the curvilinear relation be-
tween native population density in pre-colonial times and modern inequality
patterns. Moreover, the hypothesis proves robust to controlling for other pos-
sible factors that influenced development in former colonies, such as climate,
soil quality, and mineral resources.
Chapter 2 analyzes one of the most fundamental recent debates con-
nected to natural resources and economic development, namely whether or
not natural resources have been beneficial for economic growth during the
past decades. As discussed above, numerous researchers have supported the
view that resource-poor countries often outperform resource-rich countries in
economic growth, and have drawn the conclusion that natural resources seem
9to have been more of a curse than a blessing for many countries. This study
re-examines two main features of the resource curse literature and finds new
cross-country evidence contradicting previous findings of detrimental growth
effects of natural resource wealth. The first aspect addressed here regards the
measurement of natural resource abundance. Most empirical studies confirm-
ing the resource curse published over the past decade have used the Sachs
and Warner measure (or a variation thereof). This measure estimates re-
source abundance based on the share of primary exports in national income
at the beginning of the observation period. The paper presented here pro-
poses two alternative indicators, developed by the World Bank (1997, 2005),
which measure per capita mineral wealth and total natural resource wealth,
respectively, and which are argued to better capture a country’s natural re-
source abundance. The second feature that this chapter concentrates on is
the importance of institutional quality in the economic growth and develop-
ment process. Despite a recent resurgence of interest in the topic in general,
it has received limited attention in work on growth with resource abundance.
The results of the cross-country estimations show no evidence of a neg-
ative growth effect of natural resource abundance. Using the new measures
of natural resource wealth, there is instead a positive direct association with
economic growth over the period 1970-2000, which is confirmed when the
role of institutional quality is considered. The findings are highly significant
both for aggregate natural resources and for mineral resources only, which
runs contrary to most of the resource-and-growth literature. Also, the esti-
mations do not confirm the negative effects of resource abundance through
institutional quality found in several other studies. Interestingly, adding an
interaction term suggests that the beneficial resource effects diminish as in-
stitutional quality increases, although the overall effects remain strongly pos-
itive. The positive results hold both in ordinary least squares (OLS) and in
two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations which consider the endogeneity of
institutions, and they are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of additional
control variables from the growth literature.
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The empirical analysis of the resource curse is continued in Chapter 3,
which closely examines the characteristics of the traditional measure of re-
source “abundance” and its implications for empirical work in a series of
OLS, 2SLS and three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimations. As mentioned
above, this measure has been calculated as the ratio of primary exports to
national income (generally based on the information for a single year at the
beginning of the observation period), which is more appropriately thought
of as a measure of dependence (or intensity) than a measure of abundance.
The denominator explicitly captures the magnitude of other activities in the
economy. Consequently, the scaling exercise (dividing by the size of the econ-
omy), as well as the comparative advantage in non-resource sectors, implies
that the ratio variable is not independent of economic policies and the insti-
tutions that produce them. Hence, the resource dependence ratio potentially
suffers from endogeneity problems and should not be treated as an exogenous
explanatory variable at all in growth regressions, but rather as the outcome
of specific institutional settings.
To pursue this point, the study distinguishes between two different per-
spectives on institutions: the first looks at “deep and durable” characteristics
of societies, such as constitutional design, which then determine a range of
policy outcomes – institutional proxies and otherwise – that are more “change-
able”. Both the “durable constraints” and the “changeable policy outcome”
interpretations of institutions are potentially relevant for the resource curse.
Regarding the former, Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) have pioneered the
notion that constitutional designs have observable consequences on economic
policies, finding that both presidential regimes and majoritarian electoral
rules (as opposed to parliamentarian systems and proportional representa-
tion) tend to be associated with more spending for special interests. In the
context of the resource curse, one may therefore expect that sectoral lobbying
for preferential treatment is more successful in presidential than in parliamen-
tary systems. As far as the more “changeable” institutional characteristics
are concerned, the consensus view in the resource curse literature seems to be
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that resource abundance can be a blessing for countries with high-quality in-
stitutions and a curse for countries with lower-quality institutions, and that
institutional quality itself is endogenous and not invariant with respect to
resource endowments.
The main results of this chapter seem to turn received wisdom upside
down. First, mineral resource dependence, based on the conventional Sachs-
Warner resource measure in regression analyses, is influenced both by durable
and changeable institutions, even when controlling for physical resource abun-
dance. Treating resource dependence as endogenous, it is shown that coun-
tries with certain institutional designs fail to industrialize; and failing to
develop significant non-resource sectors makes them dependent on primary
sector extraction. Second, within the set of constitutional variables, the form
of government (presidential versus parliamentary system) is more relevant
than the form of the electoral system. This is interpreted as evidence that
sectoral lobbying pressure from resource firms is more relevant for policy de-
sign than electoral pressure through geographically defined constituencies.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the resource curse seems to be a red
herring. Properly accounting for resource wealth implies that resources may
actually be a blessing for both institutional and economic development – not
a curse. Moreover, instrumenting for resource dependence implies that this
variable is no longer significant in growth regressions.
Finally, Chapter 4 examines the development of renewable energy re-
sources and their importance for economic growth, particularly in developing
and transition countries. A significant obstacle in the realization of new re-
newable energy projects is their financing: energy projects generally demand
high levels of financing, which producers in less developed economies can
rarely cover on their own. However, the availability of the long-term loans
needed by renewable energy technology firms is positively linked to the de-
velopment of the banking system, which is not often a strong point of these
economies. In addition, renewable energy projects compete against fossil fuel
projects, which have a longer track record, relatively lower up-front costs,
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shorter lead times, and often favorable political treatment. These two fac-
tors combine to make the exploitation of renewable energy resources – which
would seem to be desirable both from an economic and policymaking view-
point – more difficult in less developed economies, an interpretation which
has been confirmed by numerous energy sector practitioners.
Following this line of reasoning, the last chapter presents a multi-sector
endogenous growth model of the expanding-varieties type, which explains
the influence of financial intermediaries on the development of renewable en-
ergy technologies in developing and transition countries. The focus is on the
development of financial intermediaries – and especially the banking sector
and banks’ role as evaluators of potential debtors – as a driving force in the
introduction of renewable energy technologies in these countries. Greater
renewable energy resource development and greater economic growth in the
model come from better financial intermediation and lower information costs
to banks, as well as from lower external financing needs for renewable energy
entrepreneurs. Policies should therefore aim at improving financial sector per-
formance in general and financing conditions for renewable energy firms in
particular, in order to foster the development of a diversified and sustainable
energy sector, and through it also contribute to long-term economic growth.
The main theoretical findings are tested empirically in a series of panel data
regressions for 118 non-OECD countries. The empirical results are fairly
encouraging: they confirm the positive effect of financial sector and, particu-
larly, banking sector development, as well as of power sector reforms, on the
use of renewable energy technologies in developing and transition countries
– especially for the newer technologies such as wind, solar, geothermal and
biomass.
Chapter 1
Did history breed inequality?
Colonial factor endowments and
modern income distribution∗
We explore the relation between historical population density in former colonies
and modern income distribution. A theoretical model highlights the poten-
tially opposing effects of native population density on incentives for colonists
to settle in new territories. While an abundant supply of native labor is an
“asset” that drives up land rents, it is also a “liability” that raises the conflict
costs of acquiring the land. Conflicts for land are especially likely to emerge
for intermediate native population densities. Furthermore, it is shown that
the relative conflict technology of the colonists also influences their coloniza-
tion strategy. Upper and lower population density bounds are derived for
equilibrium outcomes with a landowning e´lite and a relatively poor class of
workers. Results are confirmed by detailed empirical tests highlighting the
curvilinear relationship between native population density and modern in-
come inequality, as well as the importance of military technology. Results
are robust to controlling for geographical and mineral factors. Upon using
∗ This chapter was jointly written with Matthew J. Baker (City University New York)
and Erwin H. Bulte (Wageningen University and University of Tilburg).
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population density as an instrument for inequality in the former colonies, we
demonstrate that there is no causal relationship running from distribution to
economic growth.
1.1 Introduction
One of the classical questions in development economics concerns the nature
of the two-way relationship between income inequality and economic growth
and development. The research tradition dates back to at least the 1950s (e.g.,
Lewis, 1954; Kuznets, 1955; Kaldor, 1956), but is still relevant today (e.g.,
Anand and Kanbur, 1993a,b; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Alesina and Ro-
drik, 1994; Clarke, 1995; Forbes, 2000; Easterly, 2007). One of the key issues
in this literature is whether inequality is a barrier to growth and development.
This could be the case if inequality triggers growth-impeding redistributive
policies, or if it undermines institutional quality (resulting in political insta-
bility) and negatively affects the incentives and ability of a large part of the
population to invest in various forms of capital (e.g., Easterly, 2007). How-
ever, the exact nature of the relation remains a subject of debate, as there is
also evidence suggesting that growth is promoted if income is concentrated in
the hands of an e´lite with a relatively large propensity to invest (see Forbes,
2000 for recent evidence along these lines).
The debate on the relation between inequality and economic performance
naturally leads to another fundamental question regarding the origins of in-
equality itself. Recent research emphasizes that the distribution of income in
countries is not invariant with respect to underlying characteristics of these
countries. In other words, inequality is an endogenous variable and jointly de-
termined along with other macroeconomic variables of interest to economists.1
A plausible case can be made that inequality is closely linked to the insti-
1 For example, Bourguignon and Morrisson (1998) show that income distribution in
recent decades has increasingly depended on the relative labor productivity of the agricul-
tural sector vs. non-agricultural sectors.
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tutional structure of economies. However, this in turn begs an answer on
the origins of institutions. To the extent that institutional structures are
persistent and evolve only slowly in response to contemporary pressures (see
Glaeser et al., 2004; Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2001;
Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2000; and Sokoloff and Engerman, 2002; but
also the discussion below), we would expect inequality to change slowly as
well. If so, it may be possible to trace the roots of current inequality patterns
back to factors dating from much earlier periods in human history.
In this paper we set out to explore the main determinants of inequality
in former colonies. Following seminal work on incentives faced by colonial
settlers several centuries ago (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2002; Sokoloff
and Engerman, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002), we examine the impact
of historical factor endowments on current economic outcomes. However,
whereas earlier work focused on the effects on modern income levels and the
distribution of world income, we focus on the modern distribution of income
within countries. The factor endowment of particular interest to us is native
population density in pre-colonial days. It has been suggested that densely
populated areas were an attractive “prize” for predatory colonists, as they
were relatively prosperous (and therefore offered richer spoils), and because
abundant native labor would prove useful as an input in plantation agricul-
ture, mining, and other activities. This in turn led these areas to be char-
acterized by extractive economic and social structures (e.g. Engerman and
Sokoloff, 1997, 2002; Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2002).
In contrast however, one might also hypothesize that more numerous popu-
lations were most likely quite capable of defending themselves, and therefore
harder to conquer and subdue. If so, the relation between native population
density and historical patterns of colonization and institution-building should
be curvilinear, with limited colonization and subjugation effort at both ex-
tremes of the distribution (i.e. in very thinly and very densely populated
native societies). With institutional persistence, this would eventually affect
contemporary social structures and institutional design, in turn influencing
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modern income distributions within countries.
The main objective of this paper is twofold. First and foremost, we analyze
the relationship between population density in former colonies, incentives for
colonizers, and resulting patterns of inequality. We also test our hypothesis
against some of the other popular explanations on the origins of inequality.
The chain of events that we envisage is a three-step process: (i) the impact of
historical population density on settlement and labor allocation decisions of
colonial settlers; (ii) the impact of historical economic and social structures on
modern-day institutions; and (iii) the subsequent impact on the distribution
of income in modern societies. However, for lack of information on historical
social structures and institutions, we follow Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) and
leave this link implicit in the empirical analysis. Second, we use the results
of the above-mentioned analysis as the starting point for the development of
a novel instrument for income inequality, and use this instrument to analyze
the relation between inequality and income levels and growth. We find no
causal relationship running from inequality to contemporary income levels or
growth in former colonies.
To motivate our analysis, we first demonstrate that the relation between
historical native population density and inequality is best described by an
inverted-U shaped relationship. We link this result to colonization patterns
and – based on historical accounts – argue that this finding can be explained
by the ratio of land to the indigenous population in these countries on the
one hand, and the level of (military) technology attained by the European
colonizers on the other. It is the interaction of these two factors which proved
important for the development paths of former colonies.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2 we briefly summarize
previous research on the colonial origins of economic development and point
out an important paradox in the development pattern of former colonies.
We then explain this by formulating a new hypothesis on the interaction of
population density and technology, and support our view with historical evi-
dence. Section 1.3 provides a formal model that is intended to illustrate the
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main economic mechanisms driving colonization and subsequent social and
economic development paths. In section 1.4 we empirically test our theory
for former colonies, using data on population density around 1500, as well
as the Gini index and the top quintile income share from the recent UNU/
WIDER (2007) dataset as measures of inequality. The empirical results are
consistent with the theory, highlighting the curvilinear relation between na-
tive population density in pre-colonial times and modern inequality patterns.
Moreover, our hypothesis proves robust to controlling for other possible fac-
tors that influenced development in former colonies, such as geography and
mineral abundance. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 A hypothesis of colonization patterns and
inequality
1.2.1 Economic theories and a novel hypothesis
In a series of recent papers, Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff (hence-
forth ES) proposed that the roots of modern-day wealth disparities in former
colonies lie in their factor endowments at the time of colonization. They hy-
pothesized that three factors were crucial for development: the climate and
soil type; the presence of precious metals; and the density of the native pop-
ulation. The structural differences related to initial factor endowments then
tended to persist, “not only because certain fundamental characteristics of
New World economies were difficult to change, but also because government
policies and other institutions tended to reproduce them” (ES 2000: 223).2
2 The idea that institutions persist for a long time can be found already in Wittfogel’s
(1957) analysis of China, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Further evidence supporting
the view that colonial institutions and economic structures in particular have persisted is
provided in Young (1994), La Porta et al. (1999), Coatsworth (1999), Mariscal and Sokoloff
(2000), and North et al. (2000). Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) focus on the persistence
of institutions favoring an e´lite.
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The first factor – which we will term “geography” – determined whether
the colony was suitable for growing high-value crops such as sugarcane and
other plantation-type products. If this was the case, the society which emerged
was generally characterized by a stark class division between the landowning,
white colonist e´lite, and the rest of the population, both native and of African
slave descent. Conversely, if the soil quality lent itself more to the production
of grains and hays, which had only limited economies of scale, a more egali-
tarian social structure typically emerged, based on small landholdings owned
and worked by white settlers.
Mineral abundance – the second factor – greatly influenced the early de-
velopment of Spanish American countries such as Mexico and Peru. The
Spanish authorities awarded large land-grants (encomiendas) to the narrow
European-descent e´lite, often including claims to mines as well as to the na-
tive labor force residing near the estate. The main focus of the conquerors was
the exploitation of the mineral resources – primarily silver and gold – and the
extraction of labor and tribute from the native population; low-value “bulk”
primary products such as meat remained under-exploited until the advent of
cheaper transport in the 19th century (Waites, 1999).3 Again, areas rich in
mineral resources tended to generate economic structures with very unequal
wealth distributions between the owners of the mines and the mine workers.
The third factor, the native population density, influenced all New World
colonies in a similar fashion, and according to ES, its interaction with the
other factors was crucial for determining the development patterns in the
colonies (see also Ferguson, 2002). Sparsely inhabited territories encour-
aged settler-type colonization, based on European-descent immigrant laborers
and small-scale farmers. The result was the emergence of relatively homo-
3 The main natural resources exported from Spanish America to the Old World until the
19th century were precious metals. It is estimated that the Americas – foremost Mexico
and Peru – produced about 102’000 tons of silver from the time of their discovery until
1810, equivalent to 85% of world production. Similarly, the New World also delivered
around 70% of the world’s gold produced during that period (Waites, 1999: 35-36).
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geneous populations with similar wealth and human capital distributions.
Conversely, large native populations provided abundant cheap labor to work
on the colonists’ estates, plantations and mines.4 Consequently, substantial
native populations at the time of colonization are linked to more unequal
societies.
Though not uncontroversial, the historically-founded research of ES has
inspired several recent and interesting empirical studies which have made use
of their hypotheses. And although the focus of ES was on the Americas,
their approach has been extended to encompass all former colonies, or even
the entire world. For example, Easterly (2007) uses the ratio of soil suitability
for growing wheat versus sugarcane as an instrument for inequality. He then
finds that inequality predicts development, measured alternatively by present-
day income levels, schooling rates, and institutional quality. Acemoglu et
al. (2001) use settler mortality as an instrument for institutional quality to
explain modern income levels. They find that areas with a more hospitable
climate and disease environment are linked to higher levels of institutional de-
velopment, and through that to higher present-day income levels. Acemoglu
et al. (2002) use early native urbanization rates and population densities to
explain their hypothesis of a “reversal of fortune”. Because densely populated
areas were more likely to be subjected to extractive institutions by European
colonizers, they ended up with institutional set-ups which were less favorable
to broad investment activities of the type needed to take advantage of the
industrial revolution. Densely populated – and therefore rich – countries at
the time of colonization consequently have lower income levels today, and vice
versa.
4 An interesting case of how the conquerors used the more numerous native population
to their own advantage is given by the (forced) relocation of Tlascaltecan families into
northern Mexico starting in 1580. The Tlascaltecans – Spanish allies since the days of
Corte´s – were intended to protect the sparse white settlers against the “rude tribes” along
the borders; in return for this “service”, they benefited from certain privileges such as the
exemption from tribute (Bolton and Marshall, 1920: 59).
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Figure 1.1: Population density in 1500 and modern inequality
Notes: Scatter plot of (log) population density in 1500 and inequality measured by Gini index. Figure
1.1(a) above shows results listed by country, Figure 1.1(b) below by year of colonization.
Previous studies have assumed that the relationship between economic
and institutional development and early factor endowments is pretty much
linear, not only for the New World colonies examined by ES, but also for
colonies (and even non-colonies) elsewhere. However, this assumption turns
out to be false for one fundamental factor, namely native population density
at the time of colonization. Figure 1.1 plots the influence of population den-
sity in 1500 ca. (in logs) on modern inequality, measured by the Gini index
around 1960, for all former colonies.5 Clearly, the relationship is not lin-
5 Scatter plots using the top quintile income share as the measure of inequality show the
same pattern. Note that here as in the rest of the paper, we do not include those countries
which were colonized for a brief period in the 20th century when colonial empires were
already on the wane, such as Libya (a colony from 1911-1947) and Ethiopia (1936-1941).
The data is discussed in more detail in Section 1.4.
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ear, but rather roughly follows an inverted-U shape. It also appears from the
years of colonization in Figure 1.1(b) that the change in colonization pattern –
where population density is linked to the maximum observed inequality levels
– occurred around the turn of the 18th century.6 What determined this fun-
damental change in colonization patterns, which appears to have influenced
economic development to this day?
We develop and test the hypothesis that European colonization, and the
subsequent distribution of wealth in the colonies which has persisted until
modern times, is attributable to the ratio of land to native inhabitants which
the early colonizers were confronted with, and to the (military) technology
of which they disposed. To state it simply: the colonizers traded off a higher
native population, with the possibility of cheap labor it entailed, against the
cost of military conflict and subjugation of said population. We hypothesize
that (i) very low native population densities tended to lead to settler-type
colonization, with more egalitarian social and political structures and hence
more equal wealth distributions (as in ES); at the other end of the spectrum,
(ii) very high native population densities tended to lead to the adaptation
of existing social and institutional structures by the colonizers, as forced
change would have been too costly. A narrow (white) e´lite controlled the
administrative center previously held by the native ruling class, leaving the
rest of the social and institutional structure largely unaltered. Depending on
existing conditions, this could often imply a relatively more equal distribution
of wealth. In between lie those colonies where (iii) native population density
was low enough to permit conquest and control by force, and yet high enough
to make cheap native labor an attractive option, creating unequal societies
with a large income gap between the colonizing e´lite and the rest of the
6 Two countries – South Africa and Indonesia – are listed with the dates of the official
founding of the first permanent trading post in the early 17th century. In fact, though it
is difficult to assign an exact date to the moment where most of the present-day area was
conquered, the inland territorial expansion remained circumscribed until the 18th century.
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population.7
1.2.2 Historical background
Most former colonies – with the notable exception of Australia and New
Zealand, whose discovery in the late 18th century can indeed be regarded
as more coincidental – were already familiar to Europeans by the end of the
17th century, either through first-hand discovery or second-hand information.
They had known the countries along the North African coast of the Mediter-
ranean for centuries, and they had heard of the sub-Saharan African civiliza-
tions and of the far-off Asian countries from exchanges with merchants and
adventurers. Portuguese traders began exploring the African coast southward
from the 15th century onwards. Vasco da Gama and Albuquerque rounded
the Cape of Good Hope, sailed up the East African coast and and reached
as far as India and Malacca at the turn of the 16th century, plundering port
towns and setting up new trading posts along the way. During the same pe-
riod, Columbus, Corte´s and Pizarro conquered (most of) the Americas; and
soon afterwards, the Spaniards established the westward route from Central
America to their new Pacific colony of the Philippines. It would be difficult
to contend that there was nothing to tempt conquerors into Africa or Asia,
given the presence of precious metals and other coveted natural resources
such as spices. Yet the vast territorial conquests in the New World during
the 15th and 16th centuries were not echoed by similar advances in Africa and
Asia: there was to be no more major territorial conquest until well into the
18th century (not counting the small and sparsely populated island colonies
of Mauritius and the Seychelles, taken over by the French in the first half of
the 18th century).
7 Our hypothesis not only helps to explain the colonization pattern of those countries
that were ultimately conquered, but may also shed light on why some countries defied
colonization, most notably the densely populated and technologically advanced China and
Japan. As military conquest failed repeatedly, European powers were limited to competing
for their commercial positions in these countries.
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In their early conquests, the Europeans’ military technology had brought
them a definite advantage over the native populations, which not only lacked
firearms, but also had few defensible bases to fall back on. However, the
relatively easy victories over the great civilizations of the Aztecs and the
Incas in the Americas, and a few decades later over the Filippinos, could not
readily be repeated in other parts of the world, where the obstacles facing
the small groups of Europeans were more formidable (see e.g., Guilmartin,
1995; Parker, 1996). European conquest in Africa was halted by heavy native
resistance and the hostile disease environment, evidenced for example during
the failed Portuguese attempt to establish a colony in Luanda in the 1570s
(Waites, 1999) or their abortive expedition up the Zambesi river in the 1690s
(Black, 1995; Keim, 1995). In Asia, the Europeans found themselves facing
opponents at roughly equal technological levels. Their main early advantage
lay in the gunned sailing ship, which enabled them to terrorize coastal towns;8
however, this technology was soon imitated and put to effective use, as the
naval battles off the Malabar Coast in 1503, off Tunmen on the Chinese coast
in 1522, and in the sultanate of Aceh demonstrate (Guilmartin, 1995; Parker,
1996; Waites, 1999). Moreover, the early warships carried too few troops to
successfully launch amphibious attacks on the relatively heavily populated
interior (Cable, 1998; Waites, 1999).
In short, in both Africa and Asia – with the exception of the Philippines –
native opposition limited European territorial expansion to the occupation of
coastal forts and sometimes the immediate hinterland.9 Where forceful con-
quest proved too costly to accomplish, Europeans engaged in more peaceful
activities, either farming in order to replenish the supplies of the merchant
8 For more on the historical importance and the advances in early naval warfare, see
Glete (2005).
9 Several European powers had managed to establish footholds in Africa and Asia by the
end of the 17th century. For example, the Dutch controlled Batavia (present-day Jakarta)
and the small Cape Colony, as well as some coastal enclaves on Ceylon (Sri Lanka). The
Portuguese were present in several port towns along the West African Coast and in Timor;
and the British had made advances in some coastal areas of the Indian subcontinent.
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vessels (as in the Cape Colony), or specializing in trade – mainly in gold
and slaves in West Africa, and in spices and textiles in Asia. They “un-
dertook military expenditure either to coerce reluctant buyers or in order
to safeguard themselves against attack from their European rivals; the cost
of defence would otherwise have eaten up all their trading profits” (Parker,
1996: 132).10
From the mid-18th century however, the Europeans were able to rapidly
extend their colonial dominion inland into hitherto impregnable regions, start-
ing with major advances in the Indian subcontinent and Indochina (see e.g.,
Parker, 1996) and culminating in the “scramble for Africa”.11 This shift in
the balance of power between “the West and the rest” coincides with the com-
pletion of a remarkable series of technological innovations in Europe, which
historians have called the “military revolution”. The term, originally coined
by Michael Roberts in 1955, encompasses the introduction of three key in-
novations between 1560-1660:12 the capital ship with its broadside guns and
10 This is the period of the rise of the great European Trading Companies, foremost the
Dutch and British East India Companies. Although territorial conquest was not among
their chief objectives, it gradually came as a consequence of efforts to preserve their trading
positions (Waites, 1999). Where there was organized resistance, “the conqueror [negoti-
ated] with it in order to break it all the better later” when the opportunity arose, most
commonly by seeking allies among the opponent’s rivals (Ferro, 1997: 32; for more on the
importance of native collaboration for imperialism, see Robinson, 1972). This strategy
proved effective for the British in India, the Dutch in Indonesia, and later the French in
the Maghreb.
11 This paper does not aim at exploring the reasons behind the scramble for Africa in
the 19th century; for more on this subject, see e.g. Louis (1976) and Fo¨rster et al. (1988).
We simply contend that population density and European technology played a role in
determining colonization patterns and economic development paths in former colonies.
12 Roberts proposed the term “military revolution” during his inaugural lecture in Belfast
in 1955. His speech has been published and revised several times, most recently in Roberts
(1995). The concept and timing of the military revolution is not without controversy; but
most historians agree on the main innovations, and the fact that they had been adopted
throughout Europe by the end of the 17th century. For more on the debate, refer to Lynn
(1991), Rogers (1995), and Parker (1996).
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greater sea-endurance; the development of gunpowder weapons “as the ar-
biter of battles and sieges”; and in response to the latter, the development
of the artillery fortress or trace italienne (Parker, 1996: 159).13 These inno-
vations enabled the Europeans to overthrow – and maintain – many of those
densely populated and relatively advanced areas which had previously defied
conquest. A good example is given by India: the early colonial strategy of
the British (at the time represented by the British East India Company) was
to concentrate their trade efforts in relatively small and weak areas with few
European competitors, such as Golconda, the Carnatic, and parts of Bengal.
But by the end of the 18th century, with the help of native sepoy armies
trained by Europeans and armed with European-made weapons, the British
were able to successfully challenge the smaller independent states, as well as
their French rivals on the subcontinent. From the rest of Bengal, they moved
on to Bihar and Orissa, before their progress was halted by the Marathas,
who had in the meantime adopted European military techniques. The whole
of the Indian subcontinent was finally conquered in the 19th century (see e.g.,
Parker, 1996; Waites, 1999).
Hence, population density and technology notably influenced European
colonization patterns. Following pioneering work by ES and Acemoglu and
co-authors, we aim to complete the picture by drawing the link to the social
and economic structures which emerged, and explain the inverse-U shaped
relationship with inequality. As regards the colonies conquered before the
18th century, the Americas as well as the Philippines, our hypothesis closely
follows that of ES, without further need for historical evidence. Areas with
low native population densities were relatively easily conquered; they encour-
aged settler-type colonization and tended to produce egalitarian societies.
More substantial native populations were aggressively subdued, and previ-
13 Gunpowder weapons already came into use in the 14th century; but early firearms
such as the arquebus were notoriously inaccurate and difficult to handle, and it wasn’t until
the 16th century that they gradually became more effective on land and on board ships,
and as small firearms (Parker, 1996).
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ous systems of labor and tribute were partly borrowed and adapted to create
highly unequal “plunder economies”. Where native death rates were particu-
larly high due to disease, enslavement, or hunger, African slaves and mestizos
provided the cheap labor force necessary to work the plantations and mines.
By the end of the 17th century, the colonizers seem to have reached the
limits of the native population size which they could overthrow and extract
cheap labor from by force. But as the Europeans’ technological level in-
creased, some new territories followed the pattern of the more densely pop-
ulated Latin American colonies. For example, the early population densities
and present-day inequality levels in Southern Africa are comparable to the
more populous NewWorld colonies such as Guyana, Cuba and Panama. How-
ever, native resistance to the early European colonists was decisive enough to
delay full conquest of the southernmost part of Africa until the 18th century.
But once imposed, colonial rule gave rise to similar development paths as
those seen in densely populated American countries: white settler colonists
competed for land, labor and influence with the native Africans. Typically,
strict racial restrictions in all economic and social areas emerged, with a
small number of white landowners and capitalists forming the privileged e´lite
(Gellar, 1995).14
However, though central institutions may have been relatively easy to
capture thanks to their technological superiority, imposing colonial author-
ity in vast new territories with large native populations proved much more
difficult. Many of the more densely populated areas of Africa and Asia not
only had advanced technology levels which enabled them to put off colonial
conquest, but also economic and social systems comparable with those of
European countries (e.g., Parker 1996; Waites 1999). As the Europeans con-
quered more and more populous areas, their strategy leaned towards adapting
14 These differences persisted and were even reinforced in the early 20th century with
the Land Acts in South Africa and Rhodesia that restricted ownership of the best land to
whites and sought to relegate the remaining African farmers into poorly paid dependent
labor (Waites, 1999).
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the native social and economic structure without imposing profound changes,
leaving these colonies with relatively egalitarian income distribution patterns.
There were simply too few colonists and auxiliaries for true armies of occu-
pation, and too little money for effective policy implementation throughout
the colonial societies.15 In sum, the essential feature of European colonial
rule in Africa and Asia is the conservation of the traditional social and also
economic institutions, “while the administrative apex was monopolized by a
white e´lite” (Waites, 1999: 147).
15 In Africa, relatively populous Nigeria was not conquered until the 1880s, and admin-
istration and taxation in the colony once conquered were only possible with the support
of the Muslim Fulani aristocracy. But in order to gain this, the British colonialists (who
had allegedly espoused the humanitarian and abolitionist causes in the late 18th century)
had to reach a compromise with the slave-owning Fulani, which meant that the traditional
slave society was only phased out by the 1930s (Waites, 1999). Most of the Nigerian pop-
ulation was left out of the colonial economic system, which essentially precluded economic
development (Gellar, 1995); these early differences seem to be reflected in modern income
inequality levels, with a relatively high Gini index of 51. Uganda is an interesting exam-
ple of a very densely populated colony with present-day inequality levels comparable to
those of Canada and Australia. Slave raids had been frequent in this region, and Euro-
pean protection in the 19th century was welcomed (Waites, 1999). Rural farmers were
not displaced by colonial policies, and even enjoyed some increased economic opportunities
producing cash crops such as cocoa and coffee for European export. The colonial impact on
the social and economic structure in Uganda was limited to the central administration by
a small group of white colonists (Gellar, 1995). India had early native population densities
at the upper bounds of all former colonies (25.81 per square km on average); yet its mod-
ern income inequality level is close to that of the U.S. and Uruguay (35.56 vs. 36.02 and
36.61, respectively). The British secured authority over the Indian subcontinent by a mix
of aggression and collaboration with the traditional e´lites. When the British Government
officially took over the rule of the colony from the East India Company in 1774, it adapted
to and even reinforced the traditional social system. Above all in the countryside where
most Indians lived (and continue to live), change was hardly evident and modernization
practically wholly absent. The colonial rulers “chose security over development” as they
lacked the power resources to effectively transform and develop the entire society (Waites,
1999: 184).
28 DID HISTORY BREED INEQUALITY?
1.3 The model
In this section we build a formal model that brings out some of the main ideas
that will be tested empirically below. Following earlier suggestions by ES and
Acemoglu and co-authors, a key role is played by the population density of
the native population. However, extending earlier work, we not only view
natives as a production factor or an input in colonist-dominated production
processes. We also recognize that more densely populated areas are probably
better able to defend themselves.
1.3.1 Setting up the model
We set out to derive the equilibrium state of an economy in which “natives”
and “colonists” (also called “settlers” in what follows) combine land and labor
to produce an output, and in which colonists divide their time endowment be-
tween two activities: producing, and contesting land resources (i.e. engaging
in conflict to fight for, and ultimately control, part of the land resource base).
To facilitate the analysis, we assume that there exists a set of markets for
land and labor, so that factor endowments determine relative factor prices.
Colonists can either purchase or rent land on the market, or alternatively
engage in conflict in an effort to “grab and control” it by force. We assume
colonists use a different type of technology than natives do, possibly because
they have imported certain novel skills and management ideas (e.g., European
agricultural technologies, as well as new crops – both for subsistence and ex-
port – and livestock). Specifically, we assume that colonists produce using a
constant returns to scale technology x = scA
α
cL
1−α
c , where sc is total factor
productivity, L is labor, and A is total land in the “colony”. The assumption
of constant returns implies we do not need to keep track of land and labor
use on each colonial farm or plantation, and don’t need to distinguish total
aggregates from individual amounts. Natives, by contrast, produce using the
diminishing returns technology x = sna
αlβ, where β < 1 − α. One interpre-
tation is that each native runs his own farm (or that monitoring effort in
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larger-scale native production structures is imperfect).
Denote the number of colonists by nc, which will be endogenized below,
and the number of natives by nn, which will be a parameter throughout. We
assume that initially the natives control the entire land base. We can solve
for the amount of labor and land used in the colonist and native sectors in
equilibrium. Maximization of profits is subject to the constraint that demand
equals supply across all markets, as well as the resource balance conditions
for labor and land (L = Lc + nnln and A = Ac + nnan). The labor used on
each native farm and in the colonist sector is then given by:
l∗n =
(
sn
sc
) 1
1−α−β
(
β
1− α
) 1−α
1−α−β
, (1.1)
and
L∗c = L− nn
(
sn
sc
) 1
1−α−β
(
β
1− α
) 1−α
1−α−β
. (1.2)
Similarly, land use is described by:
a∗n =
A(1− α)
(1− α− β)nn +
βL
( sisc )
1
1−α−β ( β1−α)
1−α
1−α−β
, (1.3)
and
A∗c =
βA
[
L− nn
(
si
sc
) 1
1−α−β ( β
1−α
) 1−α
1−α−β
]
(1− α− β)nn
(
si
sc
) 1
1−α−β ( β
1−α
) 1−α
1−α−β + βL
. (1.4)
We can solve for the marginal product of land and labor by solving for the
equilibrium rental and wage rates at the above allocations. This yields the
following expression for the rental price of land:
r∗ = αsc

(1− α− β)nn
(
si
sc
) 1
1−α−β ( β
1−α
) 1−α
1−α−β + βL
βA


1−α
. (1.5)
Solving for the rental price of labor (the equilibrium wage rate) yields:
w∗ = (1− α)sc

 βA
(1− α− β)nn
(
si
sc
) 1
1−α−β ( β
1−α
) 1−α
1−α−β + βL


α
. (1.6)
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For simplicity, each of these can be rewritten as follows:
r∗ = αsc
(
nnΨ+ βL
βA
)1−α
, (1.7)
and
w∗ = (1− α)sc
(
βA
nnΨ+ βL
)α
, (1.8)
where Ψ is a combination of production parameters. These expressions in-
form colonists about the return to production, which in turn is relevant when
deciding whether to invest their effort in working, or alternatively in grabbing
part of the land (i.e. engage in conflict). The solution to the colonist’s prob-
lem involves comparing the returns to the two activities, where the returns to
grabbing are determined by the value of land (equilibrium rental rate) mul-
tiplied by some factor describing how easy it is to seize land, and the returns
to working as derived above.
Suppose that the colonists are split between npc colonists who choose just
to work, and nrc who allocate their effort to fighting. In what follows, we
consider a decentralized scenario where individual colonists decide about the
optimal allocation of their time, but a qualitatively similar story can be read-
ily developed based on a planning model with a central colonial authority
deciding about what colonists should do with their time.
To describe the land contest process, we employ a standard conflict spec-
ification in the spirit of pioneering work by Grossman and Kim (1995) and
Hirschleifer (1995):
Yc =
φnrc
φnrc + nn
A, (1.9)
where Yc is the total land base grabbed by colonists, and φ is a variable mea-
suring the (relative) offensive strength of the colonists. From equation 1.9 it
is clear that the share of land that colonists wrest from natives depends upon
the relative population numbers and upon some technological advantage. In
fact, however, the technological advantage may be more pro-colonist if the
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native population is very sparsely distributed, so population density itself
matters. Following Baker (2003), this might be captured as:
Yc =
φ
(
A
nn
)
nrc
φ
(
A
nn
)
nrc + nn
A. (1.10)
Assume that the function φ is decreasing in its only argument, but could
possibly “shift” due to technical change in conflict techniques – an issue to
which we return later. If there are larger amounts of natives per unit of land,
it becomes, other things equal, harder to conquer native land. The amount
of land captured by any individual colonist is simply Yc/n
r
c, or:
yc =
φ
(
A
nn
)
φ
(
A
nn
)
nrc + nn
A. (1.11)
1.3.2 Solving the model: equilibrium inflows of colonists
Next we characterize the outcome of the colonial process. First, we turn to the
inflow of colonists – how many people will choose to leave their country of ori-
gin and settle elsewhere? Ignoring transaction costs, we postulate that these
decisions are based on a comparison of income levels at home and abroad.
Assume potential colonists can earn a reservation wage R in their country of
origin (or earn R engaging in peaceful trade e.g. with colonies). If potential
colonists only migrate to start a new life elsewhere when the expected re-
turns to such a move are at least R, then one out of four alternative types of
equilibria will emerge. (1) R = ycr
∗ = w∗, or an interior solution with some
colonizers engaging in conflict and others in production; (2) R = ycr
∗ > w∗,
or a corner solution with some colonists engaged in conflict, but where it
is not in the interest of settlers to become workers; (3) R = w∗ > gy∗c , or
a corner solution where some colonists become workers, but where colonists
will not engage in violent conflict; and finally (4) R > w∗ and R > ycr
∗, or a
corner outcome where colonizers leave the new land undisturbed as they are
better off at home.
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To analyze the model in more detail, we first consider interior equilibrium
(1). If such an interior solution exists, colonists must be indifferent between
fighting and working:
ycr
∗ = w∗(= R) (1.12)
The number of colonist workers in equilibrium is uniquely defined, and may
be obtained by equating the wage to the reservation wage:
(1− α)sc
(
βA
nnΨ+ βL
)α
= R (1.13)
It follows immediately that the number of colonist workers is given by:
npc =
A(
R
(1−α)sc
) 1
α
− nn
(
1 +
Ψ
β
)
, (1.14)
so that
∂npc
∂nn
= −
(
1 +
Ψ
β
)
< 0 (1.15)
Hence, perhaps not surprisingly, we find that for an interior solution there is
a negative relationship between the number of natives and colonist workers.
The reason is simply that increasing the number of natives depresses the
wage rate, so that restoring equilibrium (where w∗ = R ) requires that some
colonists leave the colony.
Next, consider the number of colonial settlers who choose to engage in
conflict and contest the land base. Again, in equilibrium colonists must be
indifferent between fighting and earning the reservation wage at home:
αsc
(
nnΨ+ βL
βA
)1−α φ( A
nn
)
nrc
φ
(
A
nn
)
nrc + nn
A = R. (1.16)
In the case in which the φ function is constant, equation 1.16 describes a
linear relationship between the number of colonists and the number of natives.
However, it is likely that population densities matter in conflict, and one
simple specification that captures this element is as follows (see Baker, 2003):
φ
(
A
nn
)
= φ0
(
A
nn
)
. (1.17)
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Solving for the number of contesting colonists, we arrive at a quadratic re-
lationship between the number of violent colonists and native population
density:
nrc =
(
nnΨ+ β(n
p
c + nn)
βA
)1−α
Aαsc
R
−
1
φ0A
n2n. (1.18)
Hence, unlike the monotonous relation between colonist workers and native
population density, we now find that the number of colonists pursuing the
strategy of fighting to control land (and live off the rents) is a quadratic
function of native population density.16 The intuition is as follows. At low
native population densities land is “cheap” (i.e rental payments for land are
low) and wages are high. Colonists do better producing then, and conflict over
land hardly occurs. In contrast, when the native population density is high,
contesting land is expensive, as the physical return per unit of conflict effort
is small – for any reasonable specification of conflict the returns to fighting go
down as the opposite force gains strength (and this of course also applies to
our contest function in equations 1.9 and 1.10). Since wages are also low then,
the returns to working and contesting are both low, and only few potential
colonists actually migrate to the colony (with the majority staying at home
and earning R). At intermediate population densities, however, contesting
land is feasible in the sense that per unit of conflict effort an intermediately-
sized stretch of land can be controlled. Moreover, the value of land is rather
high, as this production factor can now be combined with sufficient amounts of
work labor. Under these conditions, a maximum number of colonists engages
in conflict.
Note that the settlement of “aggressive” colonists peaks at an intermedi-
ate native population density n∗n (which is readily found by setting the first
16 We also find a quadratic relation between the number of colonists engaged in conflict
and natives when we take the number of colonists as fixed (so that in equilibrium we only
require that w∗ = ycr
∗ and not that the return to these activities equals R). Details are
available from the authors on request.
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derivative of equation 1.18 with respect to nn equal to zero). It is imme-
diately apparent that the top of the parabola is a function of the conflict
efficiency parameter φ0, and more specifically that ∂n
∗
n/∂φ0 > 0. That is,
as colonial military technology improves, colonists are better able to take on
formidable opposition, and the “turning point” shifts to reflect that. For suffi-
ciently efficient military technologies, equation 1.18 becomes a monotonously
upward-sloping curve, reflecting both that land becomes more valuable as na-
tive population densities go up, and also that grabbing and controlling land
is still relatively easy for colonists, in spite of the numerous native opposition
(that is: as long as the technological advance persists and is not eroded by
copying, exchange, etc.).
In light of these results, it is relatively straightforward to interpret the cor-
ner solutions. There is a critical population density above which wages are
so low that returns for (colonist) workers fall below R. Denote this threshold
population density as n¯pn. For nn > n¯
p
n, colonists prefer to not settle as work-
ers. Similarly, there are critical lower and upper bounds on native population
density below and above which colonists prefer not to enter and engage in
conflict. Denote these thresholds by nˆrn1 and nˆ
r
n2, respectively. For nn < nˆ
r
n1,
conflicts over land do not materialize because land is too cheap to warrant
the effort. In contrast, for nn > nˆ
r
n2 opposition is too fierce (so that physical
returns to conflict effort are too low).
1.3.3 Linking conflict to inequality
The final challenge from a modeling perspective is to analyze how the inflow
of colonists and the allocation of their labor is related to the distribution
of income in colonial times. For this purpose, we consider the equilibrium
allocation of colonists and their effort over a wide range of native population
densities. Depending on the density, relative to the various threshold densities
defined above, “colonies” can end up in an interior solution with colonists as
both workers and landowners, or in a corner where one of these activities
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does not occur for lack of profitability. Depending on parameters, one of the
following three cases describes the series of equilibrium outcomes as native
density is increased from zero to nmax (where it is assumed that nmax > nˆ
r
n2).
Of course it is also possible that some of the threshold values “disappear” for
certain combinations of parameters.17
Consider case A, depicted in Figure 1.2. It describes four qualitatively dif-
ferent equilibrium outcomes along a range of native population densities: (i)
for sufficiently low population densities, an equilibrium emerges with colonist
workers entering, but where there is no violent conflict over land as it is
plentiful and inexpensive; (ii) for somewhat higher densities the returns to
(colonist) labor fall below R, and colonist workers prefer to exit (since there
is still no conflict this implies an outcome where the “colony” is left to its
own devices); (iii) for intermediate population densities we have an outcome
where colonists enter to grab the land and live off the rents; and finally (iv)
for high population densities neither workers nor fighters will settle, as the
return to both activities is smaller than R (although of course trade might
still occur).
The one thing to note is that for intermediate population densities, there
are equilibrium outcomes where colonists are richer than natives. Colonists
earn R in equilibrium, living off the rents of the land they conquered, but
competition on the labor market implies wages are lower than that (so that
colonists would not deign to work themselves at those rates). In Figure 1.2,
the case is highlighted with a “thick” arrow. Hence, even if we stack the
deck against inequality by assuming equal productivity of colonist and native
17 To be more precise, this happens when (i) n¯p
n
< 0 so that colonists never choose
to work as producers, since production technologies are so bad that even for the lowest
native population densities, the return to labor falls short of R; (ii) nˆr
n1
< 0, so that land
is sufficiently valuable for colonists to trigger contests even in the absence of natives; or
finally (iii) whenever nˆr
n2 < 0, so that land is of so little value that it is never contested by
any colonist. For cases (i) and (ii) we may find that, in equilibrium, natives and colonists
do not earn the same income. This occurs whenever nn > n¯
p
n
and nˆr
n1 < nn < nˆ
r
n2, as
discussed in more detail in the main text below.
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Figure 1.2: Equilibrium allocation of colonists and their effort for a range of
native population densities
workers as wage laborers, and assuming free entry by colonists that drives
down colonial income rents, we may still find that income inequality is an
equilibrium outcome. This occurs whenever nn > n¯
p
n and nˆ
r
n1 < nn < nˆ
r
n2.
The same outcome appears in case B (and also in the degenerate cases where
some of the threshold densities disappear). However, Figure 1.2 also indi-
cates that inequality is not inevitable. For some parameter combinations,
the sequence of threshold values is such that the conditions nn > n¯
p
n and
nˆrn1 < nn < nˆ
r
n2 cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Then, every individual in
the colony earns the same income. However, this case requires that colonists
be unable to grab land by force (as the opposition is too intense), but that si-
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multaneously it is feasible to enter as a migrant worker and earn a sufficiently
high income. History does not provide many examples of such conditions.
The simple model therefore generates a number of testable implications.
Our results with respect to colonial conflict intensity (section 1.3.3) as well
as income patterns (section 1.3.2) both suggest a curvilinear relationship
when regressing historical inequality measures on historical population den-
sity. Historical inequality should “top” at intermediate densities. Moreover,
the relationship will also be influenced by the interaction with the colonists’
level of offensive technology, with higher technology levels implying the ability
to subdue more densely populated areas. Unfortunately, historical inequal-
ity data are not available to directly evaluate this proposition. Instead, we
follow the social conflict view of institutional development, which predicts
that equilibrium outcomes where a privileged class of landowners is better
off than workers provides strong incentives for the e´lite to defend its position
(through a range of political and economic mechanisms). If so, the relation
between historical population density and inequality should carry over until
today, linking modern income distributions to historical population densities
in a non-linear fashion. This will be tested in the next section.
1.4 Empirical analysis
1.4.1 Data and descriptive statistics
Our main data requirements regard the measure of inequality – our depen-
dent variable – and historical native population density in former colonies, our
main explanatory variable. A frequent point of debate involving past studies
on inequality has been the poor quality of the data. Deininger and Squire
(1996, 1998) attempted to address these quality issues and proposed a new
dataset, which was updated in 1997. Following Atkinson and Brandolini’s
(2001) criticism (based on observations for OECD countries from an alterna-
tive income survey) of the heterogeneous methodologies used to gather the
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics of main variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Gini index 83 47.421 9.168 28.3 64.9
Top quintile income share 69 52.074 7.966 32.8 68.1
Average population density
per square km around 1500 83 5.275 12.276 0 100.46
Wheat-sugar ratio (in logs) 70 −0.011 0.143 −0.393 0.578
Latitude 83 0.178 0.12 0.011 9.667
Percent of land area in tropics 76 0.777 0.378 0 1
Distance from nearest coastline
or navigable river in km 76 344.125 358.182 7.952 1466.67
data presented by Deininger and Squire, the UN’s World Institute for Devel-
opment Economics Research (WIDER) produced a new inequality database,
drawing on data from both these previous datasets. The recently updated
version (UNU/WIDER, 2007) offers some further improvements regarding
cross-country comparability and country coverage, including exclusive recent
updates to the Deininger and Squire dataset, and more extended information
on the survey methodologies and quality and reliability of the data. We use
two measures of income inequality from this WIDER database, namely the
Gini index (as calculated by WIDER according to a new and more accurate
method) and the top quintile income share (in percent).
For each country, the earliest possible observation – to avoid capturing
more recent economic trends (e.g., related to globalization) – of the highest
possible quality was chosen that reflected the following fundamental criteria:
(i) the income survey covered the entire population; (ii) the basic statistical
unit was the household; and (iii) the survey was based on (disposable) income.
As our sample of former colonies consists mostly of developing countries,
some exceptions had to be made to avoid drastically reducing the number of
observations: in one case, the income survey was based on family instead of
household units; and for eight countries, the basic statistical unit was listed as
uncertain (although the surveys were not generally of bad quality otherwise).
Furthermore, for 18 countries there was only consumption or expenditure-
based inequality data available.
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The reliability of the observations is a further important point. WIDER
distinguishes four quality categories according to whether the concepts un-
derlying the survey are known and accepted, and according to the overall
quality of the survey. Observations where both quality and concepts are
unproblematic receive a rating of “1”; these include entries for virtually all
high-income countries, and some more recent survey data for other countries.
At the other extreme, observations to be treated as mere “memorandum”
entries are classified as quality “4”. We were generally able to avoid using
worst-quality data on the Gini index, favoring more recent entries for the sake
of reliability. However, this was often not the case for observations on top
quintile shares, as they are less readily available; these data should therefore
be treated with care. The trade-off between data quality and earliest-possible
observation for each country resulted in 30% of the entries stemming from
income surveys made after 1990, while the rest come mainly from the 1960s
and 1970s, with some countries offering reliable inequality data for as early
as the 1950s.18 Descriptive statistics for the two inequality measures are pre-
sented in rows 1-2 of Table 1.1. Both show a wide gap between the least and
most unequal country, New Zealand having the lowest inequality according
to both measures, and the Central African Republic (CAR) and Colombia
the highest according to the Gini index and the top quintile income share,
respectively. As a comparison, the world mean Gini index and top quintile
share are slightly lower than the ones for the colonies sample, at 42.647 and
48.926, respectively. However, the most unequal countries remain the CAR
and Colombia in the global sample.
Our data on early population densities is taken from McEvedy and Jones
(1978) and compiled according to the procedure in Acemoglu et al. (2002).
We divide the estimated total population in 1500 by the country’s total land
18 All estimations were also perfomed with the Deininger and Squire (1996, 1998) dataset,
as well as period average inequality data, with very similar results, confirming that the
observed population density-inequality relationship is not due merely to the chosen dataset
(results available upon request).
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area in 1995 (in km2, from WDI). In addition, we adjust the estimates for
the percentage of arable land area where applicable (this becomes relevant
for example in the desert countries of the Sahara), again using the informa-
tion on the relative amount of arable land area contained in McEvedy and
Jones (1978). For the most part, our data are analogous to those provided
by Acemoglu et al. (2002), with some minor discrepancies due to approxi-
mation differences, as well as additional observations on non-colonies for our
comparison estimations.19 In both samples, the Seychelles were uninhabited
before French colonization, while Egypt had by far the highest population
density in 1500 of all former colonies, with over 100 inhabitants per square
km on average (row 3 of Table 1.1).20 Estimates on population numbers five
hundred years ago are close approximations of the truth at best, which likely
introduces a bias towards zero into our empirical results. In order at least to
minimize the influence of outliers while at the same time preserving our full
sample size, we perform all estimations below using log (population density
in 1500 +1).
We use four different variables to test the “competing” geography hy-
pothesis of the origins of inequality proposed by ES and others, which holds
that certain geophysical factors – e.g. a temperate climate, soils suitable to
19 In a few cases, our data diverts from that of Acemoglu et al. (2002). Following the
original information in McEvedy and Jones (1978), we assume that all Caribbean islands
have the same population density of 1.33 (instead of 0.27 for Cuba and 1.46 for others as
in Acemoglu et al. (2002)), with the exception of more populous Jamaica, which has a
population density of 4.26 in both datasets. We also use the regional population estimates
given by McEvedy and Jones (1978) for Malaysia and Singapore to calculate an average
population density of 1.21, whereas Acemoglu et al. (2002) assume that Singapore had
the same (very low) population density as the United States, namely 0.09. Similarly, our
estimate of 9.16 for Hong Kong is based on the notes in McEvedy and Jones (1978), while
Acemoglu et al. (2002) again assumed that Hong Kong had the same population density
as the United States, even though mainland China in fact had a high average density of
10.72. Robustness tests show that our results are not influenced by the differences.
20 Egypt was by no means the world’s most populous country in 1500: Japan had nearly
triple its population density, at an average 287.53 inhabitants per square km.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 41
growing staples such as grains, and proximity to the coast – have favored the
emergence of more prosperous, egalitarian societies. The first variable which
captures one of these geographical aspects, lwheatsugar, leans directly on the
hypothesis of ES: it measures the soil suitability for growing wheat versus
sugarcane, expressed as the (log) ratio of the share of arable land suitable
for growing wheat to the share suitable for sugarcane, from Easterly (2007).
A lower ratio indicates a propensity to grow a high-yield, plantation-style
crop, with the ensuing emergence of a more unequal society, and vice versa.
Jamaica shows the greatest soil suitability for growing sugarcane, followed
by Guatemala, the Philippines and the Dominican Republic. Next, latitude
is defined as the absolute distance from the Equator and is taken from La
Porta et al. (1999). A greater distance from the Equator is linked to more
temperate climates, and to more highly developed countries with less unequal
income distributions. A similar concept lies behind the variable tropics, which
indicates a country’s land area in the geographical tropics in percent, while
distcr measures the mean distance to the nearest coastline or sea-navigable
river in km, according to the reasoning that coastal countries tend to be more
prosperous due to trade. Both of these last variables are from the Gallup,
Mellinger and Sachs geography database (available via the Center for Inter-
national Development website).
As data on early reserves or production of minerals for a large number
of countries are virtually impossible to come by, we constructed a dummy
variable (precious) to capture the possible influence of precious metals on
inequality suggested by ES. Countries are assigned value “1” if there was
a known presence of gold or silver (or both) in the 16th century, and zero
otherwise. Several historical studies served as the basis for this classification,
including Del Mar (1902) and the contributions edited by Kellenbenz (1981).
29 former colonies from all three regions – the Americas, Africa, and Asia –
are reported to have had substantial precious metal deposits at the time.
Finally, we took into account the colonizers’ level of (military) technology
by constructing a dummy variable for a country colonized with “early” mil-
42 DID HISTORY BREED INEQUALITY?
itary technology, based on information on the year of colonization from the
CIA World Factbook and the U.S. Department of State. We chose a generous
cut-off date of 1700 in order to avoid biasing the empirical results in our favor;
as described in Section 2, historians in fact most commonly date the period of
the military revolution between 1560-1660. The 29 countries colonized before
the turn of the 18th century are listed as “1”, including all of the New World
colonies and the Philippines.21
1.4.2 Empirical results using the Gini index
Table 1.2: Gini index and population density circa 1500
colonies colonies
sample world colonies early tech new tech colonies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lpopdens −5.307∗∗∗ −3.212∗∗∗ 9.872∗∗∗ −3.672∗∗∗ −3.672∗∗∗
(0.79) (0.92) (3.70) (1.03) (1.03)
earlytech*lpopdens 13.544∗∗∗
(3.84)
earlytech −7.369∗
(4.17)
Obs 130 83 29 54 83
R2 0.29 0.11 0.25 0.16 0.25
F-stat 44.42∗∗∗ 11.77∗∗∗ 6.64∗∗ 12.17∗∗∗ 17.85∗∗∗
Notes : All regressions are OLS. Dependent variable is inequality, measured by Gini index.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1
percent levels, respectively.
In Table 1.2, we show some comparison estimations using population den-
sity in 1500 to explain modern-day inequality, as measured by the Gini index.
For both the entire world and the former colonies sample (columns (1)-(2)),
early population density has a strong negative influence on inequality, i.e. a
higher population density in 1500 is linked to lower inequality today. This
21 As mentioned above, several European countries maintained coastal enclaves in Africa
and Asia during the 16th-17th centuries. However, these are not considered as “full”
colonies, because the majority of the present-day national land area remained under native
control until well into the 18th or even 19th century.
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finding is already in marked contrast to the reasoning of ES. However, this
simple approach does not adequately capture the whole breadth of the popula-
tion density-inequality relationship. As discussed above, there was a change in
the colonization pattern, where population densities are linked to the highest
observed inequality rates, around the turn of the 18th century. This change
roughly coincides with the end of the military revolution, which – as we have
shown – enabled Europeans to invade the more populous areas which had
before defied conquest on the one hand, but at the same time could not avoid
the inevitable decline in the territory size which could be put under tight
colonial control of a narrow white e´lite.
The change in colonization patterns becomes obvious once we separate the
colony sample into two subsamples according to the year of colonization. In
column (3), we see that the countries colonized with the “early” technology
show a strong positive relationship between population density and inequality.
This pattern is in accordance with the hypothesis of ES that more populous
colonies tended to give rise to extractive-type economic systems with highly
unequal societies. This pattern is confirmed empirically for the Americas
and the Philippines, and is carried through to some further colonies in the
mid-range of population density as the new technology becomes available.
However, the relationship is reversed as more and more populous colonies
are added, leading to the strong negative relationship with inequality for the
“new technology” colonies subsample in column (4).
The opposite signs and highly significant coefficients in the two subsamples
contradict the common wisdom of a linear relationship, instead confirming
our own theory of an inverse-U shaped relationship.22 Up to a certain point,
higher native population densities favor forceful control by colonists and the
emergence of unequal, extractive social and economic structures. But very
populous countries will enable less and less aggressive colonial policies, re-
22 The existence of two different subsamples with opposite slopes is confirmed by tests
using the clusters approach (in GAUSS) following Hansen (2000), which moreover does not
reject our cut-off date of 1700, albeit preferring the post-industrial 1840 as the cut-off.
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sulting in a tendency towards maintaining pre-colonial social structures and
not creating highly unequal societies with a strong colonist e´lite.
We would like to keep the entire sample of former colonies together both
because of the relatively small sample size, and in order to test our hypoth-
esis against other common explanations of the colonial origins of inequality,
including geography and precious metals, which are not assumed to have dif-
fering (i.e. non-linear) effects for the two subsamples. We can achieve this
by adding an interaction term earlytech∗lpopdens between the technology
dummy and early population density, which will assume value 0 for all obser-
vations after the military revolution. Our basic regression equation therefore
becomes:23
Inequality = α0 + α1lpopdens+ α2earlytech
∗lpopdens+ α3earlytech+ ε.
(1.19)
The coefficient α2 for earlytech
∗lpopdens, shown in column (5), gives the
slope for the countries colonized before the military revolution: one can easily
see that it is identical to the coefficient in column (3) by subtracting the
coefficient α1 for the later-colonized countries, 13.544− 3.672 = 9.872.
Together, our variables can account for one fourth of the variation in
inequality in former colonies, which we believe is quite substantial consid-
ering the complexity of the issue. The results also suggest that up to the
turning point, increasing (log) population density by one standard deviation
(0.93) produces a corresponding one-standard-deviation increase in inequal-
ity (0.93∗9.872/9.168). After the “cusp” however, the same change in (log)
population density decreases inequality by well over one-third of a standard
deviation (0.93∗(−3.672)/9.168 = 0.37).
Using this strategy, we will now proceed to test our hypothesis against
23 This simple technique for taking into account differing slope coefficients in subsamples
by adding an interaction with a dummy variable – sometimes termed a “structural break”
model – was first formally described in Suits (1957). See e.g. Kennedy (2003: Ch. 14) for
further details.
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Table 1.3: “Horse race” of colonial determinants of inequality (measured by
Gini index)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lpopdens1500 −4.061∗∗∗ −3.593∗∗∗ −3.966∗∗∗ −4.108∗∗∗ −4.155∗∗∗ −5.090∗∗∗
(1.11) (1.06) (1.21) (1.16) (1.06) (1.19)
earlytech*lpopdens 12.11∗∗ 11.10∗∗∗ 12.63∗∗∗ 14.07∗∗∗ 14.29∗∗∗ 13.82∗∗∗
(5.65) (3.83) (4.45) (3.89) (3.44) (5.22)
earlytech −6.121 −5.042 −6.983 −8.282∗ −9.696∗∗ −7.982
(5.22) (4.35) (4.81) (4.36) (4.11) (5.23)
lwheatsugar −9.690 −5.121
(8.04) (10.1)
latitude −18.31∗∗ −43.84∗∗∗
(8.79) (15.0)
tropics 3.272 −9.697∗
(3.21) (5.64)
distcr −0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
precious 3.882∗∗ 3.119
(1.95) (2.15)
Obs 70 83 76 76 83 69
R2 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.42
F-stat 15.46∗∗∗ 18.14∗∗∗ 15.26∗∗∗ 13.96∗∗∗ 18.27∗∗∗ 24.27∗∗∗
Notes : All regressions are OLS for ex-colonies sample. Dependent variable is inequality,
measured by Gini index. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically
significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
other variables. In Table 1.3, we one-by-one add variables corresponding to
the other two explanations for inequality proposed by ES, namely geography
and the exploitation of precious metals. The “horse race” of the explanations
on the colonial origins of inequality clearly shows that our hypothesis holds
up very well to the test. The early population density coefficients remain
consistently highly significant and with opposite signs, with little variation in
the magnitude of the impact on inequality, even when we add all other vari-
ables together in column (6). We do note however that the “early technology”
dummy is not always significant.
As far as the other variables are concerned, the wheat-sugar ratio and dis-
tance to the sea or a navigable river are not good predictors of inequality in
former colonies, although they each enter with the expected sign. Tropical lo-
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cation is weakly negatively significant only when we simultaneously control for
all other effects. The only geographic measure which holds its own against the
early population density variables is latitude, suggesting that greater proxim-
ity to the Equator does have an independent negative impact on egalitarian
income distribution in former colonies. Interestingly, the early presence of
precious metals has a relatively strong effect on inequality, apparently con-
firming the hypothesis of ES that mineral exploitation tended to produce
more unequal societies. However, this effect is not robust to controlling for
geographical factors. In separate estimations (available upon request), we
also controlled for further effects, including regions, colonial and legal origin,
and ethnic fractionalization, none of which influenced our results.
It is possible that our results are being influenced by the presence of out-
liers. The most commonly cited outliers in the literature on colonial roots of
economic development are the so-called “neo-Europes” – Canada, the U.S.,
Australia, and New Zealand. In our case, one could well imagine that their in-
clusion would bias the results in our favor, as they were all relatively sparsely
populated around 1500 and demonstrate low modern inequality levels. Tests
confirm this possibility; New Zealand, Canada and Australia in particular
often appear as outliers.24 In Table 1.4, we therefore repeat our main esti-
mations without these four countries. All of our previous findings regarding
the inverse-U shaped relationship between early population density and in-
equality are confirmed, while the influence of the geographic variables and
the precious metals dummy is further weakened. Moreover, the regression fit
improves to 0.32 in our basic estimation (column (1)).
The empirical results so far have very much favored our hypothesis that
there was a trade-off between higher native population, with its opportunity
for cheap labor, against the costs of conquering and controlling ever more
densely populated countries. This view has also performed well when con-
24 Further outliers indicated by the tests (using studentized residuals and overall mea-
sures of influence) include Laos, Jamaica, Brazil, and Suriname. All of our results are
reinforced when dropping these countries one at a time, as well as collectively.
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Table 1.4: Inequality (measured by Gini index) in ex-colonies, excluding neo-Europes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
lpopdens −4.775∗∗∗ −5.379∗∗∗ −4.713∗∗∗ −5.554∗∗∗ −5.462∗∗∗ −5.138∗∗∗ −6.386∗∗∗
(0.81) (0.86) (0.86) (0.82) (0.81) (0.85) (0.80)
earlytech*lpopdens 11.50∗∗∗ 12.29∗∗ 11.30∗∗∗ 13.07∗∗∗ 12.47∗∗∗ 12.72∗∗∗ 15.45∗∗∗
(3.97) (5.36) (4.05) (4.30) (4.05) (3.90) (5.42)
earlytech −6.853 −7.116 −6.610 −8.705∗ −8.390∗∗ −9.262∗∗ −11.54∗∗
(4.20) (4.94) (4.35) (4.46) (4.24) (4.50) (5.14)
lwheatsugar −2.797 −5.858
(7.76) (9.72)
latitude −3.878 −34.70∗∗
(8.25) (16.2)
tropics −1.363 −10.77∗∗
(2.22) (4.99)
distcr −0.0005 0.0002
(0.004) (0.003)
precious 2.986 3.203
(1.97) (2.15)
Obs 79 66 79 72 72 79 65
R2 0.32 0.39 0.32 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.45
F-stat 24.96∗∗∗ 22.32∗∗∗ 18.20∗∗∗ 21.66∗∗∗ 21.38∗∗∗ 22.45∗∗∗ 18.87∗∗∗
Notes : All regressions are OLS for ex-colonies sample without neo-Europes (Australia, Canada, NZ and USA). Dependent variable is inequality,
measured by Gini index. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 1.5: Top quintile income share and population density circa 1500
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
colonies colonies
sample world colonies early tech new tech colonies
lpopdens −2.868∗∗∗ −1.255 8.701∗∗∗ −1.875 −1.875
(0.70) (0.96) (2.86) (1.16) (1.16)
earlytech*lpopdens 10.58∗∗∗
(3.09)
earlytech −7.175∗
(3.71)
Obs 103 69 27 42 69
R2 0.14 0.02 0.23 0.06 0.13
F-stat 16.33∗∗∗ 1.65 8.55∗∗∗ 2.48 5.36∗∗∗
Notes : All regressions are OLS. Dependent variable is inequality, measured by income share
of top quintile. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at
10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
fronted with alternative explanations of the historical causes of income distri-
butions. In the next subsection, we will use a different measure of inequality
to further test our hypothesis.
1.4.3 Results using the top quintile income share
The income share of the richest part of the population offers a different way
of measuring inequality: the higher the wealth concentration in the upper
quintile, the more unequal the distribution of monetary wealth in the society
as a whole. Unfortunately – as we mentioned above – data on quintile income
shares is both scarcer and of worse quality than that on Gini coefficients.
Therefore, the following results should be interpreted with some care.
Tables 1.5-1.7 present the same estimations shown above with the top
quintile income share as the dependent variable. Results are similar, al-
though in Tables 1.5-1.6 we see that population density for “later” colonies
sometimes narrowly misses conventional significance levels. Also, the statis-
tical properties of the specifications using the top quintile income share are
less satisfying than those for the Gini index, evident from the low values
for the F-statistics and R-squareds. From Table 1.5, it follows that for the
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Table 1.6: “Horse race” of colonial determinants of inequality (measured by
top quintile income share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lpopdens −2.105∗ −1.806∗ −1.935 −2.214∗ −2.497∗∗ −2.743∗∗
(1.19) (1.00) (1.20) (1.26) (1.24) (1.24)
earlytech*lpopdens 8.383∗ 8.027∗∗ 8.588∗∗ 10.31∗∗∗ 12.03∗∗∗ 9.595∗
(4.66) (3.34) (3.71) (3.11) (2.97) (5.41)
earlytech −6.591 −4.886 −6.226 −7.811∗∗ −10.37∗∗∗ −7.809
(4.41) (3.80) (4.19) (3.76) (3.81) (4.86)
lwheatsugar −12.44 −3.403
(8.48) (11.5)
latitude −21.69∗∗∗ −30.75∗
(7.58) (16.3)
tropics 5.499∗ −4.451
(3.13) (6.25)
distcr −0.002 −0.0004
(0.003) (0.003)
precious 4.097∗∗ 2.110
(1.86) (2.00)
Obs 60 69 64 64 69 59
R2 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.29
F-stat 7.22∗∗∗ 7.9∗∗∗ 7.80∗∗∗ 4.39∗∗∗ 4.82∗∗∗ 6.15∗∗∗
Notes : All regressions are OLS for ex-colonies sample. Dependent variable is inequality,
measured by income share of top quintile. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗,
∗∗∗ statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
upward-sloping curve, an increase of one standard deviation in (log) popu-
lation density in 1500 would have caused the top quintile’s income share to
increase by just over one standard deviation (0.93 ∗ 8.701/7.966), all other
things equal. On the downward-sloping side, the same change in popula-
tion density would lead to an average decrease in inequality by one-fifth of a
standard deviation (0.93 ∗ (−1.875)/9.168). In Table 1.6, we see that results
are not influenced greatly by the addition of the geographical variables and
the precious metals dummy. As before, latitude and the presence of precious
metals prove the most significant additional factors, with tropical location
significant at the 10%-level when added on its own (column (3)).
Estimations using the top quintile income share are particularly prone
to outlier bias. This is evident from the results shown in Table 1.7, where
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Table 1.7: Inequality (measured by top quintile income share) in ex-colonies, excluding neo-Europes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
lpopdens −3.184∗∗∗ −3.677∗∗∗ −3.029∗∗∗ −3.709∗∗∗ −3.773∗∗∗ −3.681∗∗∗ −4.399∗∗∗
(0.81) (0.77) (0.83) (0.79) (0.77) (0.96) (0.87)
earlytech*lpopdens 8.942∗∗∗ 9.757∗∗ 8.875∗∗∗ 9.584∗∗∗ 9.351∗∗∗ 11.23∗∗∗ 12.60∗∗
(3.05) (4.07) (3.29) (3.20) (3.16) (3.65) (5.85)
earlytech −7.402∗∗ −8.501∗∗ −7.233∗∗ −8.644∗∗ −9.093∗∗∗ −11.05∗∗ −13.10∗∗∗
(3.37) (3.63) (3.55) (3.45) (3.34) (4.37) (4.90)
lwheatsugar −0.822 −1.854
(6.96) (11.2)
latitude −8.863 −25.27
(7.70) (20.6)
tropics 0.327 −6.672
(1.84) (5.24)
distcr −0.002 −0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
precious 3.307 2.592
(2.10) (2.23)
Obs 65 56 65 60 60 65 55
R2 0.18 0.24 0.19 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.30
F-stat 8.85∗∗∗ 9.44∗∗∗ 7.47∗∗∗ 8.91∗∗∗ 9.05∗∗∗ 5.87∗∗∗ 4.86∗∗∗
Notes : All regressions are OLS for ex-colonies sample without neo-Europes (Australia, Canada, NZ and USA). Dependent variable is inequality,
measured by top quintile income share. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels,
respectively.
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Table 1.8: Population density, inequality and income levels and growth
(1) (2)
Dependent variable Instruments Instrument
lpopdens & interaction lpopdens
growth 1970-2000 (N=77) -0.029 -0.01
r.s.e. 0.036 0.07
1st stage F-stat 14.72 7.98
Shea R2 0.3 0.12
Anderson IV relevance test p-value 0.000 0.002
income 2000 (N=82) 0.071∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗
r.s.e. 0.025 0.068
1st stage F-stat 17.12 10.92
Shea R2 0.24 0.10
Anderson IV relevance test p-value 0.000 0.003
Notes : All regressions are 2SLS, with inequality measured by the Gini index. The growth
regressions include the (log of) initial income as a basic control variable in the second
stage.
we omit the neo-Europes.25 Not only do we get a consistent, highly signif-
icant inverted-U shaped relationship between early population density and
inequality; the regression fits and F-statistics are also considerably improved.
Interestingly, none of the additional variables prove significant when we drop
the neo-European former colonies, suggesting that the influence of population
density dominates that of geography and precious metals in former colonies.
1.4.4 Linking inequality to growth and income levels
Finally, we test the usefulness of the analysis by revisiting the contested
relationship between inequality on the one hand, and growth and development
on the other. As argued above, the theoretical and empirical literature on
the nature of this relation is divided. Our analysis suggests we could use
historical population density, combined with the interaction term, in a first
stage regression as instruments to predict inequality in the former colonies.
25 Again, Canada, New Zealand and Australia were indicated as outliers by several tests,
along with Brazil and Egypt. Dropping all outliers reinforces the non-linear relationship
between population density and inequality and pushes up the F-statistics and R-squareds
(detailed results available upon request).
52 DID HISTORY BREED INEQUALITY?
In a second stage, then, we can examine the causal relationship running
from inequality to growth and income levels. To illustrate the importance of
careful instrument selection, we also demonstrate similar results for a na¨ıve
model based on a simple linear relation between historic population density
and inequality. Representative results for the second-stage coefficients for
inequality measured by the Gini index are reported in Table 1.8.
Two results stand out. First, when using our preferred set of instruments,
there does not appear to be a causal link from inequality to growth in the
former colonies, although inequality does appear to have a negative growth
impact (column (1)). There is a significant positive link between inequality
and current income levels, but this becomes insignificant (p=0.161) once we
control for regional effects. Perhaps the various positive and negative effects
tend to offset and neutralize each other, the implication being that any cor-
relation between inequality and growth (or income levels) is driven by either
reverse causality or omitted variables.
Second, the choice of instruments matters for the results of the second
stage. The na¨ıve model, based on a linear relation between historical popula-
tion density and modern inequality in the first stage, performs worse than our
preferred model. Although the signs are the same, the first-stage test statis-
tics are weaker and show that the explanatory power of the more complex
model with the interaction term is superior.
1.5 Conclusions
The distribution of income is a key topic in economic research, as well as
an important issue for policymakers. It is of interest in and of itself, but it
is also relevant because inequality has been linked to enhanced or depressed
economic growth rates. This paper examines the historical origins of modern
income distribution. Our story is related to that of economic historians En-
german and Sokoloff (1997, 2000, 2002), who focused on the importance of
colonial-era factor endowments for development paths in the Americas. They
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argued that a climate and soil conducive to growing high-value crops such as
sugarcane; the existence of gold and silver mines; and - most importantly - a
large native population providing cheap labor tended to bring forth social and
political structures which favored the colonial e´lites. The institutional set-ups
created to guarantee the status of the privileged classes influenced economic
development and led to the persistence of these early forms of inequality well
into the modern period.
However, we argue that the crucial influence of native population density
on European colonization and the subsequent distribution of wealth was not
uniform across all colonies. Instead, it was determined by the ratio of land
to native inhabitants which the early colonizers were confronted with, and
by the (military) technology of which they disposed: essentially, the coloniz-
ers traded off a higher native population, with its promise of cheap labor,
against the cost of military conflict and control. This lead to an inverse-U
shaped relationship between population density at the time of colonization
and the income distribution in former colonies. Specifically, we hypothesize
that (i) very low native population densities tended to lead to settler-type
colonization, with more egalitarian social and political structures and hence
more equal wealth distributions (as in previous literature); at the other end
of the spectrum, (ii) very high native population densities tended to lead to
the adaptation of existing social and institutional structures by the coloniz-
ers - as forced change would have been too costly - again resulting in more
equal wealth distributions. In between lie those colonies where (iii) native
population density was low enough to permit conquest and control by force,
and yet high enough to make cheap native labor an attractive alternative to
own work, creating unequal societies with a large income gap between the
colonizing e´lite and the rest of the population.
We develop a model which reflects the defensive capabilities of a larger
native population on the one hand, and the returns to peaceful settlement or
aggressive conquest for the colonizers on the other. The relative technological
level of the colonists plays an important role, as a better technology permits
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the forceful occupation and subjugation of the more densely populated areas,
with the possibility of a larger pool of cheap labor force to work the conquered
land. However, when the technological advantage of the colonizers wanes,
conflict becomes too costly with respect to more peaceful forms of interaction.
The result is that at intermediate levels of native population density, we can
expect the highest degree of conflict and the largest proportion of native labor
forced to work for cheap wage rates, and therefore the highest level of income
inequality between colonizers and colonized.
The findings of the model are tested empirically for a broad sample of
former colonies by regressing native population densities around 1500 on
modern-day income distributions, measured by the Gini index and the in-
come share of the top quintile. We also construct a dummy variable to reflect
whether a country was colonized before or after the military revolution of
the 17th century, which brought several fundamental advances in European
military technology. The results confirm the inverse-U shaped link between
early population density and inequality, as well as the role of the interaction
between population density in the colonies and the technological level of the
colonizers in determining subsequent development patterns. We further re-
fine the understanding of the roots of economic development by showing that
early native population density was more important in determining European
colonization than geographical factors such as soil quality, climate or access
to a navigable port, or even the presence of precious metals. We also use the
results to motivate the choice of historical population density and an inter-
action terms as instruments for inequality in regressions explaining income
growth or levels. Our 2SLS regressions imply that there is no strong causal
relation running from inequality to growth or income levels in our sample of
former colonies.
The results suggest that no one theory of the influence of colonial factor
endowments on development patterns can fit all countries, but that there
are some important non-linearities which must be considered when trying to
understand the origins of economic development.
Chapter 2
Cursing the blessings? Natural
resource abundance,
institutions, and economic
growth∗
Since Sachs and Warner’s (1995a) contribution, there has been a lively debate
on the so-called natural resource curse. This paper re-examines the effects
of natural resource abundance on economic growth using new measures of
resource endowment and considering the role of institutional quality. We
find a positive direct empirical relationship between natural resource abun-
dance and economic growth. In both OLS and 2SLS regressions, the positive
resource effects are particularly strong for subsoil wealth. Our results also
show no evidence of negative indirect effects of natural resources through the
institutional channel.
∗ This chapter has been published in World Development.
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2.1 Introduction
Natural resources seem to have been more of a curse than a blessing for many
countries. Numerous researchers have supported the view that resource-poor
countries often outperform resource-rich countries in economic growth. Sachs
andWarner (1995a) – hereafter referred to as SW –made a major contribution
when they found a negative association between natural resource abundance
and growth in a large cross-country study,1 and a substantial number of pa-
pers has since considered the natural resource curse hypothesis from different
points of view. For example, Auty (1997, 2001) tries to explain the curse his-
torically; while Ross (1999, 2001), Jensen and Wantchekon (2004), Collier and
Hoeﬄer (2005), and Hodler (2006) focus on the negative associations between
resource abundance and the stability and quality of the political system.
The explicit consideration of various transmission channels of the effects of
natural resource abundance on economic growth has lead to more differenti-
ated – and ambiguous – results. For example, Gylfason (2001), Bravo-Ortega
and De Gregorio (2005), and Stijns (2006) concentrate on different links with
human capital. The first shows that the negative growth effects of natural
resources stem from lower education spending and less schooling in resource-
rich countries. The second find that the negative resource effects can in fact
be offset by higher education levels, making natural resource abundance a
boon for countries with high human capital levels. And the third concludes
that per capita rents from natural resources are positively correlated with
human capital accumulation. Baland and Francois (2000) and Torvik (2002)
focus on the effects of natural resource abundance on rent-seeking behavior
and income; while Manzano and Rigobon (2001) believe that the real prob-
lem for growth is the debt overhang in resource-rich countries. The Dutch
disease hypothesis is examined by Stijns (2003), who confirms the typical
sectoral change pattern but finds little evidence for overall negative resource
1 The same authors contributed several more studies on the resource curse, see Sachs
and Warner (1997, 1999, 2001), as well as Rodriguez and Sachs (1999).
INTRODUCTION 57
effects on growth; and by Matsen and Torvik (2005), who propose that long-
term growth can be positive provided the savings path is adjusted to take
into account the relative importance of the traded and non-traded goods sec-
tors. Hausmann and Rigobon (2002) consider the trade structure and show
that (export) diversified economies are less likely to suffer negative effects of
natural resource wealth.
In this paper, we re-examine two main aspects of the resource curse lit-
erature and find new cross-country evidence contradicting previous findings
of detrimental growth effects of natural resource wealth. The first aspect
regards the measurement of natural resource abundance. Most empirical
studies confirming the resource curse published over the past decade have
used the SW (or a similar) measure, which estimates resource abundance
based on the share of primary exports in GDP at the beginning of the ob-
servation period. We evaluate the validity of this indicator and propose two
alternative indicators – developed by the World Bank (1997, 2005) and mea-
suring per capita mineral and total natural resource wealth, respectively –
which in our view better capture a country’s natural resource abundance.
The second aspect concentrates on the importance of institutional quality
in the economic growth and development process. Despite several recent
studies showing that “institutions matter” for development (e.g., Knack and
Keefer, 1995; La Porta et al., 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001), the role of institu-
tional quality has received limited attention in work on growth with resource
abundance.2 A review of the literature shows that institutions may however
play a critical role in determining the economic performance of resource-rich
economies, and should therefore be awarded a more prominent place in the
analysis. The results of our cross-country estimations show no evidence of a
negative growth effect of natural resource abundance. Using the new mea-
sures of natural resource wealth, we instead find a positive direct association
with economic growth over the period 1970-2000, which is confirmed when we
2 A notable recent contribution by Robinson et al. (2006) offers a rare theoretical
explanation of the resource curse based on a country’s political institutions.
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consider the role of institutional quality. The findings are consistently highly
significant when we concentrate on mineral resources, which runs contrary
to most of the resource-and-growth literature. Also, our estimations do not
confirm the negative effects of resource abundance through institutional qual-
ity found in several other studies. Interestingly, adding an interaction term
suggests that the beneficial resource effects diminish as institutional quality
increases, although the overall effects remain strongly positive. The positive
results hold both in ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares
(2SLS) estimations which consider the endogeneity of institutions, and they
are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of additional control variables from
the growth literature.
It is not within the scope of this paper to offer policy recommendations to
resource-rich countries, but the results do question development advice based
on the idea that there is a general “natural resource curse”. The findings
strongly suggest that a more cautious approach is called for when evaluating
the development effects of natural resource abundance: the “resource curse”
should be re-assessed before incurring a policy error made trying to avoid it.
The next section takes a closer look at various measures of natural re-
source abundance used in the literature and proposes some alternatives, and
then discusses the importance of considering institutional quality. Section
2.3 presents results of OLS and 2SLS regressions of the growth rates of GDP
per capita on our measures of natural resource endowment and institutional
quality, and section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 The natural resource curse hypothesis
2.2.1 Measuring natural resource abundance
Most resource-and-growth research has focused on the “curse” effect of ab-
solute natural resource abundance per se, both empirically and theoretically
(e.g., Leite and Weidmann, 2002; Torvik, 2002; Hodler, 2006). However,
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following Sachs and Warner (1995a, 1997), primary exports over GDP have
constituted the preferred indicator of natural resource abundance in empir-
ical analysis.3 SW’s measure of “resource intensity”, sxp, is easily available
and has been employed by numerous researchers who confirmed the negative
growth effects of natural resource wealth. But if the aim is to quantify natu-
ral resource abundance, then primary exports seem an unsatisfactory measure
for two main reasons.4
First, one should expect any conclusion on a “curse” of natural resource
wealth or abundance to be based on the closest possible approximation of
such wealth – in other words: some measure corresponding to the widely
used indicator of economic wealth, income (GDP) per capita. Assuming a
strong positive correlation between natural resource abundance and natural
resource exports is by no means obvious given counter-examples of resource-
rich countries with relatively low primary exports such as Australia and Ger-
many. Moreover, we could also plausibly argue that a dominant share of
primary resource exports in GDP is a strong indication for an overly special-
ized economy. Slow growth in countries with a large share of primary exports
may therefore be due more to economic policy leading to a high economic
dependence on the natural resource sector, rather than a direct natural re-
source “curse”.5 Second, it is worth noting that the resource export variable
is quite volatile, suggesting that the period average would in any case be a
better measure than the beginning-of-period value employed in the literature
(Ledermann and Maloney, 2003).6
Empirically, variations in the setup of the resource exports variable have
cast substantial doubt on the resource curse hypothesis. For example, Le-
3 Although some studies, such as Mehlum et al. (2006), actually focus on the impact
of resource rents when they speak of the “resource abundance curse”, they use the SW
measure for empirical estimations.
4 Wright and Czelusta (2004) and Stijns (2005) offer earlier critiques of this indicator.
5 See Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2007) for a closer look at this possibility and its im-
plications for the resource curse.
6 sxp is calculated for 1970, while the observation period in SW is 1970-1989.
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dermann and Maloney (2003) find positive growth effects using the share
of primary exports in total exports and primary exports over total labor
force. Davis (1995) used the share of mineral exports in total merchandise
exports as one of his natural resource proxies, showing a positive relationship
with economic development. Leite and Weidmann (2002) and Sala-i-Martin
and Subramanian (2003) find ambiguous growth effects when disaggregating
resource exports into agricultural, and fuel and non-fuel mineral products.
Neumayer (2004) introduces another variation on the resource curse theme:
although still using SW’s resource exports variable, he takes growth in gen-
uine income, i.e. GDP minus depreciation of produced and natural capital,
as the dependent variable to find a negative, albeit weakened, resource effect.
Other empirical research does not rely on export data at all, but has in-
stead employed completely different measures of natural resource abundance.
For example, Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) use the ratio of resource rents to
GDP to show both positive and negative economic effects, and Stijns (2006)
also argues in favor of using resource rent data, although he prefers per capita
measures. In this group of empirical work as well, differentiating between
various types of resources has delivered interesting results. When classified
by indices, economies dependent on “point-source” resource extraction – i.e.
minerals and plantation crops characterized by localized, intensive production
– often show evidence of worse economic performance and institutions than
economies dependent on more “diffuse” resources, i.e. characterized by more
extensive production (Isham et al., 2005). Mineral production over GDP
however delivers less clearcut results: using this measure, Davis (1995) finds
a positive relationship with economic growth, while Papyrakis and Gerlagh
(2004) find both positive and negative growth effects, with the negative ones
prevailing. Fuel and non-fuel mineral reserve and production data, as well
as land endowment – all measured per 1’000 inhabitants – again show am-
biguous effects on economic growth (Stijns, 2005). Finally, Ding and Field
(2005) use World Bank data on natural resource wealth to re-estimate SW’s
basic regression, as well as a three-equation model to consider the effects of
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Figure 2.1: Natural resource wealth and growth
Notes: Regression fit using World Bank natural wealth data measured in USD per capita (pc). See
Appendix for data and regression details.
resources on human capital. They find negative growth effects of natural
resources as a share of total produced capital, and positive growth effects
of natural resources per capita; but both indicators become insignificant in
the three-equation model. However, their simple approach leaves many open
questions on the robustness of the results.
Hence, as a first step in re-examining the hypothesis of a curse of natural
resource abundance – as opposed to the curse of a dependence on natural
resource exports actually found by much of the literature – we compare SW’s
primary exports indicator sxp with several alternative measures of natural
resource endowment. We collected data on fuel and non-fuel mineral pro-
duction in 1970 from the World Mineral Statistics (IGS, 1978) and British
Petroleum (for natural gas), and used them both separately and as an aggre-
gate, denoted by fuelmin, nonfuelmin, and min, respectively. Additionally,
these indicators were calculated as per capita (pc) measures and as shares of
1970 GDP (gdp) to give a better indication of their relative importance. We
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also employ natural resource wealth data recently published by the World
Bank (1997, 2005). The World Bank natural resource indicators value differ-
ent components of natural wealth in USD per capita on the basis of the net
present value of rents and are available for 1994 and 2000. We use the aver-
age measure over the two years available to minimize possible measurement
errors and price fluctuations in the calculations.7
Figure 2.1 shows the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression fits of the
World Bank resource abundance measures on economic growth between 1970-
2000 (detailed basic estimation results can be found in the Appendix, Table
2.8). Clearly, there is no longer a negative association suggesting a curse of
natural resource abundance: on the contrary, we now observe a significant
positive relationship, especially when we consider the evidence for per capita
subsoil wealth.
As a further illustration of how different measures of resource endowment
can deliver radically different estimation results, we calculate the correlations
between SW’s measure of natural resource wealth at the beginning of the ob-
servation period, beginning-of-period mineral production data, and the World
Bank indicators for total natural wealth and subsoil assets per capita. We can
see from the results in Table 2.1 that sxp is positively correlated with mineral
production per capita and weighed by GDP (column (1)), though correla-
tions with absolute production amounts are consistently negative. However,
primary export shares are clearly not correlated with the other measures of
resource abundance, natcap and subsoil. On the other hand, the correlations
between the World Bank indicators – per capita subsoil assets subsoil and
7 Ding and Field (2005) made use of the total natural capital data for 1994, and Gylfa-
son (2001) and Stijns (2006) employ slightly modified versions of the World Bank (1997)
data. Natural resources valued by the World Bank in both its studies include subsoil as-
sets (fuel and non-fuel minerals), timber resources, non-timber forest resources, protected
areas, cropland, pastureland, and total natural capital. The partial indicators of forest
and agricultural wealth gave no statistically significant results in the estimations and are
therefore not shown.
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Table 2.1: Correlations between natural resource wealth estimates
sxp nonfuelmin fuelmin min nonfuelminpc fuelminpc minpc subsoil natcap nonfuelmin/gdp fuelmin/gdp
nonfuelmin −0.20∗ 1.00
(−0.34∗)
fuelmin −0.06 0.85∗ 1.00
(−0.13) (0.47)
min −0.08 0.88∗ 0.99∗ 1.00
(−0.14) (0.78) (0.96)
nonfuelminpc 0.28∗ 0.13 0.06 −0.00 1.00
(−0.01) (0.82) (0.15) (0.53)
fuelminpc 0.60∗ −0.04 0.06 0.05 −0.04 1.00
(0.34∗) (0.23) (0.71) (0.62) (0.28)
minpc 0.54∗ 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.99∗ 1.00
(0.18∗) (0.67) (0.60) (0.8) (0.75) (0.93)
subsoil 0.05 0.19 0.07 0.12 0.37∗ 0.54∗ 0.58∗ 1.00
(0.02) (0.41) (0.21) (0.45) (0.4) (0.44) (0.60)
natcap −0.01 0.28∗ 0.1 0.16 0.30∗ 0.42∗ 0.49∗ 0.74∗ 1.00
(−0.12) (0.27) (0.08) (0.25) (0.3) (0.36) (0.37) (0.73)
nonfuelmin/gdp 0.4∗ 0.03 0.00 −0.03 0.61∗ 0.52∗ 0.38∗ 0.12 −0.01 1.00
(0.08) (0.72) (0.23) (0.51) (0.9) (0.3) (0.7) (0.25) (0.09)
fuelmin/gdp 0.29∗ 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.88∗ 0.79∗ 0.50∗ 0.28∗ 0.41∗ 1.00
(0.09) (0.34) (0.79) (0.68) (0.19) (0.87) (0.69) (0.39) (0.14) (0.35)
min/gdp 0.34∗ 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.45∗ 0.89∗ 0.75∗ 0.49∗ 0.20∗ 0.70∗ 0.99∗
(0.02) (0.75) (0.69) (0.8) (0.73) (0.77) (0.89) (0.49) (0.16) (0.79) (0.91)
Notes: ∗ Pearson’s correlation statistically significant at 10 percent level or less. Spearman’s rho in parentheses. sxp measures primary exports over GDP in 1971 and is
taken from SW. subsoil and natcap are averaged estimates for subsoil assets and total natural capital (in 1994 and 2000), respectively, and are taken from World Bank
(1997, 2000). Mineral production data for 1970 is measured in tons and taken from IGS (1978) and British Petroleum database. For detailed variable descriptions and
sources see the Appendix.
64 CURSING THE BLESSINGS?
total natural capital natcap – and per capita mineral production and mineral
production over GDP are consistently positive and highly significant.8
In our estimations, we will use the World Bank’s per capita natural re-
source data to test their effect on economic growth over the period 1970-2000,
and then compare the results with those reached using sxp. There are sev-
eral reasons to choose the World Bank estimates over the production data as
the most reliable measures of relative natural resource abundance currently
available, and hence the best measures for testing the resource curse hypoth-
esis. For one, data quality on mineral production for the early 1970s is not
uniform; furthermore, unweighted production data are unsatisfactory proxies
for natural resource wealth as they make no distinction between the value of
different minerals.9
Mineral production is also more likely to be affected by the levels of tech-
nology (and economic development) in a country. This endogeneity is as-
sumed to be less of a problem with the World Bank data, as they rely more
on the Bank’s own estimates as opposed to countries’ sometimes questionable
published statistics. Nevertheless, we cannot completely rule out endogeneity
a priori, as simple correlation tests reveal that both natural resource mea-
sures correlate moderately but positively with income and schooling levels.10
Much lower correlation coefficients for the mineral assets measure – which is
of particular interest due to the previous literature – seem to suggest that
mineral deposits have attracted substantial research effort regardless of their
8 This also suggests that the countries’ natural resource wealth, measured by their
mineral abundance (subsoil assets) and total natural capital, has changed relatively little
over the past three decades, confirming the hypothesis of Gylfason (2001).
9 For example, one additional ton of sulphur has the same production effect as one
additional ton of gold. Assigning weights to the minerals extracted is however equivalent
to estimating their monetary value.
10 The total natural resource measure has a correlation coefficient of 0.50 with end-of-
period income levels and of 0.60 with average schooling, while mineral resources correlated
by 0.32 and 0.34 with income and schooling levels, respectively. Results were significantly
lower for beginning-of-period values of schooling and income.
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location and consequently suffer less from endogeneity. However, we keep this
issue in mind when performing the robustness tests in Section 2.3.3 in order
check for a bias in the estimations. As a final point, the World Bank mea-
sures of natural resource wealth are deemed the best parallel to the economic
wealth indicator of income per capita.
2.2.2 Natural resources and institutional quality
Several recent contributions have stressed the importance of institutional
quality for economic development (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995;
Hall and Jones, 1999; La Porta et al., 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001). But in
quantitative work on the resource curse hypothesis, the institutional channel
has seldom been verified with much success, although it has frequently been
mentioned as an important potential cause of the curse. Institutional quality
is often simply controlled for by using a measure of corruption (e.g., Sachs
and Warner, 1995a; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004). There are some notable
exceptions: Bulte et al. (2005) find that natural resource abundance, and
especially mineral resources, have an ambiguous direct effect on several mea-
sures of human development, and a slightly negative indirect effect via two
measures of institutional quality. Mehlum et al. (2006) show that the interac-
tion of natural resource abundance with high-quality institutions – measured
by an aggregate indicator – has a positive growth effect, while the direct
negative growth effect of resource wealth seems to persist. However, these
results are based on resource exports data, which pose the problems already
discussed above: we contend that they more accurately depict the effects of
natural resource exports dependence.11
From a more qualitative angle, historians, political scientists, and econo-
mists generally agree that the presence of abundant natural resources (espe-
11 Partly addressing this shortcoming, Boschini et al. (2004) supplement export data
with production data and find evidence for a curse of highly “appropriable” resources, e.g.
minerals, in countries with low-quality institutions.
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cially minerals) leads to rent-seeking behavior and corruption, thereby de-
creasing the quality of government, which in turn negatively affects economic
performance (e.g., Auty, 2001; Leite and Weidmann, 2002; Isham et al., 2005;
Norman, 2006).12 Robinson et al. (2006) develop a political economy model
which shows that the impact of a “resource boom” crucially depends on the
quality of the political institutions, and in particular the degree of clientelism
in the public sector. Countries with worse-quality institutions are more likely
to suffer from a resource curse. There is also evidence that natural resource
abundance considerably increases the potential of violent civil conflict (Col-
lier and Hoeﬄer, 2005). Empirically, rent-seeking due to natural resources
has been shown to be non-linear, both with respect to income and the total
amount of resources in a country. In his cross-country study, Ross (2001) finds
that the negative resource effects of mineral abundance on institutions decline
with increasing income levels and with greater past mineral exports. And in
their case study of Nigeria, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003: 10) de-
scribe how “oil corrupts and excess oil corrupts more than excessively”. They
stress that the natural resource curse only holds for mineral – and particu-
larly oil – abundance, and not agricultural products and food (all measured
by their respective export shares).
In a different vein, Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) show that natural re-
source abundance may have negative effects on development when weak insti-
tutions allow resource profits to be spent in government consumption rather
than investment, especially in countries with low levels of genuine saving.
Stijns (2005) contends that there are both positive and negative channels
through which natural resource abundance affects economic growth; he finds
that land abundance tends to have negative effects on all determinants of
growth, including different measures of institutional quality, while the effects
of mineral abundance are less clear-cut. He concludes that “learning pro-
cesses” are the crucial element in determining the direction of influence of
12 For formal models of rent-seeking behavior, see Tornell and Lane (1999) and Torvik
(2002).
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resource wealth on growth, i.e. how countries exploit and develop their re-
sources. Finally, Acemoglu et al. (2001) test the effects on current income
levels of their instrumented indicator for institutions against those of natural
resource abundance, measured by the country shares of world non-fuel min-
eral reserves and per-capita oil resources. They find no significant influence
of natural resource abundance at all, confirming their view that institutional
quality alone can explain a great deal of the cross-country differences in eco-
nomic development, and implicitly questioning the natural resource curse
hypothesis even further.
From the literature, it emerges that the growth and development effects of
natural resource abundance are rather ambiguous when institutional quality
is included in the analysis; there may in fact only be a curse when natural
resource wealth occurs together with low-quality institutions. In this paper,
we will explore this possibility by focusing both on natural resource abun-
dance and on institutional quality. The most important institutional aspects
in this context appear to be the rule of law and corruption, and the compe-
tence of the state and particularly the bureaucracy – aspects which are in fact
connected. We show results for two different institutional quality indicators
that cover these aspects, namely measures of the rule of law and government
effectiveness (described below), and interact them with our resource abun-
dance measures. In a second step we instrument for them to account for the
possible endogeneity of the quality of institutions themselves, including the
possibility that natural resource abundance negatively affects institutions.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Log growth of income per capita,
average 1970-2000 (g7000 ) 102 2.44 0.80 −0.13 4.26
Log total natural capital in US$ per
capita, average 1994-2000 (lnnatcap) 84 8.36 0.92 6.59 10.76
Log subsoil wealth in US$ per capita,
average 1994-2000 (lnsubsoil) 63 5.76 2.41 −0.69 10.46
Primary exports / GDP in 1970 (sxp) 114 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.89
Rule of law, average 1996-2000
(ruleoflaw) 158 2.54 1.0 0.67 4.74
Government effectiveness, average
1996-2000 (goveffect) 165 2.52 0.99 0.19 5.01
Note: Variable sources and detailed descriptions are given in the Appendix.
2.3 Natural resources, institutions, and growth:
results of cross-country estimations
2.3.1 Data and descriptive statistics
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables. Average growth
of per capita income between 1970-2000 is PPP adjusted (detailed variable
descriptions and sources are provided in the Appendix). This will be the de-
pendent variable for the subsequent estimations. It is evident from the data
that the growth differences in the sample of roughly 100 countries are quite
large, with a standard deviation in log per capita income growth of 0.8. Rows
2-3 describe the logs of the natural resource abundance indicators introduced
above, namely total natural capital and subsoil wealth per capita, respec-
tively, averaged over 1994-2000. The differences in subsoil wealth between
the countries in the sample are particularly remarkable, with a standard de-
viation of 2.39. SW’s natural resource indicator sxp is described in row 4.
The last two rows show the main variables used to measure institutional
quality, which are taken from a World Bank dataset covering different di-
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mensions of governance from 1996 onwards (Kaufmann et al., 2005; also
included in the World Development Indicators). The dataset comprises six
“clustered” indicators, which are all positively correlated amongst each other,
as well as with measures of institutional quality used in the growth literature
(e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1995; La Porta et al., 1999; Acemoglu and Johnson,
2005).13 The main advantages of the World Bank measures lie in their objec-
tivity – provided by a very broad survey sample which includes and adds to
the sources for earlier indicators – and the excellent country coverage.
The six indicators are roughly divided into three groups: the first looks
at the selection and replacement process of those in authority (voice and
accountability and political stability and violence); the second examines the
state’s ability to implement sound policies (government effectiveness and reg-
ulatory burden); and the final two indicators measure the respect of citizens
and the state for rules and regulations (rule of law and control of corruption).
We present results for one indicator each from the second and third group –
the more relevant groups for our purposes – which closely resemble those used
in other studies, and averaged them over 1996-2000. For space reasons, we
do not present the findings for control of corruption; however, all regressions
were also performed with this, as well as the other World Bank indicators with
analogous results (available upon request). ruleoflaw measures the quality of
contract enforcement, of the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood
of crime and violence; goveffect measures the quality of the bureaucracy and
of public services. Again, the data report a wide variety in the level of rule
of law and government effectiveness between the countries, considering that
the estimates range from zero to 5, with institutional quality increasing with
the value of the indicator.
13 Correlations with several other measures of institutional quality, including indicators
for the beginning of the sample period are shown in the Appendix, Tables 2.9-2.10. They
confirm the view that institutions have remained relatively stable over the last decades,
and also diminishes the disadvantage of not having earlier data for our estimations.
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2.3.2 Ordinary Least Squares regressions
To better compare the growth effects of different natural resource measures,
we begin with standard cross-country OLS regressions of the type used in
the resource curse literature. The idea is that (the log of) economic growth
Gi between t=1970 and T=2000 in country i is a function of a vector of
explanatory variables, including the natural logarithm of natural resource
abundance Ri, and institutional quality INST i.
Table 2.3 presents results of the linear regressions for14
Gi = α0 + α1Y
i
70 + α2R
i + α3INST
i + α4Z
i + ǫi (2.1)
where Y is the log of income per capita in 1970 (our basic control for the
growth regressions, as in SW and subsequent estimations), R and INST
are the natural resource abundance and institutional quality variables, re-
spectively, Z is a vector of other covariates, and ǫ is a random error term.
Throughout the paper, we are particularly interested in the coefficient α2.
Since we use logs, the effect of natural resource abundance on income growth
is expressed as an elasticity.
Panel A in Table 2.3 shows the results of estimations using the rule of
law as the main institutional indicator, while Panel B reports the results
using government effectiveness. Column (1) shows a significant negative ef-
fect of natural resource abundance on growth when using the SW indicator
sxp. Columns (2)-(4) show a weakly significant positive influence of natural
resource abundance on growth when using total natural capital per capita,
which disappears when we control for regional effects (Europe and Central
Asia is the omitted region throughout the estimations). Columns (5)-(7) how-
ever show that an abundance of subsoil wealth has a consistent and highly
significant positive effect on economic growth. All other things equal, the
results would imply that an increase in per capita subsoil wealth would have
14 The results of simple OLS regressions using only our natural resource variables
lnnatcap and lnsubsoil and the SW variable sxp are presented in the Appendix, Table
2.8.
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Table 2.3: OLS regressions: natural resources, institutions, and growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A
lgdp70 −0.32∗∗ −0.62∗∗∗ −0.63∗∗∗ −0.75∗∗∗ −0.85∗∗∗ −0.86∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18)
sxp −2.48∗∗∗
(0.79)
lnnatcap 0.20∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.08
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
lnsubsoil 0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
ruleoflaw 0.59∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.16)
latitude -0.32 0.11 0.77
(0.58) (0.70) (0.74)
Africa&ME −0.85∗∗∗ −0.99∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.27)
Asia&Ocean. 0.07 -0.21
(0.27) (0.26)
N.Am. 0.21 -0.12
(0.37) (0.35)
C.&S.Am. -0.05 -0.37
(0.27) (0.3)
Adj.R2 0.37 0.32 0.31 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.58
N 90 79 79 79 61 61 61
Panel B
lgdp70 −0.32∗∗ −0.59∗∗∗ −0.59∗∗∗ −0.68∗∗∗ −0.85∗∗∗ −0.87∗∗∗ −0.87∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17)
sxp −2.32∗
∗
∗
(0.8)
lnnatcap 0.19∗ 0.2∗ 0.07
(0.10) (0.10) (0.1)
lnsubsoil 0.14∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
goveffect 0.56∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.13) (0.17) (0.16)
latitude -0.1 0.29 0.80
(0.58) (0.72) (0.69)
Africa&ME −0.80∗∗∗ −0.89∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.28)
Asia&Ocean. 0.16 -0.11
(0.27) (0.25)
N.Am. 0.1 -0.21
(0.38) (0.34)
C.&S.Am. −0.04 -0.35
(0.28) (0.29)
Adj.R2 0.37 0.29 0.28 0.45 0.49 0.49 0.59
N 89 79 79 79 61 61 61
Notes: Dependent variable is log income growth 1970-2000. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Joint significance tests strongly reject
hypothesis of no difference between covariates in all estimations. For detailed variable descriptions and
sources see the Appendix.
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a fairly large positive growth effect if we were to assume a direct causality.
On average, an increase by one standard deviation in dollarized per capita
subsoil assets would have increased income growth over the period by up to
(2.41 ∗ 0.16 =) 0.39. The corresponding beta coefficient of 0.39/0.80 = 0.48
shows that a one-standard-deviation difference in mineral wealth corresponds
to an average change in growth of nearly half a standard deviation. The find-
ings suggest that the use of sxp as the preferred measure of natural resource
abundance may have led to a negative bias in the literature.
In all estimations, the institutional quality indicators are positive and
highly significant, confirming the view that “institutions matter”. The coeffi-
cients for our rule-of-law and government-effectiveness measures suggest that
an increase on the institutional quality index would have had a sizeable pos-
itive growth effect on average, again assuming a direct causal relationship.15
The highly significant negative coefficients for initial income throughout the
growth estimations are in accordance with the convergence literature.16
OLS estimations with interaction terms
A question which naturally arises is how resource abundance and institutional
quality interact. Although natural resources may have positive growth effects
in general, the results so far could have been driven by resource-rich countries
with high-quality institutions. To investigate this possibility, we insert an
interaction term between our natural resource abundance and institutional
quality measures in the basic regression equation 2.1 and again compare them
with the SW primary exports ratio, sxp. Accordingly, the new estimation
15 For example, for a one-standard-deviation improvement on the rule-of-law index we
could have observed a ceteris paribus average growth increase of up to 0.73 over the period,
corresponding to a beta coefficient of (0.73/0.80 =) 0.91!
16 As an interesting aside, latitude proves insignificant in our estimations, running
counter to the hypothesis that geographical and climatic factors, determined by distance
from the equator, have an important direct effect on economic growth (see also 2SLS re-
gressions below).
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Table 2.4: OLS regressions with interaction terms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
lgdp70 −0.30∗∗ −0.78∗∗∗−0.84∗∗∗−0.88∗∗∗−0.95∗∗∗ −0.24∗ −0.75∗∗∗−0.76∗∗∗−0.91∗∗∗ −0.9∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16)
sxp −5.95∗∗∗ −5.59∗∗∗
(2.39) (2.29)
lnnatcap 1.25∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.23) (0.29) (0.26)
lnsubsoil 0.37∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
ruleoflaw 0.33∗ 3.66∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.7) (0.63) (0.25) (0.24)
goveffect 0.29∗ 3.64∗∗∗ 3.23∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.79) (0.72) (0.25) (0.25)
interaction 1.53∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.3∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗−0.07∗∗∗ 1.43∗ −0.33∗∗∗−0.29∗∗∗−0.09∗∗∗−0.08∗∗∗
(0.85) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.83) (0.09) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03)
latitude 0.55 0.67 0.70 0.75
(0.64) (0.7) (0.67) (0.64)
Africa&ME −0.22 −0.71∗∗∗ −0.85∗∗∗ −0.2 −0.65∗∗ −0.74∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.25) (0.26) (0.29) (0.27) (0.26)
Asia&Ocean. 0.48∗ 0.15 −0.15 0.48 0.28 −0.03
(0.26) (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) (0.26) (0.24)
N.Am. 0.04 0.46 0.14 0.04 0.38 0.09
(0.45) (0.34) (0.34) (0.45) (0.36) (0.34)
C.&S.Am. 0.14 −0.05 −0.27 0.14 −0.03 −0.25
(0.26) (0.24) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26) (0.28)
Adj.R2 0.44 0.45 0.58 0.53 0.63 0.43 0.4 0.54 0.56 0.64
N 90 79 79 61 61 89 79 79 61 61
Notes: Dependent variable is log income growth 1970-2000. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Joint significance tests strongly reject
hypothesis of no difference between covariates in all estimations. For detailed variable descriptions and
sources see the Appendix.
equation is:
Gi = α0 + α1Y
i
70 + α2R
i + α3INST
i + α4R
i
∗ INST i + α5Z
i + ǫi (2.2)
where α4 denotes the coefficient of the interaction term. The results are shown
in Table 2.4.
First, we note that the coefficients on our natural resource and institu-
tional quality measures retain their expected signs; their significance in fact
seems reinforced. But the interaction terms appear significantly negative
throughout the estimations (columns (2)-(5) and (7)-(10)), suggesting that
the positive growth effects diminish as institutional quality improves. And
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conversely, from columns (1) and (6) we see that higher institutional quality
appears to reinforce the negative growth effects of the share of primary ex-
ports, confirming the findings of Mehlum et al. (2006). It is possible that
natural resource wealth has boosted growth rates more in countries at lower
levels of institutional development; the more highly developed the institu-
tions, the weaker the positive growth impulses of natural resource abundance.
This explanation is reminiscent of the convergence effect of income levels with
respect to growth rates; and in fact institutional quality and income levels are
highly positively correlated. Consequently, to test this “convergence effect” of
natural resources with regards to institutions, we re-estimated the regressions
allowing initial GDP per capita to interact with our resource abundance mea-
sures. The interaction terms again turned up with a negative sign, confirming
that more institutionally and economically developed countries have on av-
erage experienced lower positive growth effects of resource wealth (results
available upon request).
We can therefore explain the negative interaction coefficients in Table 2.4;
but what of the positive findings on the growth effects of natural resource
abundance found so far? In fact, our overall results do not change much with
the interaction terms: natural resource abundance still has a significantly
positive net influence on economic growth. To show this, we can calculate
the total resource effects for interesting values of our institutional quality
measures – as the coefficients in Table 2.4 correspond to an effect with zero,
i.e. unrealistically bad, quality institutions. For example, using the results
from column (2), we can take the sample mean of the quality of rule of law
to obtain the average effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in natural
resources per capita on a country’s growth as 0.92∗(1.25−(0.33∗2.54)) = 0.38.
With other words, a one-standard-deviation change in natural resource wealth
would increase economic growth by 0.38 from the mean. Similarly, from
column (4) a one-standard-deviation increase in mineral resources gives us a
positive total growth effect of 2.41∗(0.37−(0.08∗2.54)) = 0.40. On the other
hand, sxp still has negative overall growth effects, namely around −0.33 for a
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one-standard-deviation change in the share of resource exports (from column
(1)).
However, it is possible that the institutional indicators in our OLS esti-
mations suffer from endogeneity due to omitted variable effects. Indeed, if
there is resource-induced rent-seeking behavior leading to corruption among
government officials and less respect for the rule of law, as well as worse
bureaucratic quality, then natural resource wealth itself may be negatively
correlated with institutions and outweigh the positive direct growth influ-
ence. These factors are not sufficiently accounted for in OLS, which is why in
the next subsection we use an appropriate instrument for institutional varia-
tion and also take into account the possible influence of resource wealth, and
then perform two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations.
2.3.3 Two-Stage Least Squares regressions
Equation 2.1 described the basic relationship between natural resource wealth
and institutional quality on one side, and economic growth on the other. In
addition we have
INST i = β0 + β1R
i + β2L
i + β3Z
i + νi, (2.3)
where INST denotes the measure of institutional quality, now the dependent
variable, R is again the natural resource abundance measure, Z is the vector
of covariates affecting all variables, ν is the random error term, and L is
latitude (distance from equator calculated on a scale from 0 to 1), our main
instrument for institutional quality.17
17 We also considered a country’s regime type, classified according to the Polity IV index
of Marshall and Jaggers (2002), as an instrument for institutional quality, with similar
results to those shown using latitude. However, the Polity measure was less robust to the
inclusion of other variables, and – being a complex composite index – could suffer from
measurement error and endogeneity issues. A further possible instrument for institutional
quality is given by the data on settler mortality collected by Acemoglu et al. (2001).
Using this instrument drastically reduced the sample size and the statistical quality of
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Table 2.5: Determinants of institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
latitude 2.53∗∗∗ 4.09∗∗∗ 2.67∗∗∗ 4.30∗∗∗ 2.91∗∗∗ 2.61∗∗∗ 3.91∗∗∗ 2.59∗∗∗ 4.06∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.36) (0.40) (0.35) (0.42) (0.35) (0.34) (0.38) (0.35) (0.42)
lnnatcap 0.26∗∗∗ 0.04 0.27∗∗∗ 0.06
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
lnsubsoil 0.07∗∗ 0.01 0.08∗∗∗ 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
lgdp70 0.51∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
adjR 0.22 0.71 0.79 0.74 0.81 0.25 0.71 0.79 0.73 0.79
N 158 84 84 63 63 165 84 84 63 63
Notes: All regressions are OLS. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(5) is ruleoflaw, and in columns
(6)-(10) it is goveffect. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1
percent levels, respectively. For detailed variable descriptions and sources see the Appendix.
There have been several studies on the link between latitude and economic
development, but there is no widely accepted explanation for the observed
correlation.18 We follow Hall and Jones (1999) in assuming that the direct
effect of a country’s latitude on its economic performance is zero and that any
observed influence appears only via the institutional channel. This assump-
tion is strengthened by the observation that latitude becomes statistically
insignificant in our OLS estimations once institutional quality is controlled
for (see Tables 2.3-2.4).
Table 2.5 presents OLS regressions for equation 2.3. Columns (1) and
(6) show that latitude alone accounts for up to one quarter of the variation
in our institutional quality measures, and it remains highly significant when
adding other covariates. Columns (2)-(5) and (7)-(10) show that natural
resource abundance has a positive effect on institutional quality; the effect is
however not robust to controlling for initial income, although the sign remains
positive. Nevertheless, we believe that these findings cast some doubt on the
rent-seeking explanation for the resource curse: we find that natural resource
the estimations, although the coefficients on the resource abundance indicators remained
positive. Results are available upon request.
18 See for example Gallup et al. (1999) and the debate on the importance of geography
for economic development in Rodrik et al. (2004) and Sachs (2003).
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abundance does not necessarily lead to worse institutions, and may even have
a positive influence.19
Equations 2.1 and 2.3 form the basis for the two-stage least squares re-
gressions presented in Table 2.6. Equation 2.3 is our first stage for the insti-
tutional quality measures, shown in Panel B; equation (1) is the second stage,
shown in Panel A. The results confirm those found in the OLS regressions,
both regarding the sign and the magnitude of the coefficients of interest. The
broad measure of natural resource abundance, natural capital per capita, has
a positive direct effect on economic growth in the period observed. But this
effect practically disappears when we control for regions, suggesting that most
of the positive growth effect of natural capital is limited to certain areas of
the world. The results show that resource-rich African and Middle Eastern
economies in particular have performed much worse than European and Cen-
tral Asian ones. The indirect effect via the institutional channel is statistically
even weaker.
Subsoil wealth, on the other hand, has a highly significant positive direct
effect on growth, while the indirect effect is once more very weak. Again,
this is especially interesting as much of the resource-and-growth literature
has found highly significant negative growth effects of mineral resources, in
particular. But our results consistently show that on average a one-standard-
deviation increase in per capita subsoil wealth in a country would have directly
increased average economic growth by up to 0.16∗2.41 = 0.39 over the period,
all other things equal (beta coefficient 0.48). This closely corresponds to the
previous findings in the simple OLS regressions.20
These results challenge the resource curse hypothesis: neither a broadly
constructed measure of natural resource wealth, nor a narrower measure of
19 We could also not find signs of rent-seeking using alternative institutional quality
measures based on the level of corruption: estimations yielded the same significant positive
effect of resource abundance on (the absence of) corruption (results available upon request).
20 Adding the effect of the (statistically insignificant) indirect institutions channel gives
us a growth impact of a one-standard-deviation change in mineral resources of up to 0.41.
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Table 2.6: 2SLS regressions: natural resources, institutions, and growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A
2SLS
lnnatcap 0.20∗∗ 0.08 0.19∗ 0.06
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.1)
lnsubsoil 0.16∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
ruleoflaw 0.76∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.67∗
(0.21) (0.32) (0.19) (0.34)
goveffect 0.79∗∗∗ 0.8∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗
(0.22) (0.38) (0.21) (0.43)
lgdp70 −0.65∗∗∗ −0.75∗∗∗ −0.99∗∗∗ −0.9∗∗∗ −0.65∗∗∗ −0.77∗∗ −1.02∗∗∗ −1.04∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.28) (0.20) (0.31) (0.22) (0.3) (0.21) (0.34)
Africa&ME −0.84∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗ −0.75∗∗ −0.75∗
(0.31) (0.31) (0.34) (0.37)
Asia&Ocean. 0.07 −0.16 0.17 −0.09
(0.27) (0.26) (0.28) (0.26)
N.Am. 0.20 −0.11 0.13 −0.12
(0.40) (0.38) (0.4) (0.38)
C.&S.Am. −0.04 −0.27 0.08 −0.09
(0.39) (0.44) (0.45) (0.53)
Panel B
1st stage
latitude 2.68∗∗∗ 1.98∗∗∗ 2.85∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗ 2.62∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗
(0.4) (0.48) (0.42) (0.47) (0.38) (0.47) (0.42) (0.51)
lnnatcap 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
lnsubsoil 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
lgdp70 0.51∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Africa&ME −0.01 −0.03 −0.15 −0.26
(0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.37)
Asia&Ocean. 0.32 0.34∗ 0.13 0.13
(0.22) (0.2) (0.21) (0.22)
N.Am. −0.31 −0.31 −0.18 −0.21
(0.28) (0.25) (0.27) (0.27)
C.&S.Am. −0.39∗ −0.51∗∗ −0.51∗∗ −0.64∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24)
Adj.R2 0.8 0.83 0.82 0.87 0.8 0.82 0.81 0.85
N 79 79 61 61 79 79 61 61
Notes: Dependent variable in 2SLS is log income growth 1970-2000; dependent variable in first stage is
ruleoflaw in columns (1)-(4) and goveffect in columns (5)-(8). Standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. For detailed variable descriptions and
sources see the Appendix.
mineral wealth show a negative effect on economic growth. On the contrary,
the empirical results point to a significant positive effect of natural resource
abundance, especially for mineral resources, which is confirmed when we con-
sider institutional quality and its possible endogeneity. In other words, nat-
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ural resources – and particularly mineral resources – seem to have robust
direct positive effects even when we explicitly control for institutional quality
and possible interactions. We also find no conclusive evidence of a negative
indirect growth effect of natural resource abundance via institutional quality,
apparently contradicting the rent-seeking hypothesis.
Consistent with the hypothesis that “institutions matter”, our institu-
tional quality measures remain positive and significant even when accounting
for endogeneity. In addition, the magnitude of the institutional effect remains
largely unchanged with respect to the results of the simple OLS regressions
reported in Table 2.3. The robustness of these overall results is investigated
below.
Robustness tests
The validity of our results depends on the assumption that natural resource
wealth has strong direct growth effects which are not due to omitted variable
bias. We check the robustness of the findings by adding further control vari-
ables which have been found to influence economic growth in the literature.21
The variables include ethnic fractionalisation on a scale from 0 to 1 (from
Alesina et al., 2003); the log of initial population; the average years of school-
ing of adults age 15 and over between 1970-2000 (Barro and Lee, 2001); and
the measure of economic openness developed by Sachs and Warner (1995b),
which has been used extensively in the resource curse literature. An alterna-
tive measure of openness, defined as the GDP share of total trades (exports
plus imports) between 1970-2000, yielded statistically more significant coef-
ficients but had no effect on the natural resource indicators.
Other economic control variables included government consumption and
investment as shares of GDP between 1970-2000; and the period averages
of financial depth – i.e. the ratio of liquidity in an economy to its GDP
21 See Easterly and Levine (1997) for an early application of this method of testing
robustness.
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– and foreign direct investment. Further social controls were measures of
language and religious fractionalization; a dummy variable derived from the
Polity IV database indicating whether a country experienced a regime tran-
sition or violent change between 1970-2000; legal origin dummies; and the
average mortality between 1970-2000. Our results proved robust to all these
additional variables, as well (for convenience, only a selection of controls is
presented; full results are available upon request).
Overall, the estimations, reported in Table 2.7, show that our results
change very little with the inclusion of these variables. The estimations for
the broad natural resource measure, reported in columns (1)-(5), confirm
that the influence is significantly positive, but not robust to all controls,
in particular years of schooling (column (3)). However, the results using our
measure of per capita subsoil wealth are very robust to all additional controls;
the positive effect remains highly significant and essentially unchanged in its
magnitude even when controlling for all other effects simultaneously (column
(10)). Note in particular that the average level of schooling – as a proxy of
the level of technology – does not alter the positive growth effects of mineral
wealth. With other words, there does not seem to be a serious endogeneity
problem with our measures of resource abundance related to the quality and
amount of resource exploration in a given country. There is also no large-
country bias: including initial population size does not change the findings
for our resource estimates.
Our indicators of institutional quality, on the other hand, are no longer sig-
nificant when including all control variables together, which is not surprising
as there is probably some multicollinearity between the variables. Interest-
ingly, not all of the variables emphasized in previous research prove significant
in our estimations. Ethnic fractionalization has a significant negative effect
on growth, confirming the results of Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina
et al. (2003). Schooling has a significant positive growth effect (in the general
natural capital estimations in columns (2) and (5)), as found in the human
capital and growth literature. Population size also positively influences the
RESULTS OF CROSS-COUNTRY ESTIMATIONS 81
Table 2.7: 2SLS growth regressions with additional control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A 2SLS
with ruleoflaw
lnnatcap 0.25∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.13 0.22∗∗ 0.21∗∗
(0.1) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
lnsubsoil 0.17∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
ruleoflaw 0.46∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.6∗∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.06 0.71∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.45
(0.24) (0.2) (0.25) (0.28) (0.32) (0.23) (0.19) (0.27) (0.25) (0.31)
lgdp70 −0.56∗∗∗−0.54∗∗∗−0.85∗∗∗ −0.7∗∗ −0.72∗∗∗ −0.89∗∗∗−0.85∗∗∗−1.02∗∗∗−1.01∗∗∗−0.83∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.29) (0.18) (0.20) (0.17) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18)
ethnic fract. −1.07∗∗∗ −0.88∗∗ −0.82∗∗ −0.68∗
(0.39) (0.36) (0.4) (0.37)
lpop70 0.17∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
schooling 0.15∗∗ 0.13∗ 0.03 0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
openness 0.57 0.76∗∗ 0.32 0.53∗
(0.36) (0.32) (0.32) (0.29)
N 79 79 75 77 73 61 61 59 61 59
Panel B 2SLS
with goveffect
lnnatcap 0.25∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.12 0.21∗∗ 0.21∗∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
lnsubsoil 0.16∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
goveffect 0.45∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗ 0.65∗∗ 0.06 0.75∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.47
(0.23) (0.22) (0.25) (0.30) (0.32) (0.24) (0.21) (0.27) (0.27) (0.32)
lgdp70 −0.55∗∗∗−0.56∗∗∗−0.88∗∗∗−0.71∗∗∗−0.73∗∗∗ −0.90∗∗∗ −0.9∗∗∗ −1.02∗∗∗−1.03∗∗∗ −0.74∗∗
(0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.2) (0.20) (0.18)
ethnic frac. −1.02∗∗∗ −0.89∗∗∗ −0.88∗∗ −0.74∗∗
(0.35) (0.32) (0.37) (0.34)
lpop70 0.15∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
schooling 0.17∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.03 0.03
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07)
openness 0.58 0.76∗∗ 0.3 0.53∗
(0.36) (0.31) (0.32) (0.28)
N 79 79 75 77 73 61 61 59 61 59
Notes: Dependent variable in 2SLS is log income growth 1970-2000. First stage regressions for institutional
variables are not shown to save space. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at
10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. For detailed variable descriptions and sources see the Appendix.
average growth over the period. The measure for economic openness, how-
ever, is only significantly related to economic growth when controlling for all
effects simultaneously. In the first-stage regressions (not shown), our main
instrument for institutional quality – latitude – consistently remained highly
significant, while the natural resources measures again had no significant ef-
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fect on institutions.
2.4 Conclusions
This paper re-examines two main aspects of the resource curse literature,
namely the widespread use of Sachs and Warner’s (1995a) measure of resource
abundance based on primary export data, and the limited attention paid
to institutional quality in growth with natural resources. Using recently-
developed measures of resource abundance which estimate natural capital in
USD per capita, as well as indicators of institutional quality, we find new
cross-country evidence which challenges the resource curse hypothesis.
Results from both OLS and 2SLS estimations contradict most of the re-
source curse literature so far, showing that natural resources, and in par-
ticular mineral resources, have a positive direct association with real GDP
growth over the period 1970-2000, even when controlling for the quality of
institutions. In addition, there is no evidence that resource abundance nega-
tively affects institutional quality, contradicting the hypothesis of an indirect
natural resource curse, e.g. through rent-seeking behavior. Interestingly how-
ever, the beneficial growth effects seem to diminish as institutional quality
improves, although they remain strongly positive overall. The results are
robust to controlling through additional variables.
In sum, an abundance of natural resources may in fact be much less of a
curse and more of a boon for economic performance than often believed. This
conclusion suggests a different perspective on the growth effects of natural
resources over the last thirty years and is also relevant from a policymak-
ing perspective. While advancing particular policy suggestions is beyond the
scope of this paper, more caution should be applied before making gloomy
predictions for resource-rich countries and suggesting that resources had bet-
ter be left untouched to avoid adverse development impacts. Further research
is needed to analyze normative aspects, including more case studies of how
resource-rich countries have developed their natural wealth to supplement
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the findings of large cross-country studies. Also, the attempts to model the
influence of natural resource abundance on economic growth have so far not
proven wholly satisfactory; in addition to the possibility that resources may
have positive instead of the usually assumed negative growth effects, a theo-
retical explanation would surely have to include the role of institutions in the
growth process.
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2.5 Appendix
Table 2.8: Basic OLS regressions of natural resource abundance on growth
SW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
lgdp70 0.4∗ 0.14∗ 0.04 -0.05
(0.22) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12)
sxp −6.92∗∗∗ −3.39∗∗∗ −3.16∗∗∗
(2.11) (0.83) (0.83)
lnnatcap 0.20∗∗ 0.18
(0.09) (0.12)
lnsubsoil 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)
Adj.R2 0.13 0.15 0.05 0.12 0.17 0.04 0.11
N 97 90 79 61 90 79 61
Notes: Column (1) reports the basic result of Sachs and Warner (1995a) with log of per capita GDP
growth between 1970-1989 as the dependent variable. In columns (2)-(7) the dependent variable is log of
per capita GDP growth from 1970-2000. Results shown using SW’s measure sxp, as well as logs of World
Bank indicators of subsoil and total natural capital (1994-2000 averages). Standard errors in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 2.9: Correlations between institutional quality measures: rule of law
ruleoflaw GLprights70 GLprights7000 Hprights95 Hprights9500
ruleoflaw 1.00 (158)
GLprights70 0.8 (48) 1.00 (48)
GLprights7000 0.84 (118) 0.92 (48) 1.00 (118)
Hprights95 −0.8 (95) −0.63 (38) −0.7 (84) 1.00 (96)
Hprights9500 −0.86 (151) −0.67 (48) −0.69 (116) 0.93 (95) 1.00 (153)
Notes: Number of observations in parentheses. All results are statistically significant at the 1-percent
level. ruleoflaw denotes average 1996-2000 World Bank measure of the rule of law. GLprights70 and
GLprights7000 are measures of the legal system quality and property rights enforcement in 1970 and
averaged over 1970-2000, respectively, taken from the dataset compiled by Gwartney and Lawson (2005).
They are measured on a scale of 0 (no legal system and property rights in place or enforced) to 10 (very
well-developed legal system and fully enforced property rights). Hprights95 and Hprights9500 are measures
for property right enforcement for 1995 (first available year) and averaged over 1995-2000, respectively.
They are measured on a scale from 1 (fully enforced) to 5 (no enforcement) and are taken from the Heritage
Foundation dataset (Holmes et al., 2006).
Table 2.10: Correlations between institutional quality measures: government
effectiveness
goveffect burdelay corrupt
goveffect 1.00 (165)
burdelay 0.85 (58) 1.00 (58)
corrupt 0.76 (118) 0.85 (54) 1.00 (118)
Notes: Number of observations in parentheses. All results are statistically significant at the 1-percent
level. goveffect denotes average 1996-2000 World Bank measure of government effectiveness. burdelay is a
measure of bureaucratic delays (average 1972-1995), scaled from 0 to 10 with low ratings indicating higher
levels of red tape (less effectiveness). corrupt is an indicator of government corruption, scaled from 0 to
10 with low ratings indicating more corrupt government officials. The latter indicators are taken from the
dataset compiled by La Porta et al. (1999).
86 CURSING THE BLESSINGS?
Table 2.11: Natural resource measures by country
Country Subsoil Tot. natural Country Subsoil Tot. natural
wealth capital wealth capital
Argentina 1886.5 10081.0 Korea, South 41.5 2480.0
Australia 10285.5 29753.5 Lesotho 727.5
Austria 357.5 7372.0 Madagascar 4095.5
Bangladesh 51.5 2035.5 Malawi 832.5
Benin 12.5 1631.5 Malaysia 5076.0 10461.5
Bolivia 787.0 5421.5 Mali 3498.5
Botswana 408.0 4401.5 Mauritania 4041.0
Brazil 1309.0 6906.0 Mauritius 941.0
Burkina Faso 1809.5 Mexico 4967.5 7561.5
Burundi 2.0 1575.9 Morocco 93.0 1907.0
Cameroon 627.0 5766.5 Mozambique 0.00 1094.5
Canada 12658.0 35680.5 Namibia 953.0 4766.0
Chad 3705.5 Nepal 5.0 2064.5
Chile 12692.0 Netherlands 2151.5 5439.5
China 465.5 2446.5 New Zealand 2448.0 47158.0
Colombia 2193.0 6323.5 Nicaragua 4.5 2891.0
Congo, Rep. of 4248.0 6875.0 Niger 0.5 7157.5
Costa Rica 8193.5 Norway 34964.5 42524.0
Coˆte d’Ivoire 16.0 3455.5 Pakistan 207.5 1624.0
Denmark 2716.5 11408.0 Panama 5675.5
Dominican Rep. 193.0 5778.0 Paraguay 6181.0
Ecuador 3587.5 12223.5 Peru 682.0 4102.5
Egypt 937.0 2818.0 Philippines 55.0 2139.5
El Salvador 1031.0 Portugal 115.5 3834.5
Finland 84.0 13687.5 Rwanda 1588.0
France 73.5 7227.5 Senegal 32.0 3286.0
Gambia, The 1317.0 South Africa 1229.0 3800.0
Germany 309.5 4297.5 Spain 95.0 5057.0
Ghana 37.5 1628.0 Sri Lanka 0.0 2148.5
Greece 319.0 4882.0 Sweden 336.5 11270.0
Guatemala 180.5 2345.5 Trinidad&Tobago 19794.5 21543.5
Guinea-Bissau 4914.0 Switzerland 0.0 4496.5
Haiti 0.0 816.5 Thailand 274.5 5768.0
Honduras 62.0 3192.5 Togo 63.5 1792.5
India 205.5 2919.0 Tunisia 1160.0 5154.5
Indonesia 1109.5 5476.0 Turkey 195.0 3722.0
Ireland 457.5 14157.0 United Kingdom 2734.5 6053.5
Italy 260.5 4039.0 United States 5143.0 15626.0
Jamaica 1743.0 2853.5 Uruguay 12044.5
Japan 34.0 1906.5 Venezuela 19131 24023.5
Jordan 154.5 975.5 Zambia 247.0 3634.5
Kenya 0.5 1549.00 Zimbabwe 235.5 2025.5
Notes : Main World Bank (1997, 2005) natural resource abundance variables used in esti-
mations, measured in USD per capita. 1994-2000 averages shown; variables used and listed
only for countries for which data were available in both years.
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Table 2.12: Variables and sources
Variable Definition Source
g7000 Log of growth of real GDP per capita between 1970-2000, PPP ad-
justed.
PWT 6.1
natcap Log of the average total natural capital in 1994 and 2000, estimated in
USD per capita. The measure includes subsoil assets, timber resources,
non-timber forest resources, protected areas, cropland, and pastureland.
World Bank
(1997, 2005)
subsoil Log of the average subsoil assets in 1994 and 2000, estimated in USD
per capita. The measure includes energy resources (oil, natural gas,
hard coal, lignite) and other mineral resources (bauxite, copper, gold,
iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, silver, tin, zinc).
World Bank
(1997, 2005)
nonfuelmin Aggregate production in tonnes of 52 non-fuel minerals, ranging from
aluminium to zirconium. With the exception of a few countries where
series started in 1971-1974, data is for 1970. Variables used in esti-
mations include total tonnes, tonnes per capita, and weighted by real
GDP.
IGS
fuelmin Aggregate production in tonnes of coal, petroleum, and natural gas.
With the exception of a few countries where coal and petroleum series
started in 1971-1974, data is for 1970. Variables used in estimations
include total tonnes, tonnes per capita, and weighted by real GDP.
IGS and BP
min nonfuelmin+fuelmin IGS and BP
sxp Primary exports over GDP in 1971. SW
ruleoflaw Measures the average score of the quality of contract enforcement, the
police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence
between 1996-2000. Recalibrated to assume values between zero (worst)
and 5 (best).
Kaufmann et
al. (2005)
goveffect Measures the average score of the quality of the bureaucracy and of
public services between 1996-200. Recalibrated to assume values be-
tween zero (worst) and 5 (best).
Kaufmann et
al. (2005)
lgdp70 Log of real GDP per capita in 1970. PWT 6.1
latitude Absolute value of latitude of a country on a scale of 0 to 1. La Porta et
al. (1999)
polity70 Political regime measure ranging from−10 (institutionalised autocracy)
to 10 (institutionalised democracy). Transition periods are smoothed,
anarchy is assigned score 0, and foreign “interruption” is treated as
missing data. Score of 1970.
Marshall
and Jaggers
(2002)
ethnic frac-
tionalisation
Measure of ethnic fractionalisation ranging from 0 (least fractionalised)
to 1 (extremely fractionalised) based on racial or linguistic characteris-
tics, determined country-by-country. Most data for mid-1990s.
Alesina et al.
(2003)
lpop70 Population in 1970 (logs). PWT 6.1
schooling Average years of schooling of population 15 years and over between
1970-2000.
Barro and
Lee (2001)
openness Measure of openness, defined as the fraction of years during period
1965-1990 in which the country is rated as an open economy according
to set criteria.
Sachs and
Warner
(1995b)
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Chapter 3
The resource curse revisited
and revised: a tale of paradoxes
and red herrings∗
We critically evaluate the empirical basis for the so-called resource curse and
find that, despite the topic’s popularity in economics and political science
research, this apparent paradox may be a red herring. The most commonly
used measure of ’resource abundance’ can be more usefully interpreted as a
proxy for ’resource dependence’-endogenous to underlying structural factors.
In multiple estimations that combine resource abundance and dependence,
institutional and constitutional variables, we find that (i) resource abundance,
constitutions and institutions determine resource dependence, (ii) resource
dependence does not affect growth, and (iii) resource abundance positively
affects growth and institutional quality.
∗This chapter is forthcoming in the Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment. It was jointly written with Erwin H. Bulte (Wageningen University and University
of Tilburg).
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3.1 Introduction
Inspired by work of Sachs and Warner (1995a), a new literature has developed
that focuses on the so-called “resource curse” – the puzzling paradox suggest-
ing that resource-rich countries tend to grow more slowly than resource-poor
ones. Like most people, economists are fond of paradoxes. It is therefore
not surprising that the curse has inspired many economists to consider its
origins or test its robustness. Among the popular early explanations for the
curse are ’structuralist’ theories with roots in the 1950s (e.g., Prebisch, 1950),
rent-seeking analyses (e.g., Torvik, 2002), and stories based on Dutch-disease
type of arguments, where the non-resource sector is the long-run engine of
growth due to increasing returns at the sector level but becomes “crowded
out” by the resource sector (e.g., Matsuyama, 1992).1
The rough contours of a consensus view now seem to be gaining shape.
In the words of a recent World Bank publication (Harford and Klein, 2005):
“[Natural resource exports] can damage institutions (including
governance and the legal system) indirectly – by removing incen-
tives to reform, improve infrastructure, or even establish a well-
functioning tax bureaucracy – as well as directly – by provoking
a fight to control resource rents. [. . . ] There is growing evidence
that [this] effect is the most problematic.”
Empirical support for this view is provided by various authors, including
Ross (2001), Bulte et al. (2005), and Isham et al. (2005).2 While resource
abundance can be a blessing for countries with good institutions and a curse
1 See also Wright and Czelusta (2004) for a critical assessment of the claim that the
resource sector is unlikely to yield spillover benefits.
2 This is not to argue that there are no “dissident” views: Manzano and Rigobon
(2001) focus their analysis on debt overhang, Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) focus on the
role of investments, Gylfason (2001) and Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2005) on the
role of human capital, and Hausmann and Rigobon (2002) on having a diversified export
structure.
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for countries with bad institutions (as demonstrated by Mehlum et al., 2006),
the new consensus view goes one step further. It argues that the institutional
context itself is endogenous and not invariant with respect to resource en-
dowments (see also Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Jensen and Wantchekon,
2004; Robinson et al., 2006).3 While the exact definition of “institutional
quality” is open to debate, most economists agree that it refers to the rules
of the game, and that it is an important driver of economic development and
growth (e.g., Rodrik et al., 2004).
In this paper we re-examine the consensus view that abundant resources
lead to bad institutions or slow growth. We argue instead that causality may
run the other way: that bad institutions are associated with high scores on a
resource abundance indicator such as that popularized by Sachs and Warner.
To appreciate our argument, it is important to understand that the common
proxy for resource abundance in the literature on the curse is rather peculiar.
It is defined as the ratio of resource exports to GDP, generally based on the
information for a single year at the beginning of the observation period.4 This
ratio is more appropriately thought of as a measure of dependence (or inten-
sity) than as a measure of abundance. The denominator explicitly measures
the magnitude of other activities in the economy. Consequently, the scaling
exercise – dividing by the size of the economy – implies that the ratio vari-
3 In a model by Hodler (2006), the link from resources to institutional deterioration is
via conflict. For other work on the link between resources and conflict, refer to Collier and
Hoeﬄer (1998) and others.
4 Several authors have used alternative measures of resource abundance, casting some
doubts on the consistency and robustness of the curse. Results of Atkinson and Hamil-
ton (2003) and Gylfason (2001) suggest that the overall growth curse remains, although
Boschini et al. (2004) confine it to countries with bad institutions. Brunnschweiler (2008)
finds no curse evidence using World Bank resource data; Alexeev and Conrad (2005) em-
ploy several measures of resource abundance, including hydrocarbon deposits per capita,
and oil and mining outputs, and find no negative effects on income; while Stijns (2005)
considers several physical reserves and finds that the curse disappears for resources other
than land – a result which in turn is challenged by Norman (2006).
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able is not independent of economic policies and the institutions that produce
them. Moreover, not only the scale of economic activity, but also the com-
parative advantage in non-resource sectors is to a large extent determined by
government choices (Clarida and Findlay, 1992). Hence, the resource depen-
dence ratio potentially suffers from endogeneity problems, and perhaps should
not be treated as an exogenous explanatory variable at all in growth regres-
sions (Wright and Czelusta, 2004). A better measure of resource abundance
would reflect resource stocks, as opposed to current economic flows derived
from them, and we examine several stock-based measures in this paper.
We distinguish between two different perspectives on institutions. Some
analysts interpret institutions as “deep and durable” characteristics of so-
cieties (Glaeser et al., 2004), whereas others view them as the reflection of
policy outcomes that are in a state of flux (Rodrik et al., 2004). The former
interpretation is consistent with the idea of institutions as persistent consti-
tutional variables – think of presidential systems versus parliamentary ones,
or the specification of electoral rules. Within the framework of constitutional
design, policy makers formulate specific short-term “governance” policies to
fight corruption, uphold the rule of law, invest in human capital for public
servants, etc. Constitutional design therefore determines a range of policy
outcomes – institutional proxies and otherwise (Persson and Tabellini, here-
after PT, 2003, 2004). Evidently, the interpretation of institutions as policy
outcomes is more likely to suffer from endogeneity problems in the context of
growth regressions.
Both the “durable constraints” and the “changeable policy outcome” in-
terpretations of institutions are potentially relevant for the resource curse.
PT (2003, 2004) have pioneered the notion that constitutional designs have
observable consequences on economic policies. Key concepts in their analysis
are accountability and representativeness of a country’s executive body. They
find that both presidential regimes and majoritarian electoral rules (as op-
posed to parliamentarian systems and proportional representation) tend to be
associated with more spending for special interests, at the expense of public
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goods that benefit a wider swathe of voters (and that could enhance economic
growth). The reason is that presidential regimes and majoritarian rules im-
ply that the incumbent decision-maker is not dependent on a stable majority
among the legislators, and is therefore more likely to cater to the interests
of powerful minorities (for more information, refer to Persson et al., 2000).
In the context of the resource curse, one may therefore expect that sectoral
lobbying for preferential treatment is more successful in presidential than in
parliamentary systems. Indeed, an analysis based on the Sachs-Warner ratio
of resource exports as a share of GDP suggests the “curse” is more likely
to materialize in presidential regimes and in non-democracies (Andersen and
Aslaksen, 2006).
The objectives of this paper are threefold. First, we explore the underly-
ing factors that determine resource dependence and institutional quality, and
properly account for them in Two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) and Three-
stage Least Squares (3SLS) regression analyses of economic growth. Second,
we explore the impact of an alternative and exogenous measure of resource
abundance on economic growth and institutional quality. And third, we aim
to dig deeper into the institutional dimensions of policy making by distin-
guishing between “durable” and “changeable” interpretations of institutions
– i.e., how constitutional variables and institutional outcomes interact to give
rise to virtuous or vicious circles of development.
Our main results seem to turn received wisdom upside down. Concen-
trating on mineral resources, we find that, first, resource dependence, based
on a conventional Sachs-Warner “resource” measure in regression analyses, is
influenced both by durable and changeable institutions, even if we control for
physical resource abundance. Treating resource dependence as endogenous,
we can reverse the causality implied in earlier work. Contrary to the para-
doxical result that resource “abundant” countries tend to invite rent seeking
and therefore suffer from worse institutions, we find that countries with cer-
tain institutional designs may fail to industrialize – and failing to develop
significant non-resource sectors may make them dependent on primary sector
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extraction. This is an argument made previously by Wright and Czelusta
(2004), and our results provide statistical support for it. Second, within the
set of constitutional variables, we find that the form of government (presi-
dential versus parliamentary system) is more relevant than the form of the
electoral system. We interpret this as evidence that sectoral lobbying pressure
from resource firms is more relevant for policy design than electoral pressure
through geographically defined constituencies. We present evidence for this
interpretation by distinguishing between different types of resources – clus-
tered ones versus diffuse ones. Third, and perhaps most importantly, we find
that the resource curse may be a red herring. Properly accounting for re-
source wealth implies that resources can be a blessing for both institutional
and economic development – not a curse. Moreover, instrumenting for re-
source dependence implies that this variable is no longer significant in growth
regressions.
3.2 Estimation strategy and data
In this section, we outline our empirical procedure and present the most im-
portant data. Our aim is to explore the underlying factors that determine
the degree to which economies depend on exports of natural resources, and
analyze the impacts of resource abundance and dependence on economic per-
formance and institutional quality. Resource abundance may directly affect
economic growth; but the influence may also be indirect, either through the
level of resource dependence or via possible institutional impacts. Our em-
pirical approach allows us to examine both direct and indirect links.
We run three different regression equations. Following earlier work (Isham
et al., 2005; Bulte et al., 2005), we first perform a series of estimations to
analyze whether resource abundance (RA) does in fact have the commonly
reported negative effect on institutional quality (I ). Specifically, we try to
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unravel the determinants of institutional quality as follows:
I = a0 + a1 ∗ conditioningvariables + a2 ∗RA+ e. (3.1)
Our main conditioning variables include latitude measured in absolute terms
– a common instrument for institutions5 – and regional dummy variables, as
well as resource dependence (RD) in some specifications to check for a curse
on institutions in a more conventional form. In light of earlier evidence, we
distinguish between different “types” of resources: point resources, which are
geographically clustered in space and relatively easy to monitor and control,
versus diffuse resources spread across space. If resources are a curse for insti-
tutional quality, as has been argued in the past based on studies regressing I
on RD as opposed to RA, then a2 < 0. But if resource abundance is positively
associated with institutions – due to an income effect, say – then a2 > 0. The
term “resource curse” would be inappropriate then.
In a second step, we study the association between RD on the one hand,
and RA as well as “durable” and “changeable” institutional factors on the
other. As outlined above, we distinguish between the “durable” constitu-
tional dummy-variables for regime type and electoral rules (CV ),6 and the
“changeable” indicators for institutions or institutional quality (I ). In other
words, we explore whether RD is an exogenous variable, as implicitly assumed
in earlier work, or not. Our reduced-form “dependence equation” is specified
as follows:
RD = b0+ b1 ∗ conditioningvariables+ b2 ∗RA+ b3 ∗CV + b4 ∗ I+ e, (3.2)
5 All relevant estimations were also run with other frequent instruments for institutions,
including the log of settler mortality Acemoglu et al. (2001) and the fractions of the
population speaking English or another Western European language. We focus on the
results using latitude (our strongest instrument); results using the other instruments are
very similar and available on request.
6 We consider two indicator variables. The first assigns a value of one to any country
that has a presidential regime. The second assigns a value of one to any country that uses
majoritarian electoral rules.
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where our main conditioning variables are historic openness averaged over
1950-1969 – which is expected to positively affect resource export shares –
and regional dummies. There are several reasons why we believe RD may be
best treated as an endogenous variable. Obviously, it is likely to be positively
influenced by resource abundance due to comparative advantage arguments
(which is also why most conventional regression analyses treat the former as
a proxy for the latter). But institutions may also matter, because they in-
fluence policy-making and (indirectly) affect incentives to invest and develop
industrial or formal services sectors and thereby reduce the dependence on
resources. Therefore, we expect b2, b3 > 0 and b4 < 0.
7 In an additional step,
we integrate the findings from equation 3.1 by endogenizing the changeable
indicators for institutional quality I in a 2SLS procedure.
Finally, we test for the presence of a direct effect of RA on economic
growth (G), i.e., effects not transmitted through either I or RD :
G = c0+ c1 ∗RD+ c2 ∗ I + c3 ∗RA+ c4 ∗ conditioningvariables+ e, (3.3)
where RD and I are estimated using 3.2 and 3.1, respectively. Equation 3.3
reflects that resource abundance may potentially have an impact on economic
performance measures through three channels: indirectly via resource depen-
dence or institutional quality, and directly as an asset that may be traded.
It will be interesting to see if resource dependence, i.e. the conventional re-
source variable in resource curse papers, is still significant if we treat it as
endogenous.
Next, we introduce the various data and their sources that we will use to
estimate equations 3.1 - 3.3. Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the
main dependent variables and instruments for resource dependence. The first
column covers our base sample of some 60 countries from five regions (Europe,
North America, Central and South America, Africa and the Middle East, Asia
7 The two dummy variables for constitutional design, CV, assign values of one to coun-
tries which have a presidential regime vs. a parliamentary one, and to those which have
majoritarian vs. proportional electoral rules.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of main variables
Basesample Largesample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Average income growth 1970-2000 (g7000) 2.457 0.813 2.398 0.802
Average natural resource exports over GDP 1970-1980 (natxp) 0.073 0.095 0.065 0.089
Average mineral resource exports over GDP 1970-1980 (minxp) 0.059 0.093 0.05 0.087
Log of total natural capital in USD per capita (lnatcap) 8.547 0.860 8.517 0.863
Log of subsoil assets in USD per capita (lsubsoil) 5.82 1.857 – –
Presidential regime dummy for the 1970s (pres70s) 0.576 0.498 0.642 0.482
Majoritarian electoral rules dummy for the 1970s (maj70s) 0.5 0.505 0.530 0.503
Rule of law (rule) 2.81 1.069 2.729 1.026
Government effectiveness (goveffect) 2.875 1.07 2.753 1.035
Average openness 1950-1960 (open5060s) 0.434 0.237 0.442 0.233
Notes: Base sample for mineral dependence includes: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium,
Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Rep. of Congo, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Denmark,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. In addition, the large sample for total natural resources includes:
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, The Gambia,
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Niger, Panama, Paraguay,
Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Uruguay. Variable sources and detailed descriptions are given in the Appendix,
Table 3.15.
and Oceania) for which we have data on mineral resource abundance and
export shares.8 Given the particular importance of point-source resources
for institutional and economic development found in the literature, this will
constitute our preferred sample. The second column depicts the descriptive
statistics for the larger sample, covering total resource abundance and export
shares in over 80 countries. In general, our variables show little variation
between the two samples.
The first row depicts the log of average growth of per capita GDP (PPP
adjusted) between 1970-2000 (g7000 ). Korea was the growth leader during
this period in both samples, while Zambia was at the very bottom of the
growth ladder.
Our main resource dependence variables, the GDP shares of total natu-
8 Former Soviet and most Middle Eastern countries are excluded due to data unavail-
ability.
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ral resource and mineral resource exports – akin to the Sachs and Warner
“resource abundance” variable – are described in rows 3-4. They are com-
piled on the basis of information from the World Development Indicators and
aggregate the export share of total natural resources (natxp), i.e. the sum
of mineral and agricultural raw material exports over GDP, and the export
shares of mineral ores, metals and fuels (minxp), respectively. We average the
shares over the period 1970-1989, because choosing a single year could lead
to spurious links and false conclusions since exports are inevitably influenced
by market conditions (see e.g., Ledermann and Maloney, 2003). In addi-
tion, the 1970s saw unusually large turbulence in many resource prices due
to external shocks, which suggests using a longer time span.9 Total natural
resource dependence in our base sample and larger sample varies from GDP
shares of practically zero for Japan and Mauritius to over 0.4 in the cases of
Trinidad and Tobago and Zambia. Similarly, Nepal and Burkina Faso have
exported next to no mineral resources relative to their GDP, while Trinidad
and Tobago and Zambia again top the list with a GDP share of over 0.4. In
Figure 3.1 we plot economic growth against resource dependence for a simple
regression fit – controlling only for initial income and the change in terms of
trade – confirming that the “curse” also materializes for our dataset (detailed
results given in Table 3.4, column (1)).10
The next two rows show our preferred natural resource abundance mea-
sures, the logs of total natural capital and mineral resource assets in USD per
capita. The data is taken from a World Bank (1997) study on countries’ nat-
9 Moreover we feel that working with average resource dependence over the period 1970-
1989 better captures the idea that dependence may be endogenously determined, affected
by other variables in the 1970s. However, we performed all estimations with alternative pe-
riod averages for resource dependence (1970s and 1970-2000) with qualitatively unchanged
results. For example, if we just base our dependence variable on 1970 resource exports (as
SW did), then the main results are unaffected (details are available from the authors on
request).
10 The curse result is even stronger when we omit the outliers on the far right (t-ratio
becomes −2.79, significant at the one-percent level).
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Figure 3.1: GDP share of mineral exports and income growth
ural resource wealth and is estimated for the year 1994. The measure for total
natural capital aggregates the estimates for subsoil assets, cropland, pasture-
land, timber and non-timber forest resources, and protected areas; the subsoil
wealth measure values the principal fuel and non-fuel mineral stocks present
in a country. All estimates are based on valuations of the net present value of
benefits over a time horizon of 20-25 years (see World Bank, 1997 for further
details). The richest countries in terms of overall resources turn out to be
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Norway, while Venezuela and Norway
have the most subsoil assets relative to their population. Jordan and Malawi
have the least total natural resources; and Belgium, Benin, Ghana, and Nepal
share the bottom of the scale as regards subsoil wealth. Relying on data for
the 1990s implicitly assumes that cumulative resource extraction since the
1970s has not significantly altered countries’ relative resource abundance two
decades later (Gylfason, 2001). This is supported by a high positive correla-
tion with resource production data for the early 1970s: the countries which
produced the most at the beginning of our observation period still had the
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richest resource stocks in the 1990s (Stijns, 2005; Brunnschweiler, 2008).11
A second issue concerns the exogeneity of our resource wealth measures.
We argue that the commonly used resource variable of Sachs and Warner is
endogenous, but do our variables offer an improvement? The accuracy and
reliability of the country data were important concerns for the authors of
the World Bank (1997) study; nevertheless, one could object that basic data
availability is already subject to a country’s technological level. However, the
data on natural resource wealth are likely to be relatively independent of local
issues, and therefore sufficiently exogenous for our purpose. In particular, we
contend that the (fuel and non-fuel) mineral deposits which determine our
core sample have been quite well explored and estimated due to their substan-
tial economic potential, and thanks also to the involvement of large multina-
tional firms who use similar technical approaches to gather their information,
and do so regardless of the local political or technological conditions.12 We
are not suggesting that our resource abundance data are beyond criticism:
the present value of rents is not completely invariant with respect to policies
11 In the Appendix, Table 3.6 we show how various “abundance” measures discussed in
this paper are correlated. For example, the correlation between our abundance variables
and the primary exports to GNP ratio sxp from Sachs and Warner (1997) is 0.28 for subsoil
assets, and 0.12 for total natural resource wealth.
12 Around 90% of known oil and gas stocks are controlled by national companies, but
“...because of the enormous capital and technological resources necessary to exploit min-
erals, foreign oil companies became the dominant internal actors in all oil exporters [...]
The complexities of the international market, the continued need for foreign investment
and technology, and their links to other powerful actors mean that these companies still
retain significant power even after nationalization.” (Karl, 1997, p.55) Moreover, foreign
mineral companies have been known to get involved in production even if local political
and regulatory conditions were unstable or deteriorated to the point of open conflict. An
example is Shell’s long-standing involvement in oil production in Nigeria despite violent
conflict, and its willingness to enter into arrangements with both warring parties to ensure
some level of production continuity (Zalik, 2004). Nevertheless, a counterfactual is lacking
and we don’t know to what extent these companies would have been involved in a different
political setting.
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(Bohn and Deacon, 2000). Rather, we believe they are less prone to the policy
endogeneity which plagues export-based measures; less subject to technology
standards which influence production levels; and only reasonably affected by
price fluctuations (and market conditions), which must be an issue for any
measure that attempts to assign a “true” (i.e. monetary) value to natural
resource wealth. Despite their obvious shortcomings (such as a relatively lim-
ited sample coverage), these data probably offer some of the most interesting
and high-quality estimates of resource abundance currently available. Never-
theless, we perform all estimations using a variety of alternative measures to
confirm that our results are robust to different specifications.
As described above, we use two variables for the constitutional design, i.e.
the fundamental and durable institutional characteristics, at the beginning
of the period, depicted in rows 7-8. They are based on the classification of
the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) compiled by Beck et al. (2005),
and supplemented with data from PT (2004). As not all countries are coded
starting in 1970, we use the first available entry for the 1970s.13 The DPI
codes a country’s form of government as “presidential” (pres70s = 1) when
the chief executive is largely independent of the legislature. This is true both
when the president is directly elected by popular vote (as in the “classical”
presidential model); or when the chief executive is elected by the assembly, but
cannot easily be recalled once in office and therefore is mostly independent
vis-a`-vis the other branches of the political system. The alternative is a
strictly parliamentary form of government (pres70s = 0). This definition
corresponds to that of PT (2004, 2005); nevertheless, the classifications for
the relevant years differ for three countries in our sample, namely Greece,
Nepal, and Portugal. In these cases, we preferred the DPI coding, as it is
more careful in indicating the true balance of power in the executive.
Regarding the electoral rule, a country is considered “majoritarian”
(maj70s = 1) when all or the majority of the house seats are elected by
13 In a few cases, the form of government changed during the decade; we use the later
classification, as it is more likely to be important for development until 2000.
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plurality rule, the alternative being (mostly) proportional rule (maj70s = 0).
This DPI definition differs slightly from that of PT (2004, 2005), who consider
a country’s electoral rule to be majoritarian only if all house seats are elected
by plurality, adding a third, “mixed” possibility to the classification. The
country coding accordingly diverges for two countries in our sample, Japan
and Mexico. Again, we follow the definition of the DPI in conflicting cases.
Looking at the data, we see that the samples are divided roughly according to
the global prevalence of presidential over parliamentary political regimes, and
the closer balance between majoritarian and proportional electoral formulas.
We can consequently avoid a possible sample bias in our estimations.
The next two rows in Table 3.1 describe our main measures of “change-
able” institutional quality. They were compiled by Kaufmann et al. (2005)
for the World Bank and measure the rule of law (rule), i.e. the quality of
contract enforcement, police, and courts, as well as the likelihood of crime
and violence; and what we dub government effectiveness (goveffect), i.e. the
quality of the bureaucracy and public services. Both are recalibrated to as-
sume values between 0 (weakest institutions) and 5 (strongest). The World
Bank data have the advantages of a very wide country coverage and relative
objectiveness thanks to a large survey base, which makes them particularly
attractive for econometric analysis.14 The differences between the samples are
only slight, while the variation within the samples (the standard deviation is
14 We performed robustness checks using several alternative institutional quality mea-
sures, including the remaining Kaufmann et al. (2005) variables (e.g. corruption control,
voice and accountability). As these data begin in 1996, we also compared results using
measures for earlier time periods, namely the measure of the quality of the legal system
and property rights enforcement for the 1970s from the Fraser Institute’s Freedom of the
World database, and the measure of rule of law for 1982 compiled by Political Risk Services,
taken from Sachs and Warner (1997). Correlations between the four measures were very
high (0.8 and more), suggesting that institutions in our country sample have undergone
only limited qualitative change over the last three decades. The estimation results with
alternative institutional measures further confirm our main observations on the effects of
natural resource abundance and dependence.
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just above unity) shows that there are considerable differences in institutional
quality among the countries in our survey. The Republic of Congo has the
weakest and Norway the strongest institutions in our base sample, while Haiti
exhibits the weakest institutions and Switzerland the strongest in the larger
sample.
Finally, the last row describes our historic openness indicator for the two
decades preceding our observation period, which serves as another principal
instrument for explaining resource dependence in our estimations. It is calcu-
lated as the average ratio of imports plus exports to GDP between 1950-1969
to avoid endogeneity problems.15 The data shows that there is wide variation
in openness to trade in our samples, with a standard deviation of around 0.24.
3.3 Empirical results
We first analyze the determinants of institutions according to equation 3.1.
In the most parsimonious specification, we use latitude as the main instru-
ment for institutional quality and add natural resource abundance to ex-
plore whether resource wealth erodes institutional quality, be it through rent-
seeking, conflict, or otherwise. The results, controlling for region-specific
effects (Europe is the omitted region throughout the paper), are reported in
Table 3.2, columns (1)-(4). They show that, quite contrary to earlier work
on the resource curse – which argues that resources undermine economic per-
formance through weakening of institutional structures – there is a positive
correlation between resource abundance and institutional quality. Possibly
this reflects the income effects of resource booms and discoveries, enabling
countries to introduce superior institutions, while at the same time increas-
15 The possible endogeneity of the openness measure was considered in separate estima-
tions by using the predicted trade shares developed by Frankel and Romer (1999) as an
instrument. Results were not affected.
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Table 3.2: Institutional quality and natural resources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
rule rule goveffect goveffect rule rule goveffect goveffect
latitude 2.519∗∗∗ 2.972∗∗∗ 2.706∗∗∗ 2.374∗∗∗ 2.631∗∗∗ 2.887∗∗∗ 2.486∗∗∗ 2.171∗∗∗
(0.554) (0.669) (0.53) (0.671) (0.57) (0.63) (0.53) (0.63)
lnatcap 0.215∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.194∗ 0.208∗∗
(0.081) (0.082) (0.100) (0.093)
lsubsoil 0.109∗∗ 0.097∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.132∗∗
(0.041) (0.045) (0.051) (0.052)
natxp 0.150 −0.098
(0.67) (0.66)
minxp −0.194 −1.145
(0.69) (0.72)
Observations 89 63 89 63 83 61 83 61
F-stat 58.49∗∗∗ 55.24∗∗∗ 56.16∗∗∗ 43.73∗∗∗ 48.54∗∗∗ 49.04∗∗∗ 44.50∗∗∗ 37.61∗∗∗
R2 0.71 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.72 0.78 0.76 0.77
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Regional dummy variables included in all specifications. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
ing the demand for such improvements.16
To check if resource dependence has an impact on institutional quality, as
postulated by advocates of the resource curse consensus, we also add the ag-
gregate resource and mineral resource dependence variables to the analysis in
columns (5)-(8). Although it mostly enters with a negative sign, resource de-
pendence proves insignificant once we control for actual resource abundance.
We now consider whether the ratio of resource exports to GDP is a proper
16 There are several plausible mechanisms linking higher incomes to better economic and
political institutions: institutional quality as conventionally measured in economic studies
is a policy choice (affected by human capital and income) (Glaeser et al., 2004); income
shocks affecting real wages of civil servants may affect the willingness to accept bribes
(Chand and Moene, 1999; Mookherjee, 1997) or have an impact on morale (both corrup-
tion and quality of the bureaucracy are conventional measures of institutional quality); or
adverse income shocks can increase the risk of civil conflict, which in turn affects insti-
tutional quality (Miguel et al., 2004). While it does not explicitly consider institutional
development, the model in Findlay and Lundahl (2001) could be interpreted that way.
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explanatory variable in growth regressions. Since the denominator of this de-
pendence measure is the size of the economy, it seems reasonable to expect
that the variable is endogenous with respect to various variables that de-
termine economic performance. We “explain” resource dependence with our
indicators for institutions and add the two constitutional variables. Insofar
as institutional quality and certain constitutional designs are associated with
high incomes and growth-enhancing economic policies, we expect them to be
negatively correlated with resource dependence.
In Table 3.3 we present the results of equation 3.2 and explore whether
our prior expectation is correct, controlling for resource abundance and sev-
eral other variables. In the various columns we distinguish between different
types of resource dependence. Earlier work suggests that “point resources”
have a different impact on the economy than “diffuse resources” (Bulte et al.,
2005; Isham et al 2005). Columns (1) and (2) interpret resource dependence
quite broadly so that it encompasses all types of primary exports; columns
(3) and (4) focus on agricultural exports; and columns (5) - (8) present re-
sults for the narrower category of mineral resources. Consistent with earlier
results, we find significant differences between mineral and agricultural ex-
ports, which in turn determine the findings for aggregate resource exports.
The results are especially strong for the dependence on mineral resources, as
is evident from the values for R-square and the highly significant F-statistics;
they clearly indicate that resource dependence is greatly influenced by many
“deep” variables of economies. This suggests that using resource dependence
as an exogenous variable could produce misleading or biased outcomes, and
makes an instrumental variables (IV) approach more suitable.17
First consider mineral resource dependence, as presented in columns (5)
- (8), for which we find significant and robust results. Consistent with our
17 Ding and Field (2005) also consider the endogeneity of resource dependence. However,
their dependence measure is based on the share of natural capital in total capital, which
less closely resembles the commonly used exports measures, and furthermore focus on the
role of human capital for resource dependence and economic growth.
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Table 3.3: Resource dependence, constitutions and institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
natxp natxp agrixp agrixp minxp minxp minxp minxp minxp minxp minxp minxp
pres70s 0.043∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ −0.004 0.004 0.063∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.051∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.037 0.040∗
(0.020) (0.020) 0.005 (0.0044) (0.022) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024)
maj70s 0.024 0.034∗ 0.005 −0.005 0.027 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.021
(0.017) (0.018) (0.005) (0.005) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
lsubsoil 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
lnatcap 0.038∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.006∗
(0.01) (0.004) (0.0031)
open5060s 0.205∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.014 0.023 0.247∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.057) (0.015) (0.018) (0.067) (0.059) (0.070) (0.068) (0.072) (0.067) (0.066) (0.061)
rule −0.004 −0.035∗∗ −0.031 −0.036∗
(0.003) (0.014) (0.023) (0.020)
goveffect −0.038∗∗ −0.040 −0.044∗
(0.016) (0.029) (0.024)
Obs 66 52 66 66 52 59 52 52 52 52 59 59
Estimation meth. OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Regional controls no no no yes no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
F-stat 4.16∗∗∗ 9.06∗∗∗ 0.87 0.93 6.66∗∗∗ 9.81∗∗∗ 3.37∗∗∗ 3.48∗∗∗
R2 0.37 0.59 0.09 0.18 0.53 0.53 0.58 0.58
Notes: Only second-stage results shown for the 2SLS in columns (9)-(10), where institutional quality is instrumented with latitude. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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expectations, we find that the presidential regime dummy is positively corre-
lated with mineral resource dependence, and remains significant at least at
the 5%-level even when we control for regions and institutional quality. The
results suggest that having a presidential instead of a parliamentary system
would have increased mineral resource dependence during this period by up
to six percentage points. On the other hand, there is practically never any
significant correlation between electoral rules and dependence. Indeed, in col-
umn (6) we see that omitting the majoritarian dummy does not affect results
for our other explanatory variables, so we do not include this variable in sub-
sequent regressions.18 Since both majority rule and presidential systems are
associated with a tendency to cater to interest groups and minorities (PT,
2004), our findings suggest that sectoral lobbies (from resource industries)
tend to be more successful in pursuing distorting policies than geographic
lobbies (working through constituencies). Moreover, openness and resource
abundance are positively correlated with resource dependence.
In columns (7) and (8) we introduce two important institutional variables-
rule of law and government effectiveness. These will constitute our basic
specifications for later estimations. Not only are the earlier results robust;
equally interesting, we find that the institutions variables enter with a sig-
nificant negative sign (at the 2%-level). This suggests that better-quality
institutions lead to less resource dependence, as opposed to the other way
around. Even when we instrument for institutional quality to account for the
probable endogeneity of this variable; as in the results reported in columns
(9)-(12), we find that the negative relation persists. While the coefficients
have the right sign, they are only significant at the 17% level when we also
include the (weak) “majoritarian” dummy. However, when we remove this
variable, both institutional variables are again significant at the 10% level
(columns (11) and (12)).19
18 All regressions were performed both with and without the weak majoritarian instru-
ment, with the main change lying in the magnitude of the F-statistics.
19 All our main results are robust to including ethnic fractionalization, foreign direct
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Columns (3) and (4) indicate that dependence on agriculture is not ad-
equately explained by the same variables. The goodness of fit of these re-
gressions is much worse, and our presidential dummy is no longer significant.
We believe this is due to the “diffuse nature” of agriculture, making it harder
for farmers in developing countries to organize themselves into lobby groups
and successfully appeal for special favors. The institutional quality variables
also (narrowly) miss conventional levels of significance, although the sign is
consistently negative. Not surprisingly, we find that natural capital – which
also captures soil quality – is significantly associated with exports of agricul-
tural products. However, in separate estimations we find that sheer country
size is in fact more important than the value of the land in explaining the
dependence on agricultural exports.
As shown in columns (1) and (2), aggregating the effects of point-source
mineral resource and diffuse agricultural resource dependence allows us to
account for a large part of total natural resource dependence using some
common explanatory variables. But the results in column (2) indicate the
strength of our explanation for total resource dependence is due in large part
to the importance of minerals in overall exports: the values for R-square
and the F-statistic jump upward when we use subsoil wealth as the resource
abundance proxy. However, the differing factors which explain the extent of
mineral and non-mineral resource dependence weaken each other’s effect on
total resource dependence, and the results are no longer robust to regional
controls, nor is institutional quality robustly linked to resource dependence.
Taken together, the results in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 describe the net effect of
resource abundance on resource dependence. On the one hand there is a direct
effect based on the comparative advantage argument (captured in Table 3.3).
On the other, resource abundance also enhances institutional quality (Table
3.2), which in turn translates into reduced dependence on primary exports of
investment, the average GDP shares of investment and government consumption, initial
income, average schooling levels, distance to navigable port, and country size as alternative
regressors.
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minerals, (Table 3.3). However, our estimations show that the comparative-
advantage effect dominates the indirect institutions effect. For example, a
one-standard-deviation increase in a country’s per-capita subsoil wealth would
lead to an expected average increase in mineral resource dependence of one-
third of a standard deviation.20 The less-than-proportional impact of resource
abundance on the degree of resource dependence would further confirm our
hypothesis that the traditional resource dependence variable is only a weak
proxy for true resource abundance.
A possible objection to our interpretation is that the results so far are
mainly due to the circumstances in non-democratic and authoritarian devel-
oping countries, which are also considered presidential in the dummy clas-
sification. Such countries may also have weaker economic performance and
worse policies per se, and therefore bias the results in favor of our hypotheses
(e.g., Przeworski and Limongi, 1993). However, when we remove any country
that scored above “5” on the 1972 Gastil index (the earliest available) com-
piled by Freedom House from our sample and re-run the estimations, we find
that our earlier conclusions are largely unchanged.21
20 From column (7) in Table 3.3 and column (2) in Table 3.2, the change is 1.857∗(0.109∗
(−0.035) + 0.021) = 0.032. The effect of mineral abundance on dependence in terms of
standard deviations is then is 0.032/0.093 = 0.344. Estimates from 2SLS with endogenous
institutions deliver very similar results.
21 Specifically, democratic countries with presidential regimes or low institutional qual-
ity are more resource dependent, although the influence of one type of political regime
over the other is less clear-cut. We also find that resource abundance has a positive im-
pact on resource dependence and institutional quality. However, the indirect effect of
resource abundance on dependence via institutions is strengthened relative to the direct,
comparative-advantage effect. Although comparative advantage prevails and the net effect
remains positive, the impact is weaker, a result which is confirmed in 2SLS estimations
where we again endogenize the institutional variable. One interpretation is that coun-
tries with better-developed institutions (such as democracies) have economies that are
less biased towards lower-growth sectors (such as natural resource extraction and export)
irrespective of their relative resource abundance. We also found that countries with a pres-
idential regime tended to have worse-quality institutions, an effect which persisted in the
democracies-only sample; see the Appendix for details. Similar results were obtained using
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Table 3.4: Mineral dependence, institutional design, and growth impacts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
minxp7080s −6.59∗∗ −4.612 −3.568 −3.263 0.507
(3.36) (3.97) (3.96) (3.58) (4.01)
lsubsoil 0.353∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗ 0.160
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.20)
rule 1.545∗∗∗ 2.006∗
(0.41) (1.02)
goveffect 1.165∗∗∗ 3.636
(0.41) (2.26)
lgdp70 0.127 −2.023∗∗∗ −1.622∗∗∗ −2.385∗∗∗ −3.433∗∗
(0.21) (0.40) (0.41) (0.82) (1.57)
Endog. var. minxp minxp rule goveffect
Obs 59 58 58 59 59
F-stat 6.47*** 4.00∗∗∗ 4.84∗∗∗ 108.08∗∗∗ 96.65∗∗∗
Excl. F-stat 6.54 8.16∗∗∗
Hansen J 0.22 0.42
Shea partial R2 0.43 0.46
1st stage R2 0.27 0.61 0.65 0.9 0.88
Notes: Dependent variable is (log) economic growth 1970-2000. Regression (1) reproduces a simple OLS
specification from the curse literature with the additional basic control variable of change in terms of trade
1970-1998, which has a coefficient of 0.538 and r.s.e. 0.13 (source: Neumayer 2004). Regressions (2)-(5) are
2SLS with regional dummy variables included in all second-stage specifications. Only second-stage results
shown; pres70s and open5060s are exogenous instruments for mineral resource dependence; latitude is the
exogenous instrument for institutions. The p-values of the Hansen J statistic refer to the overidentification
test that the instruments in the first-stage regressions do not enter the second-stage economic development
equations. Constant term included in all regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
We now turn to our main results. In column (1) of Table 3.4, we show
OLS results for a growth regression of the type popular in the resource curse
literature (corresponding to the regression fit in Figure 3.1), in order to test
whether our findings depend merely on our narrower sample. We still find a
significant curse result for our dependence measure, even when using a less
parsimonious specification. We can therefore concentrate on the outcomes
of the 2SLS regressions reported in the following columns, where we regress
per capita income growth between 1970-2000 on the endogenous variables
resource dependence and institutional quality. Only second-stage coefficients
different classifications of democracies, e.g. according to the Polity IV project.
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are shown.
In columns (2)-(5) we provide the basic estimation results when instru-
menting for resource dependence to correct for omitted variables, measure-
ment errors and reverse causality. The first noteworthy result is that there is
no significant association between resource dependence and income growth –
although the sign is negative, the conventional “curse” ceases to exist. But
our analysis seems to redeem resources to an even greater extent: the resource
abundance variable mostly enters positively and significantly in the second
stage estimations, so that the cumulative net effect on average growth is pos-
itive.22 Moreover, in additional estimations limited to democracies only (see
the Appendix), we show that the political and economic mechanisms linking
resources to economic performance are not driven by idiosyncracies of dicta-
torships. We believe these results lend credibility to earlier ideas advanced by
Davis (1995, 1998) – ideas that got snowed under in recent years by the em-
phasis on the detrimental effects of resources on growth and peace. Note that
the Hansen J statistics imply that constitutional design and our openness-
to-trade variable have no significant direct effect on economic growth (but
influence it via their impact on the degree of resource dependence). While
this does not dispute that alternative measures of “openness” may matter
directly for growth, this result shows average historic openness over the 1950s
and 1960s is an appropriate instrument for mineral dependence in first stage
regressions.23
After having established that institutional quality is not invariant with
respect to some of the deep economic and political variables, we also instru-
ment for our two institutional proxies: Government Effectiveness and Rule
22 For example, summing the effects from the two stages reported in column (2) yields
a rough estimate of the average resource effect on growth: 0.015 ∗ (−4.612) + 0.353 =
0.284. This corresponds to an effect of (0.284 ∗ 1.857)/1.774 = 0.297 in terms of standard
deviations.
23 The empirical evidence from the large literature on trade and growth remains mixed.
Rodrik (2001, p. 24) argues that “the only systematic relationship is that countries dis-
mantle trade barriers as they get richer.”
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of Law. These 2SLS results are provided in columns (4)-(5). Consistent with
previous results, we find that that the resource dependence variable does not
enter significantly, and even becomes positive when considering the quality
of the bureaucracy (column (5)). Resource abundance still positively affects
institutions in the first stage of the IV analysis; however, we now find weaker
evidence of a direct effect on income growth. This suggests that the indirect
institutional effect of resource abundance as shown in Table 3.3 is perhaps the
main link from resources to economic performance. Nevertheless, the consis-
tently positive signs show that natural resources have the potential to be a
blessing for economic growth, not a curse. Institutions themselves enter the
growth regression positively but not very significantly. Once again, similar
results are found in the democracy sample (see the Appendix).
Our final set of results are based on an estimation of the full system
of equations 3.1-3.3 described in Section 3.2, simultaneously instrumenting
for both resource dependence and institutions. If the disturbances for the
three equations are correlated, using a 3SLS approach will produce efficient
estimates (Greene, 2003). In this analysis we aim to trace back the chain of
causal relationships all the way to exogenous variables (resource abundance,
constitutional variables, and latitude), but it is evident that this comes at a
cost. The first and second-stage F-statistic is a useful summary statistic for
assessing the potential bias in the second stage (the inverse of the F-statistic
is proportional to the bias in the second stage). From the earlier tables
it is evident that in particular instrumenting for resource dependence may
introduce some bias, and the 3SLS analysis shown in Table 3.5 compounds
that bias by regressing dependence on the predicted institutions variable.
The main culprit for what must be a cautious statistical inference at this
stage appears to be our small sample size, which in turn is due to the limited
number of countries for which we have resource abundance data.
Notwithstanding these qualifications and caveats, the results in Table 3.5
support the earlier findings. In columns (1)-(2) we present results using the
now familiar World Bank abundance variable. All signs are as expected,
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Table 3.5: Mineral dependence, constitutions and institutions, and their im-
pact on economic growth (3SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Economic growth g7000 g7000 g7000 g7000 g7000 g7000 g7000 g7000
minxp −4.625 −2.885 2.431 3.417 3.666 3.144 −1.464 −2.992
(3.13) (3.55) (2.96) (3.18) (2.67) (2.75) (3.73) (3.23)
mineral abund. 0.345∗∗∗ 0.198 0.134∗∗ 0.094 0.055 0.057 0.261∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.15) (0.060) (0.058) (0.074) (0.077) (0.091) (0.084)
rule 1.666∗ 2.658∗∗∗ 2.274∗∗ 1.280
(0.92) (0.98) (1.05) (1.17)
goveffect 2.371 3.089∗∗ 2.473∗∗ 1.440
(1.62) (1.22) (1.17) (1.08)
lgdp70 −2.073∗∗∗ −1.953 −1.843∗∗ −1.879∗∗ −1.604∗ −1.737∗ −1.097 −1.395
(0.80) (1.25) (0.79) (0.92) (0.87) (0.97) (0.96) (0.90)
R2 0.58 0.44 0.37 0.24 0.33 0.30 0.49 0.53
Min. dependence minxp minxp minxp minxp minxp minxp minxp minxp
pres70s 0.035 0.038∗ 0.036 0.036 0.059∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.041∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.023)
mineral abund. 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
rule −0.027 0.005 −0.018 −0.027
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
goveffect −0.018 0.013 −0.008 −0.017
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
open5060s 0.259∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.038) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.037) (0.037)
R2 0.60 0.62 0.52 0.49 0.58 0.59 0.57 0.63
Institutions rule goveffect rule goveffect rule goveffect rule goveffect
latitude 2.920∗∗∗ 2.284∗∗∗ 2.159∗∗∗ 1.981∗∗∗ 2.071∗∗∗ 1.921∗∗∗ 2.898∗∗∗ 2.841∗∗∗
(0.59) (0.59) (0.57) (0.56) (0.59) (0.60) (0.62) (0.62)
mineral abund. 0.104∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ −0.006 0.005 0.024 0.031 0.004 0.003
(0.039) (0.040) (0.016) (0.015) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028)
R2 0.77 0.76 0.65 0.67 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.67
Mineral abund. var. lsubsoil lsubsoil lhcpc lhcpc lallminpc lallminpc lsubsoil00 lsubsoil00
Obs 58 58 86 86 84 83 69 68
Wald test min. ab. 22.24∗∗∗ 20.1∗∗∗ 43.31∗∗∗ 42.32∗∗∗ 44.73∗∗∗ 44.46∗∗∗ 43.12∗∗∗ 41.56∗∗∗
Notes: All regressions are 3SLS. Regional dummy variables and constant term included in all specifications.
The Wald test statistics refer to the hypothesis that the sum of the effects of the mineral abundance variable
is insignificantly different from zero. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at
10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
and the magnitude and significance of the main coefficients of interest are
generally consistent with our previous findings. We do not find that resource
dependence significantly impacts the average growth rate, although the sign
remains negative. Moreover, mineral resource abundance seems to have a
positive overall effect on economic performance which is significantly different
from zero (p-values for the Wald test of 0.0001 or below in all specifications),
confirming our view that there is no real evidence of a curse. Again, when we
limit our sample to democracies only we find substantially unchanged effects
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(see the Appendix for details).
3.4 Robustness with respect to alternative re-
source abundance measures
As mentioned above, it is challenging to find truly exogenous measures of
resource abundance, and one might argue our abundance measure is not fully
exogenous. To address this concern, we evaluate our model based on three
alternative measures of resource abundance: (i) per capita hydrocarbon re-
serves in 1993 (in logs) from Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) (lhcpc), which exclude
all non-fuel mineral resources; (ii) estimates of the per capita value of 1970
stocks (in logs) of the main fuel and non-fuel mineral resources, provided
by Norman (2006) (lallminpc); and (iii) the (log of) World Bank resource
abundance measures for 2000 (lsubsoil00 ) (World Bank, 2005).
For all these alternative measures, we find that the “resource curse” re-
sult disappears when we instrument for dependence, and that abundance is
positively linked to dependence. For space reasons, we only present 3SLS
results; further results are available in the Appendix. Columns (3)-(4) of
Table 3.5 show the findings using the hydrocarbon data as the abundance
variable; in columns (5)-(6) we employ the mineral stocks estimates; and in
columns (7)-(8) we use the subsoil wealth measures for 2000. With all al-
ternative measures, the direct effect of mineral abundance on growth in the
third stage continues to be positive and even significant (in the case of hy-
drocarbons and the 2000 subsoil wealth data). As expected, we also find that
resource abundance positively affects dependence. Moreover, there is no evi-
dence that resource dependence, when instrumented for, lowers growth rates:
on the contrary, dependence even enters with a positive sign in several cases.
However, we find no significant effect of mineral abundance on institutional
quality with any alternative measure, although the sign is positive in all cases
but one (see the bottom panel).
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3.5 Conclusions and discussion
The paradoxical finding of a negative relationship between a sizable resource
sector and economic growth has attracted widespread attention from aca-
demics, policy makers and international organizations. The main causal
mechanism linking resources to poor performance is commonly hypothesized
to be ”executive discretion over resource rents“ (Jensen and Wantchekon,
2004). According to this view, an abundance of rents allows incumbent
politicians to maintain support and consolidate their power base through
repression, buying off the opposition, or institutionalized patronage (includ-
ing massive spending on public service employment). Since such policies are
unlikely to promote economic growth, it is no surprise that economic and
political performance is not independent. The logic of the story, combined
with the fact that it is corroborated with observations of certain countries in
the developing world, has undoubtedly added to the appeal of the resource
curse hypothesis.
However, our empirical results cast new light on the validity of this emerg-
ing consensus. In discussing the impact of natural resources on growth, it is
useful to distinguish between resource abundance (a stock measure of in situ
resource wealth), resource rents (the flow of income derived from the resource
stock at some point in time), and resource dependence (the degree to which
countries do – or do not – have access to alternative sources of income other
than resource extraction, again at some point in time). Although possibly
correlated, these concepts are not equivalent. In fact, there exists a discrep-
ancy between the theory behind the curse, and the empirical work used to
support it. While abundant resource rents are a crucial element in the theory,
most previous analyses rely on a measure of resource dependence, and our
analysis suggests that resource dependence may not be a proper exogenous
variable. Treating resource dependence as endogenous, we find it to be in-
significant in growth regressions, with no effect on institutional quality. While
we find resource abundance to be significantly associated with both growth
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and institutional quality, the association runs contrary to the resource curse
hypothesis: greater abundance leads to better institutions and more rapid
growth. In short, the received result that resource wealth impedes growth
appears to be a red herring, and suggestions that countries should turn their
back on resource wealth to lower resource dependence may have to be recon-
sidered.
How may we reconcile our finding that resource-abundant countries could
in fact be better off than resource-poor ones with the existing literature?
One possible explanation may be that resources in the ground do not pose
the same problem for institutional quality or economic performance as flows of
resource rents do. But this begs another question – since resource stocks can
be converted into flows of money, why would outcomes for stocks and flows
be different? Another possible explanation would be more straightforward
and fully consistent with our main findings, namely that the curse simply
does not exist. The empirically significant relationship between institutional
quality and resource dependence reflects that countries with poor institutions
are unlikely to develop non-primary production sectors to reduce their depen-
dence on resource exports. If so, the causality would be from institutions to
dependence, and not the other way around. It would be inappropriate to
talk about the “curse of resources” then. Instead, growth regressions in the
resource curse literature may be viewed as a reminder of the important direct
and indirect impacts of institutions on economic outcomes.
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3.6 Appendix
Table 3.6: Correlations between different proxies for natural resource abun-
dance
sxp natxp70 minxp70 natxp minxp lnatcap lsubsoil lhcpc mintpc70
natxp70 0.705∗
(0.577∗)
[74]
minxp70 0.791∗ 0.884∗
(0.538∗) (0.625∗)
[81] [69]
natxp 0.657∗ 0.814∗ 0.897∗
(0.521∗) (0.609∗) (0.668∗)
[106] [76] [86]
minxp 0.672∗ 0.782∗ 0.9263∗ 0.984∗
(0.447∗) (0.489∗) (0.845∗) (0.886∗)
[106] [76] [86] [123]
lnatcap 0.118 0.147 0.146 0.359∗ 0.332∗
(−0.03) (−0.084) (−0.134) (0.286∗) (0.245∗)
[84] [62] [69] [83] [83]
lsubsoil 0.279∗ 0.361∗ 0.309∗ 0.505∗ 0.509∗ 0.707∗
(0.173) (0.308∗) (0.293∗) (0.448∗) (0.534∗) (0.654∗)
[61] [47] [51] [61] [61] [63]
lhcpc 0.215∗ 0.088 0.143 0.327∗ 0.363∗ 0.4064∗ 0.592∗
(0.091) (0.168) (0.316∗) (0.423∗) (0.495∗) (0.387∗) (0.694∗)
[100] [71] [79] [101] [101] [89] [63]
mintpc70 0.544∗ 0.529∗ 0.608∗ 0.607∗ 0.640∗ 0.517∗ 0.637∗ 0.295∗
(0.181) (0.168) (0.521∗) (0.462∗) (0.575∗) (0.343∗) (0.518∗) (0.498∗)
[98] [72] [75] [99] [99] [77] [60] [97]
lallminpc 0.382* 0.303* 0.438* 0.483* 0.539* 0.457* 0.799* 0.623* 0.394*
(0.258*) (0.199) (0.539*) (0.528*) (0.661*) (0.437*) (0.806*) 0.626*) (0.771*)
[103] [75] [81] [107] [107] [83] [62] [104] [114]
Notes: The table depicts Pearson’s correlations and Spearman’s rank correlations in parentheses below,
with the number of observations in square brackets. * denotes significance at 5 percent level or below. sxp
is the GNP share of total primary exports from Sachs & Warner (1997); natxp70 is the GDP share of total
primary resource exports in 1970; and minxp70 is the corresponding GDP share of mineral exports only.
lhcpc is the log of hydrocarbon deposits in 1993, from Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004); mintpc70 is the 1970
per capita mineral output in tons, from IGS (1978) and the BP database; lallminpc measures (log) total
fuel and nonfuel mineral reserves in 1970 in current prices (in USD per capita), from Norman (2006).
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Table 3.7: Institutions, constitutions, and natural resources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
rule goveffect rule goveffect rule goveffect rule goveffect
latitude 2.480∗∗∗ 2.130∗∗∗ 3.041∗∗∗ 2.383∗∗∗ 2.519∗∗∗ 2.367∗∗∗ 3.310∗∗∗ 2.982∗∗∗
(0.579) (0.629) (0.658) (0.749) (0.74) (0.806) (0.883) (0.986)
pres70s −0.338∗∗ −0.26 −0.24 −0.134 −0.366∗ −0.118 −0.19 0.09
(0.164) (0.167) (0.176) (0.169) (0.191) (0.211) (0.245) (0.241)
maj70s 0.246∗ 0.132 0.024 −0.02 0.262∗ 0.198 0.126 0.054
(0.129) (0.131) (0.13) (0.133) (0.142) (0.151) (0.135) (0.158)
lnatcap 0.254∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗ 0.281∗∗
(0.097) (0.105) (0.107) (0.116)
lsubsoil 0.133∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗ 0.167∗∗
(0.049) (0.053) (0.061) (0.065)
Sample All All All All Dems Dems Dems Dems
Obs 68 68 54 54 53 53 42 42
F-stat 47.54∗∗∗ 36.76∗∗∗ 44.85∗∗∗ 31.52∗∗∗ 41.28∗∗∗ 30.88∗∗∗ 37.82∗∗∗ 26.73∗∗∗
R2 0.78 0.78 0.82 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.83 0.8
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Regional dummy variables and constant term included in all specifications.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels,
respectively.
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Table 3.8: Mineral dependence and institutions (democracies)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
minxp minxp rule goveffect minxp minxp
pres70s 0.055 0.061∗ 0.052 0.061∗
(0.036) (0.033) (0.038) (0.035)
maj70s 0.024 0.022 0.024 0.022
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
lsubsoil 0.015∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
−0.005 −0.005 (0.051) (0.051) (0.006) (0.006)
rule −0.029∗∗ −0.036
(0.015) (0.024)
goveffect −0.045∗∗∗ −0.041∗
(0.015) (0.025)
open5060s 0.292∗∗∗ 0.297*** 0.295∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.066) (0.071) (0.066)
latitude 3.566∗∗∗ 2.889∗∗∗
(0.75) (0.80)
Obs 40 40 42 42 40 40
Estimation meth. OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
F-stat 2.72∗∗ 3.24∗∗∗ 43.66∗∗∗ 37.08∗∗∗
R2 0.62 0.66 0.82 0.80
Notes: Regional dummy variables and constant term included in all specifications. Country sample includes
democracies only, defined by a 1972 Gastil score between 0 and 5. Columns (5)-(6) show 2SLS results
(second stage only), where institutions are instrumented by latitude. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 3.9: Mineral dependence and the finer points of constitutional design
(1) (2) (3) (4)
minxp minxp minxp minxp
majpres 0.074∗∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.090∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.036) (0.040) (0.036)
propres 0.054∗ 0.054∗ 0.108∗ 0.121∗∗
(0.029) (0.031) (0.055) (0.051)
majpar 0.027 0.023 0.060∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026)
lnsubsoil 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
open5060s 0.260∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.068) (0.071) (0.066)
rule −0.035∗∗ −0.029∗
(0.014) (0.015)
goveffect −0.038∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015)
Sample all all dems dems
Obs 52 52 40 40
F-stat 3.12∗∗∗ 3.23∗∗∗ 2.70∗∗ 3.26∗∗∗
Wald test p-value 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.05
R2 0.58 0.58 0.63 0.67
Notes: All regressions are OLS with regional control variables and constant term. majpres is dummy
variable for majoritarian electoral rules and presidential governmental system; propres for proportional
electoral rules and presidential system; majpar for majoritarian electoral rules and parliamentary system;
and propar is the omitted dummy variable, referring to proportional electoral rules in a parliamentary sys-
tem. Europe and Central Asia is omitted regional dummy variable. p-values are given for the Wald test of
joint significance of the constitutional dummy variables (null hypothesis of joint significance insignificantly
different from zero). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at 10, 5, and
1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 3.10: Mineral dependence and alternative resource measures (full sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
pres70s 0.055∗∗∗ 0.028 0.032 0.065∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.045∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.017) (0.025) (0.026) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024)
maj70s 0.018 0.016 0.013 0.028∗ 0.02 0.024 0.026 0.006 0.014
(0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022)
min. abund. 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
rule −0.022∗ -0.0187* -0.0144
(0.011) (0.0098) (0.011)
goveffect −0.017 −0.020∗ −0.019
(0.015) (0.011) (0.012)
open5060s 0.174∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.028) (0.031) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.060) (0.056) (0.054)
Min. abund. var. lhcpc lhcpc lhcpc lallminpc lallminpc lallminpc lsubsoil00 lsubsoil00 lsubsoil00
Obs 70 70 70 73 73 72 60 60 59
Regional controls no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
F-stat 9.06∗∗∗ 5.60∗∗∗ 7.92∗∗∗ 12.98∗∗∗ 7.34∗∗∗ 8.19∗∗∗ 8.99∗∗∗ 4.17∗∗∗ 4.52∗∗∗
R2 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.47 0.52 0.57
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Dependent variable is mineral dependence (minxp). Constant term included in all specifications. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 3.11: Mineral dependence and alternative resource measures (democ-
racies)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pres70s 0.022 0.022 0.055 0.041 0.068∗ 0.045
(0.036) (0.033) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.035)
maj70s 0.022 0.019 0.0241 0.0301 0.0166 0.0251
(0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
min. abund. 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
rule −0.020∗ −0.016 −0.013
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
goveffect −0.028∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.030∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
open5060s 0.189∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.025) (0.025) (0.055) (0.052)
Min. abund. var. lhcpc lhcpc lallminpc lallminpc lsubsoil00 lsubsoil00
Obs 54 54 57 56 47 46
F-stat 5.81∗∗∗ 7.20∗∗∗ 6.89∗∗∗ 8.49∗∗∗ 3.22∗∗∗ 3.86∗∗∗
R2 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.60 0.53 0.61
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Dependent variable is mineral dependence (minxp). Regional controls and
constant term included in all specifications. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically
significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 3.12: Mineral dependence, institutional design and growth impacts
with alternative resource measures (full sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
minxp 1.896 2.396 2.992 2.567 -2.133 -3.453
(2.52) (2.11) (2.71) (2.44) (4.36) (3.84)
min.abund. 0.120∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗ 0.08 0.086 0.288∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.044) (0.055) (0.053) (0.11) (0.094)
rule 1.470∗∗∗ 1.215∗∗∗ 0.996∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.31) (0.30)
goveffect 1.399∗∗∗ 1.180∗∗∗ 1.076∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.28) (0.34)
lgdp70 −1.353∗∗∗ −1.249∗∗∗ −1.230∗∗∗ −1.239∗∗∗ −1.193∗∗∗ −1.304∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.34) (0.35) (0.32) (0.37) (0.38)
Min.abund.var. lhcpc lhcpc lallminpc lallminpc lsubsoil00 lsubsoil00
Obs 86 86 84 83 69 68
F-stat 7.23∗∗∗ 11.68∗∗∗ 6.88∗∗∗ 10.52∗∗∗ 5.08∗∗∗ 7.77∗∗∗
Excl. F-stat 20.68∗∗∗ 28.68∗∗∗ 27.05∗∗∗ 38.85∗∗∗ 5.79∗∗∗ 8.92∗∗∗
Hansen J p-value 0.97 0.81 0.49 0.36 0.35 0.26
Shea partial R2 0.46 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.3 0.38
1st stage R2 0.57 0.61 0.59 0.64 0.58 0.66
Notes: All regressions are 2SLS, with (log) income growth 1970-2000 as the dependent variable in the
second stage and mineral dependence in the first stage. Regional controls and constant term included in
all specifications. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1
percent levels, respectively.
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Table 3.13: Mineral dependence, institutional design and growth impacts (democracies)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
minxp −3.956 −2.934 0.254 0.240 1.102 −0.113 −4.583 −6.422
(3.61) (3.59) (2.98) (2.554) (3.44) (2.94) (5.47) (4.92)
min.abund. 0.198∗ 0.177∗ 0.095∗ 0.071 0.019 0.049 0.234∗ 0.251∗∗
(0.12) (0.10) (0.051) (0.044) (0.060) (0.056) (0.12) (0.10)
rule 1.517∗∗∗ 2.053∗∗∗ 1.603∗∗∗ 1.354∗∗∗
(0.55) (0.54) (0.50) (0.44)
goveffect 1.144∗∗ 1.853∗∗∗ 1.681∗∗∗ 1.573∗∗∗
(0.53) 0.4573496 (0.44) (0.41)
lgdp70 −1.812∗∗∗ −1.402∗∗ −1.934∗∗∗ −1.732∗∗∗ −1.532∗∗∗ −1.713∗∗∗ −1.545∗∗∗ −1.803∗∗∗
(0.56) (0.57) (0.53) (0.468) (0.55) (0.48) (0.57) (0.46)
Min.abund.var. lsubsoil lsubsoil lhcpc lhcpc lallminpc lallminpc lsubsoil00 lsubsoil00
Obs 40 40 56 56 56 55 45 44
F-stat 3.05∗∗ 5.22∗∗∗ 5.45∗∗∗ 7.04∗∗∗ 6.32∗∗∗ 7.63∗∗∗ 2.61∗∗ 2.99∗∗∗
Excl. F-stat 6.08∗∗∗ 10∗∗∗ 10.89∗∗∗ 11.07∗∗∗ 15.23∗∗∗ 17.51∗∗∗ 2.96∗ 5.34∗∗∗
Hansen J p-value 0.79 0.76 0.16 0.04 0.30 0.20 0.44 0.45
Shea partial R2 0.48 0.56 0.45 0.5 0.47 0.54 0.28 0.40
1st stage R2 0.62 0.7 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.61 0.52 0.61
Notes: All regressions are 2SLS, with (log) income growth 1970-2000 as the dependent variable in the second stage and mineral dependence in the first stage. Regional
controls and constant term included in all specifications. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels,
respectively.
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Table 3.14: 3SLS for democracies only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Economic growth g7000 g7000 g7000 g7000 g7000 g7000 g7000 g7000
minxp −3.878 −2.601 0.309 0.118 0.747 0.738 −7.350∗ −9.149∗
(3.61) (3.76) (7.31) (4.16) (3.53) (5.59) (4.39) (4.97)
min.abund. 0.286∗∗ 0.288∗ 0.059 0.082 0.043 0.061 0.326∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.15) (0.097) (0.068) (0.073) (0.10) (0.13) (0.14)
rule 0.544 1.267 0.734 0.629
(1.29) (1.31) (1.20) (1.42)
goveffect −0.121 −0.039 0.174 0.716
(1.72) (2.42) (1.99) (2.20)
lgdp70 −1.343 −0.802 −0.813 −1.491 −1.131 −0.869 −1.547 −1.907
(1.14) (1.38) (2.17) (1.21) (1.07) (1.84) (1.25) (1.93)
R2 0.50 0.43 0.19 0.47 0.43 0.34 0.39 0.33
Min. dependence minxp minxp minxp minxp minxp minxp minxp minxp
pres70s 0.051 0.063∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.051∗ 0.045 0.049 0.045
(0.034) (0.031) (0.026) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.035) (0.032)
min.abund. 0.013∗ 0.011∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
rule −0.019 −0.017 −0.034∗ −0.036∗
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
goveffect −0.004 −0.01 −0.022 −0.020
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
open5060s 0.292∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.048) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.047) (0.047)
R2 0.61 0.60 0.51 0.51 0.55 0.60 0.49 0.59
Institutions rule goveffect rule goveffect rule goveffect rule goveffect
latitude 3.501∗∗∗ 2.630∗∗∗ 2.392∗∗∗ 3.024∗∗∗ 2.713∗∗∗ 2.152∗∗∗ 3.754∗∗∗ 3.195∗∗∗
(0.67) (0.72) (0.80) (0.77) (0.75) (0.80) (0.76) (0.78)
min.abund. 0.160∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.012 0.031 0.033 0.039 0.055
(0.043) (0.047) (0.022) (0.021) (0.028) (0.030) (0.036) (0.038)
Min. abund. var. lsubsoil lsubsoil lhcpc lhcpc lallminpc lallminpc lsubsoil00 lsubsoil00
Obs 40 40 56 56 56 55 45 44
R2 0.83 0.80 0.65 0.67 0.70 0.67 0.73 0.72
Wald test min.abund. 20.12 18.98 25.12 24.95 28.23 27.88 23.09 26.09
Notes: All regressions are 3SLS. The Wald test statistics refer to the hypothesis that the sum of the effects
of the mineral abundance variable is insignificantly different from zero. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗,
∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 3.15: Variables and sources
Economic development
g7000: Log of growth of real GDP per capita between 1970-2000. Source: PWT 6.1.
lgdp70: Log of real GDP per capita in 1970. Source: PWT 6.1.
Resource exports and abundance
agrixp: GDP share of yearly agricultural raw materials exports, averaged over 1970-2000. Agri-
cultural raw materials comprise SITC section 2 (crude materials except fuels) excluding divisions
22, 27 (crude fertilizers and minerals excluding coal, petroleum, and precious stones), and 28
(metalliferous ores and scrap). Sources: WDI, PWT 6.1.
lallminpc: Log of fuel and 35 non-fuel mineral stocks estimated for 1970 at market prices, in
USD per capita. Sources: Norman (2007) and PWT 6.1 (for population data).
lhcpc: Log of per capita hydrocarbon deposits in 1993. Source: Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004).
lnatcap: Log of total natural capital, estimated in USD per capita for 1994. The measure
includes subsoil assets, timber resources, non-timber forest resources, protected areas, cropland,
and pastureland. Source: World Bank (1997).
lsubsoil, lsubsoil00: Log of subsoil assets, estimated in USD per capita for 1994 and 2000,
respectively. The measure includes energy resources (oil, natural gas, hard coal, lignite) and
other mineral resources (bauxite, copper, gold, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, silver, tin, zinc).
Sources: World Bank (1997, 2005).
minxp: GDP share of total yearly mineral exports, defined as the sum of mineral fuels, ores and
metal exports, averaged over 1970-2000. Fuels comprise SITC section 3 (mineral fuels); ores and
metals comprise the commodities in SITC sections 27 (crude fertilizer, minerals not elsewhere
specified (n.e.s.)), 28 (metalliferous ores, scrap), and 68 (non-ferrous metals). Sources: WDI,
PWT 6.1.
natxp: GDP share of total yearly natural resource exports, defined as the sum of mineral and
agricultural raw materials exports, averaged over 1970-2000. Sources: WDI, PWT 6.1.
Constitutions and institutions
goveffect: Measures the quality of the bureaucracy and of public services in 1996. Recalibrated
to assume values between zero (worst) and 5 (best). Source: Kaufmann et al. (2005).
maj70s: Binary indicator for majoritarian (plurality) elections of house representatives. Coded
1 when majority or all house members elected by plurality rule. Coded 0 when majority or
all members elected by proportional rule. Value for early 1970s. Sources: Beck et al. (2005),
Persson & Tabellini (2004).
pres70s: Binary indicator for form of government, coded 1 if the chief executive is directly
presidential or a strong president elected by an assembly. Coded 0 if parliamentary. Value for
early 1970s. Sources: Beck et al. (2005), Persson & Tabellini (2004).
rule: Measures the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence in 1996. Recalibrated to assume values between zero (worst)
and 5 (best). Source: Kaufmann et al. (2005).
Other variables
latitude: Absolute value of latitude of a country on a scale of 0 to 1. Source: La Porta et al.
(1999).
open5060s: Measure of trade openness (in nominal terms), defined as the sum of imports and
exports over GDP. Average between 1950 and 1969. Source: PWT 6.1.
Chapter 4
Financing the alternative:
renewable energy in developing
and transition countries
This paper examines the determinants of credit allocation to renewable en-
ergy firms in developing and transition countries. Using a simple endogenous
growth model, we show that the development of the renewable energy sector,
i.e. the diversification of renewable energy resources used in primary energy
production, depends on the quality of financial intermediation, debtor infor-
mation costs to banks, and financing needs of renewable energy firms. Policies
should aim at increasing financial sector performance through better institu-
tional frameworks and improving financing conditions for new energy firms.
The empirical analysis confirms the positive effect of financial intermediary
development on the renewable energy sector.
4.1 Introduction
Achieving a diversified and sustainable energy supply for future generations
is one of the major challenges for today’s policymakers. But financing the
necessary energy projects is proving a serious obstacle to this goal. Over
127
128 FINANCING THE ALTERNATIVE
the next twenty-five years, global energy demand is projected to grow by
nearly 60 percent; more than two thirds of the increased demand will come
from developing and transition countries. Energy demand will continue to
be covered mainly by conventional fossil fuels, such as coal, oil, and natural
gas, with over two thirds of the energy-related pollution increase coming from
the developing world (IEA, 2005). Meanwhile, many estimates predict that
oil and possibly natural gas production will plateau around the same time,
casting doubt on future energy security.1 Hence, achieving a sustainable
energy supply requires diversifying energy sources and changing the current
dependence on non-renewable and polluting hydrocarbon fuels.
However, energy projects generally demand high levels of financing, which
producers in less developed economies can rarely cover on their own; but ob-
taining sufficient investment to pursue energy diversification faces a number
of obstacles (World Bank, 1999; IEA, 2003). More precisely, the financing
for renewable energy technologies (RETs) is closely connected to the devel-
opment of the financial sector:2 on the one hand, energy sector privatization
and liberalization during the course of the 1990s have increased the contribu-
tion of smaller private power projects, and at the same time induced a shift
in external financing from the local government and multilateral institutions
to private investors (Babbar and Schuster, 1998). On the other hand, re-
1 The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2000) alone has published several
different scenarios, with global oil production peaking between 2021 and 2112.
2 Another important issue regards the institutional framework: as previous literature
has pointed out, limited financing of RETs derives both from the lack of a specific policy
design, and/or crowding-out effects from government policies favoring investment in fossil
fuel projects (Churchill and Saunders, 1989; Head, 2000; World Bank, 2002; Sonntag-
O’Brien and Usher, 2004b; UNEP FI, 2004). Institutional shortcomings also contribute
to the often limited consideration by potential investors of the positive environmental
externalities of RETs in project development costs. In general, the perception that energy
sustainability is not a top priority for policymakers further lowers investors’ willingness to
finance projects where the foreseeable rewards are already relatively low and long in the
coming.
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newable energy (RE) projects have very high start-up costs relative to the
expected monetary returns, and very lengthy payback periods; they therefore
typically require long-term maturity loans (UNEP FI, 2004; Sonntag-O’Brien
and Usher, 2004b).
Accordingly, the problem of financing RE projects is twofold: first, the
availability of the long-term loans needed by RET firms is positively linked
to the development of the banking system (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic,
1999). As a consequence, RE projects in less developed countries are at a
particular disadvantage.3 Second, RET firms firms have limited access to
financing because RE projects compete against fossil fuel projects, which
have a longer track record, relatively lower up-front costs, shorter lead times,
and often favorable political treatment (Churchill and Saunders, 1989; Head,
2000; World Bank, 2002; and Sonntag-O’Brien and Usher, 2004b).
It is worth noting that in both cases, underinvestment in RET firms can be
interpreted in terms of imperfect information between firms and financiers:
projects aimed at developing new technologies bear, almost by definition,
greater information costs to investors, which are more easily borne by a highly
developed financial sector. Where the latter is not given, the result may
well be a market distortion in favor of less risky investments, such as fossil
fuel projects and large-sized enterprises. This is consistent with the view
that the development of the domestic financial sectors is the crucial factor in
meeting the booming energy demand in less developed economies (Ishiguro
and Akiyama, 1995; World Bank, 2003).4
Following this line of reasoning, the paper presents a multi-sector en-
dogenous growth model of the expanding-varieties type (following Gries et
3 In less developed economies, the banking sector is the major source of external financ-
ing (Tadesse, 2002; Carlin and Mayer, 2003; and Beck et al., 2004a), and access to bank
credit is a serious problem especially for small- and medium-sized companies (Beck et al.,
2004b).
4 The notion that commercial financing plays an important role in RET expansion in
developing countries is empirically confirmed by a number of case studies, for example on
the experiences in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
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al., 2004; and Romer, 1990), which is applied to explain the influence of
financial intermediaries on the development of RETs in developing and tran-
sition countries. The focus is on the development of financial intermediaries
– and especially the banking sector and banks’ role as evaluators of potential
debtors – as a driving force in the introduction of RETs in these countries.
We assume imperfect information between RE entrepreneurs and financiers,
and show that high information costs to determine creditworthy investment
projects, and distortions in the banking sector, have a negative impact on the
expansion of the RE sector. Greater RE development and economic growth
in the model come from better financial intermediation and lower information
costs to banks, as well as lower external financing needs for RE entrepreneurs.
From this simple model, we can derive that policies should aim at improv-
ing financial sector performance in general and financing conditions for RE
firms in particular, in order to foster the development of a diversified and
sustainable energy sector.
The main theoretical findings on the determinants of renewable energy
sector development are tested empirically in a series of panel data regressions
for 118 non-OECD countries. The empirical results are fairly encouraging:
they confirm the positive effect of financial sector and particularly banking
sector development, as well as of power sector reforms, on the use of RETs in
developing and transition countries – especially the newer technologies such
as wind, solar, geothermal and biomass.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 contains the description of
the model and the resulting steady-state equilibrium; policy implications are
discussed in Section 4.3 and the empirical results given in Section 4.4; while
section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The model
The approach is based on a simple general equilibrium model of endogenous
growth with three sectors: final and primary energy production, and the
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banking sector. The focus is on the development of the renewable energy
(RE) sector in transition and developing economies. Experience in these
countries shows that renewable energy technologies (RETs) have typically
been adopted from developed countries and not been the result of domestic
R&D. The model therefore considers only the expansion of renewable energy
resources and firms using already-developed RETs and does not include an
R&D sector.
Final energy provision
We assume that there are N primary renewable energy producers in a given
country, each supplying energy derived from a different RE resource Ri, e.g.
hydropower, wind, geothermal, photovoltaic and solar thermal, biomass, etc.,
to the final energy producer. Final energy is produced by means of labour and
primary RE resources Ri according to the following extended Cobb-Douglas
production function (Romer, 1990; Gries et al., 2004):
Y = L1−α
N∑
i=1
Rαi , (4.1)
where 0 < α < 1. Since the production function is homogeneous of degree
one, there will be constant returns to scale of all inputs taken together.5
Following the basic idea of the expanding-varieties model, growth is driven
by an expansion in N (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004), i.e. a diversification in
the primary renewable energy sources. The latter is interpreted as beneficial
for the sustainable development of the energy sector: a larger number of
RE resources in primary energy production increases the share of RETs in
5 The formulation used here also implies that the different types of primary renewable
energy in a country are not perfect substitutes but have additively separate effects on a
country’s energy supply. In a particular case, a new type of primary renewable energy i
may substitute for an existing one i′, reducing its marginal productivity; but in finite time,
the overall independence of marginal product will hold, following Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2004).
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a country’s energy supply, and by implication diminishes the dependence on
existing primary energy resources used in energy production.
The final energy production sector behaves like a single competitive firm,
which maximises profits according to
πY = Y − wL−
N∑
i=1
PiRi, (4.2)
with Pi denoting the price of primary resource Ri and w the wage rate. This
implies a demand for primary RE resources given by
Ri = L
( α
Pi
) 1
1−α
. (4.3)
Realization of primary RE production projects
Primary RE production is relatively capital-intensive. Planning and imple-
menting a new energy project, regardless of the type of resource used, is a
very costly enterprise. And because of the additional costs facing RETs – e.g.
long lead times, low levels of regulatory and financial support, and relatively
high production costs in a fledgling industry where economies of scale and
learning effects have only recently set in – renewable energy entrepreneurs in
less developed economies are especially reliant on outside financing, as their
own wealth is unlikely to be sufficient to cover their investment needs.6
In the model, the RE entrepreneur has own wealth of W , which by as-
sumption is less than 1. He must therefore obtain 1−W = Z units of financing
from an outside creditor in order to undertake a new energy project. If the
creditor decides to award the loan necessary to finance the project, he will
charge periodic interest payments Zrl on the credit.
The main source of finance for entrepreneurs in developing and transition
countries is the banking sector. We exclude the possibility of Ponzi schemes
6 Whether we consider a new investment project by an established firm or the start-
up of a new energy firm, financing needs in the energy sector are still likely to surpass
own wealth. For a study of the financing patterns of the energy sector in less developed
countries, see World Bank (1999).
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by assuming that firms revolve loans infinitely and service no more than the
interest payments (Gries et al., 2004). With rd denoting the bank deposit
rate, the present discounted value of the entrepreneur’s setup costs is Vs(t) =∫
∞
t
Zrle
−
R v
t
rd(s)ds. rd is constant in a steady-state equilibrium, and the setup
costs simplify to
Vs = Z
rl
rd
. (4.4)
After obtaining the initial project credit from the financier, profit flows of
primary energy producers may continue to be affected by the quality of the
banks’ financial intermediation. The level of banking sector distortion is
captured by τ , which enters the profit stream as an indirect “tax” on banking
services provided to the entrepreneur once he has been granted the initial
loan. The “tax” rate τ depends on the legal and institutional environment
and includes factors which influence banks’ lending ability such as currency
taxes, as well as accounting standards and the power of banks to draw up
contracts.7
In addition, the RE producer will have to pay costs of δ on each unit
of energy resource he uses. δ includes periodic costs of primary energy pro-
duction, e.g. maintenance costs for wind mills or photovoltaic panels. The
primary RE production sector cannot be described by a single firm; instead,
there is a distinct firm i which produces energy with each RE resource Ri.
Once the primary energy producer has secured the financing of his project,
he can supply his output to the final energy producer. In this form of monop-
olistic competition between primary RE producers, the present discounted
value of the infinite stream of returns on the initial investment is given by
Vr(t) =
∫
∞
t
(
(1− τ)Pi− δ
)
Rie
−
R v
t
rd(s)ds. In the steady state, the interest rate
7 King and Levine (1993b) introduced a similar financial sector “tax” caused by market
distortions in their model. For empirical studies of indirect financial sector taxes, see
Chamley and Honohan (1990) and Giovannini and de Melo (1993). For more on institutions
and financial intermediation, see La Porta et al. (1997), Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1998), Levine et al. (2000), and Beck et al. (2004a).
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rd is constant and the net present value of returns is given by
Vr =
1
rd
Ri
(
(1− τ)Pi − δ
)
. (4.5)
The primary energy producer takes the demand curve for primary RE by
the final energy provider (4.3) as given when choosing the profit-maximizing
price to set. Profit maximization gives the optimal primary resource price P ,
which holds for all RE resource types,
P =
δ
α
1
(1− τ)
. (4.6)
Using the optimal price P (4.6) and equation (4.3), and substituting them in
(4.5) yields a net present value of the RE producer of
Vr =
1
rd
L
(
1− α
α
)(
α2(1− τ)
δα
) 1
1−α
. (4.7)
Primary energy producers compete for bank credits to realize their projects;
setup costs must therefore equal the net present value of profits Vs = Vr. This
leads to a loan demand by the RE producers of
rl =
L
Z
(
1− α
α
)(
α2(1− τ)
δα
) 1
1−α
. (4.8)
Equation (4.8) gives the equilibrium interest on loan payments that the RE
producers will be willing to pay the bank.
The banking sector
Banks keep deposits D and make interest payments to their depositors at
rate rd, and they allocate credits Q at the loan rate rl. Of potential RE
entrepreneurs applying for a loan, only a fraction φ will actually be credit-
worthy. However, there is a critical situation of imperfect information be-
tween the possible debtor and the investor: the financier cannot directly
observe the quality of the investment project. Instead, he has to evaluate
the RET project’s potential at cost f before deciding on credit allocation.
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The reasoning is that although the entrepreneurs may observe their own po-
tential costlessly, they cannot evaluate and credibly communicate it to the
financial intermediators.8 We assume that the financing constraints of RE
entrepreneurs and information costs to financiers are similar across different
RETs.
Banks are faced with a balance-sheet constraint which requires that to-
tal assets – credits Q plus reserve holdings RD – equal total liabilities, i.e.
deposits D:
Q+RD = D. (4.9)
In this model, we concentrate on the market distortions affecting the finan-
cial intermediation between banks and debtors, and assume that interbank
frictions are negligible and reserve holdings unnecessary. This means that
RD = 0 and that total credits Q must equal total deposits D at all times.
Bank profits are thus given by
πB =
(
rl −
f
φ
)
Q− rdQ. (4.10)
Profit maximization yields the bank loan supply of
rl = rd +
f
φ
. (4.11)
The result corresponds to a situation with zero profits. Credit market equi-
librium is given by Q = ZN .
Households
The model uses a standard description of consumer preferences. The repre-
sentative household maximizes intertemporal utility according to
U =
∫
∞
o
C1−σ − 1
1− σ
e−ρtdt for σ ∈ [0,∞). (4.12)
8 See King and Levine (1993b), and Fazzari et al. (1988) for more on the importance
of imperfect information in new debt provision.
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ρ denotes the rate of time preference, and 1/σ indicates the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. The households’ income will come from interest
on deposits and wages and can be spent on consumption or savings (further
deposits), giving the following budget constraint
Drd + wL = C + s = C + D˙. (4.13)
The first-order conditions imply the familiar Keynes-Ramsey rule:
γC =
rd − ρ
σ
, (4.14)
where γC = C˙/C is the equilibrium growth rate of consumption. In the
steady state, consumption and output grow at the same rate γC = γY = γ,
and rd = γ σ + ρ.
Solution for the steady state
Combining the primary RE producers’ loan demand (4.8) with the banks’
optimal loan supply (4.11) and the Keynes-Ramsey rule (4.14) gives us the
solution to the model
γ =
1
σ
(
L
Z
(1− α
α
)(α2(1− τ)
δα
) 1
1−α
− ρ−
f
φ
)
. (4.15)
This steady-state growth rate applies to the number of primary RE firms N ,
as well as output Y and consumption C.
The most interesting aspects of the solution regard the signs of the terms
involving the banking and RE sectors. Banking sector distortions, captured
by τ , will negatively affect growth, as less efficient financial intermediaries
channel part of firms’ profits away from growth-enhancing activities. Also, a
higher proportion of creditworthy investment projects φ will have a positive
effect not only on the RE sector’s growth, but on the growth of the economy
as a whole. We further see that higher information costs f to the financier
evaluating a potential creditor will result in lower growth rates.
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A higher dependence of the RE producer on external financing for a
project (a larger credit Z) is associated with a lower growth rate.9 Simi-
larly, higher resource costs to the primary RE producer δ will also result in
less growth in the RE sector and the economy overall. Finally, the model
shows that a greater willingness to save by the households – lower ρ and σ –
raises the growth rate.
Possible extensions regard the inclusion of positive production external-
ities, e.g. better environmental quality and lower economic and social costs
due to pollution. Through specific policies such as production subsidies and
guaranteed feed-in prices, these benefits can be internalized to lower the pro-
duction costs per unit of RE δ. Formally, this can be represented as δ = δ0−ǫ,
where δ is the net total periodic production cost per unit of primary RE
resource. δ0 includes the actual production cost such as equipment mainte-
nance, while ǫ is the per-unit value of production externalities. It is easy
to see that the inclusion of these externalities in the equation would have a
positive impact on RE sector development.
4.3 Policy implications for RE sector devel-
opment
The model’s findings have several implications for the development of the re-
newable energy sector. We will discuss two main issues involving the banking
sector, and other important points regarding RE production costs and the
external financing needs.
First, the cost τ is associated with inefficiencies in the provision of banks’
services. Banking sector distortions increase direct and indirect costs to the
debtors: examples of these distortions include narrow restrictions on banks’
9 The higher the credit need of an entrepreneur, the lower the interest rate on the loan
must be for him to be able to undertake the project, according to equation (4.8). Banks
will be less willing to give a credit, depressing the overall growth rate.
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operations and services to clients (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998).
One may argue that this “tax” applies equally to all energy firms operating
in a given country, and not only to the RE producers represented in the model.
However, energy firms in the conventional fossil fuel industry tend to be older
and more established than RET firms, and may have greater means of using
legal loopholes and institutional weaknesses to their advantage. Especially
in regions where the economy depends on the income from the hydrocarbon
extraction, refining and transportation industries, fossil fuel companies often
have privileged access to local financing. Government policy should aim at
providing a clear legal and institutional framework to create a more efficient
banking sector, and at enforcing the rules which are put in place.
The second issue regards the potential creditor evaluation costs to banks
f : the message is that better information on the available renewable energy
technologies will foster the sector’s development, i.e. an increase N . From en-
ergy sector surveys and firms’ own accounts, it appears that renewable energy
projects are at a particular disadvantage because of the short track record of
the new energy technologies, high up-front costs, and relatively low returns
spread out over long periods (Sonntag-O’Brien and Usher, 2004a,b). This
implies higher information costs to the financier in order to properly assess
the creditworthiness of the RE investment project. In addition, government
policies favoring fossil energy producers, such as guarantees and special fiscal
incentives, make the evaluation of a RET project vis-a`-vis a fossil fuel project
even less attractive and more costly for the financier.
The potential investors’ evaluation costs can be reduced through public
policy, e.g. by raising awareness and providing better information on new
technologies and the risks and experiences connected with them. These costs
can also be lowered more indirectly by eliminating tax breaks and other in-
centives granted to fossil fuel producers, or by setting up similar incentives for
funding RE. The latter policy option would have a more direct positive effect
on the fraction of creditworthy RE entrepreneurs φ. There is also increasing
experience of shared RE project funding through public-private partnerships
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(PPPs), which can allow a cash-strapped government to mobilize complemen-
tary financing sources by mixing its experience in public-sector infrastructure
and the reduced risk of partial governmental guarantees with private-sector
commercial and financial experience.10
Bank concentration reduces financing opportunities in countries with less
developed economies and institutions (Beck, 2003), making banking sector
competition another policy goal for better-functioning credit allocation, which
would affect both the distortional tax τ and the bank information costs f. An
interesting alternative to traditional commercial banking, which also con-
tributes to greater competition in financial intermediation, is venture capi-
talism (Rajan and Zingales, 2001). Venture capitalism has emerged as an
important source of start-up investment finance, which could mitigate some
of the difficulties involved with financing RE firms. However, the lack of
well-developed legal frameworks and the generally greater political risk in de-
veloping and transition countries are two factors which reduce the investment
attractiveness for venture capitalists, who rely on clear and enforceable con-
tract laws and accounting standards to exercise their organizational rights
and profit guarantees and, finally, their exit strategy.11 The better insti-
tutions mentioned earlier could not only help increase competition in the
traditional banking sector, but also attract new types of relationship-based
financial intermediaries able to optimally evaluate credit potential.
Another policy implication is given by the primary resource-specific costs
δ: possibilities for intervention in this area are numerous. Based on the
premise that different types of energy resources create different types of ex-
ternalities, primary resource-specific costs could vary according to the prin-
10 An example for a PPP is given by mezzanine funds, i.e. subordinated debt with a
risk level somewhere between equity and bank debt.
11 Whether or not a venture capitalist or even a market-based financial system should
be preferred to a bank-based system is beyond the scope of this paper. For more on the
debate of bank-based vs. market-based financial intermediation, see Levine and Zervos
(1998).
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ciple of internalizing externalities. The positive effect for RE firms of lower
net production costs per unit δ also acts through the higher loan interest
rate that they would be willing to pay to lenders (see equation 4.8). Benefits
of renewable energy use can be priced in, for example by providing direct
subsidies to RE firms or guaranteed feed-in costs into the national energy
distribution grid for energy produced using new technologies, a system which
has been successfully implemented for example in Germany. As economies
of scale and learning effects reduce the costs associated with RETs, making
them more competitive with fossil fuels, the incentives are gradually phased
out.
In addition, a policy targeted at lowering production costs for RE would
have an indirect effect on RE firms’ access to bank financing. Government
subsidies affect financial intermediaries’ decisions through implicit or explicit
backing of certain firms or sectors, leading in fact to a credit market distortion
and more favorable lending terms (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999).
Accordingly, in the model a subsidy decreasing δ would act as a government
guarantee, lowering information costs f for lenders and at the same time
increasing the fraction of creditworthy RE firms φ, and therefore pushing
down the loan interest rate demanded by banks (see equation 4.11).
Finally, public policy can intervene to reduce the external financing Z
needed by RE firms, e.g. through grants and public facilities aimed at sharing
project development and transaction costs (World Bank, 2002; Matsukawa et
al., 2003; Sonntag-O’Brien and Usher, 2004a,b; UNEP, 2004). Governments
in transition and developing countries may however not award a high priority
to these policies, or simply not have the means to design and implement them.
Advice and loans provided by international institutions can and have already
been helpful, but risk creating situations of dependency and not being very
effective or efficient in the long run.
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4.4 Empirical evidence
The theoretical model presented above predicts that a better-developed finan-
cial sector will have a positive impact on the development of the renewable
energy sector. The focus in particular has been on the importance of an un-
restricted banking sector and of low information costs on RETs for financiers
in order to foster the RE sector in transition and developing economies. This
section presents an empirical framework to test these effects.
4.4.1 Method and data description
There has so far been only anecdotal evidence on the role of commercial fi-
nance in the development of RE. The lack of a more systematic empirical
analysis of the correlation between financial sector and RE development is
also due to the data problem regarding the quantification of the RE sector,
especially in the developing world. The obstacles begin with the definition
of RE in official statistics: traditionally, hydropower – mostly provided by
large plants – has delivered the lion’s share of renewable energy in countries’
energy production mix, with other types of RE – when included – making
up for barely a few percent of the overall energy production. Recently how-
ever, some environmentalists and policymakers have contended that large
hydropower projects should not be viewed as viable contributions to sustain-
able energy production, as they often cause serious and substantial negative
environmental and social externalities.
We consider these issues when testing the importance of financial inter-
mediation for RET development by using two different dependent variables
as proxies for RE sector development. The first, reshare, measures the overall
RE share – including all types of hydro – in net total electricity generation.
In a second series of estimations, we take into account the importance of large
hydropower in electricity generation and their possible distorting effect on the
results12 by using the non-hydro RE share in net total electricity generation
12 Most traditional, large hydro projects in the developing world have been co-financed
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as the dependent variable (geoshare). This measure includes electricity pro-
duced from geothermal, solar, wind, and wood and waste energy resources.
The data for both dependent variables is freely available from the U.S. En-
ergy Information Administration (EIA). The covariates include four different
indicators of financial sector development, and a vector of control variables,
described below.
The data set provides an unbalanced panel for up to 118 non-OECD coun-
tries with observations for a maximum of 24 years (1980-2003). We perform
generalized least squares (GLS) regressions for the equation
Yit = β1 + β2Fit + β3Xit + ωit, (4.16)
where Yit is the dependent variable (reshare or geoshare) in country i at time
t, Fit denotes the financial sector development variable, and Xit the vector
of control variables.13 The composite error term ωit consists of the country-
specific error component ǫi and the combined cross-section and time series
error component uit, according to ωit = ǫi + uit.
14
The financial sector development indicators are not direct measures of
banks’ efficiency in credit allocation, but rather different proxies for financial
intermediary development tested in the literature. The first variable, priv-
cred, captures the amount of credit provided by financial institutions to the
private sector as a share of GDP. It excludes credits issued by governments
and development banks. An unrestricted financial sector can be expected
to account for a larger share of lending to the private sector. In fact, this
by multilateral financial institutions (MFIs) and the local governments, with little or no
involvement sought of commercial finance (World Bank, 2003). The use of the overall RE
share may therefore not only distort the results on the importance of the financial sector
for more modern RETs, but in fact reverse them.
13 Estimations were performed both with 1-year-lags for the financial indicators – as
financial sector changes are not expected to have immediate effects – and 4-year-averages
for all variables. For a detailed description of the variables and sources, see the Appendix.
14 See for example Baltagi (2001) or Hsiao (2003) for an extensive discussion of panel
data analysis models.
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variable has been shown by Levine et al. (2000) to be a reliable measure of
financial intermediary development, i.e. the ability of financial institutions
to efficiently mobilize and allocate resources to profitable ventures. Earlier
versions of the measure were used for example in King and Levine (1993a,b)
and Levine and Zervos (1998). We expect privcred to correlate positively
with the level of development of the RE sector.
The second variable, commbank, measures the importance of commercial
banks’ asset share versus that of the central bank, defined as the assets of
deposit money banks over the sum of these assets plus those of the central
bank. In more highly developed and open economies, the commercial financial
sector handles a greater share of household savings than the central bank.
Assuming that the commercial financial sector is more efficient than the public
one in allocating credits, commbank should positively correlate with RET
development. This variable has also been tested several times in the literature,
e.g. in King and Levine (1993a,b) and Levine et al. (2000).
The third variable, findep, is a general measure of financial sector devel-
opment commonly known as “financial depth”, i.e. liquid liabilities of the
financial system (generally M2) divided by GDP, which has been widely used
in the literature on finance and growth since King and Levine (1993a,b). The
present variable is based on the more sophisticated measure developed in
Levine et al. (2000). The assumption is that the relative size of the finan-
cial intermediary sector is positively correlated with the quantity and quality
of the financial services provided, and we would therefore expect a positive
influence on the development of RETs.
The fourth and final financial sector variable, finunder, takes a different
approach, measuring financial underdevelopment or repression as the ratio
of reserve holdings to liquidity. A high reserve ratio is expected to have a
negative impact on the amount of assets available for credit allocation and
consequently the development of RETs, since “a high coefficient of required
reserve for commercial banks will force them to hold a greater amount of
non-interest bearing monetary reserves” (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992:
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25).
Our main control variable psreform describes the level of power sector
reform in developing and transition countries. It is based on a broad qualita-
tive survey by the World Bank conducted in 1998 (ESMAP, 1999) and takes
on values from 0 (least reformed) to 6 (reforms in all relevant areas have
been implemented). The evaluation considers measures to create equal mar-
ket opportunities for all energy resource types and encourage private firms’
participation and competition. Hence, psreform is a proxy for government
energy policies. As discussed in the previous section, the institutional frame-
work is a crucial element of financiers’ information costs on RETs (i.e. f
in the theoretical model), signalling a government’s commitment to leveling
the playing field for energy providers and thereby reducing uncertainty about
future profitability of a RE project. Since there is no reliable data available
on creditor evaluation costs in less developed economies, this crude proxy will
have to suffice. We expect a positive impact of power sector reforms on the
RE sector, particularly on the share of non-hydro RE.
Several other control variables are included.15 Official development as-
sistance by multilaterals (oda) aims to control for the effect of multilateral
donor money, while foreign direct investment (fdi) and net domestic invest-
ment (inv) capture general private investment in a country (inv being the
more complete measure, including portfolio investments and financial deriva-
tives as well as foreign and domestic capital and equity investment). Further
variables include regional and period dummies (for the 4-year average estima-
tions); initial real GDP per capita; and a measure of economic development
(devind) ranging from 1 to 4 based on the World Bank classification of low,
lower middle, middle, and high income countries according to 2003 GNI. Fi-
nally, we control for the possible exogenous effects on RE development of the
costs of non-renewable energy resource production by including the average
15 Unfortunately, there is not enough cross-country data available on RE potential to
provide a useful control variable. However, we believe that this does not greatly bias our
results given the range of RETs considered.
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annual market price of crude oil. If the price of the most common conven-
tional fuel affects investment in alternative energy sources, we would expect a
positive effect of an oil price increase on the share of RE in power production.
4.4.2 Estimation results
It is of particular interest to observe the sign and statistical validity of the
financial sector coefficients β2 rather than their actual magnitude, given the
quality of the data for the RE sector. The aim is to observe whether the devel-
opment of the RE sector is positively influenced by the financial intermediary
sector, and especially by the banking system.
Table 4.1 reports the results for random-effects regressions on the full
sample16 for RE share (panel A) and non-hydro RE share (panel B). It is
apparent that the four financial sector variables are statistically significant
when regressed on both measures of RE sector development, and that they
are fairly robust to controlling for other effects both regarding their statistical
significance and the magnitude of their coefficients. findep and privcred gen-
erally prove more reliable, while finunder has the weakest explanatory power,
with commbank situated in between.
It is however interesting that the signs of the four coefficients are consis-
tently opposite when estimating with reshare versus geoshare as dependent
variables. When considering non-hydro RE share (panel B), the signs corre-
spond to those predicted by the theory, namely that financial sector develop-
ment has a positive effect on the development of RETs. When hydropower is
included in the estimations, the situation changes round completely, confirm-
ing the inherent difficulty surmised above in including mostly MFI-financed
(large) hydro in the sample. This hypothesis receives further support through
the high significance of the economic development indicator devind observed
16 Both random-effects and fixed-effects estimations were performed on all variables for
the lagged sample and the 4-year averages. As the Hausman test showed no clear advantage
of using fixed effects, only random-effects estimation results are shown. See Baltagi (2001)
for more details on the Hausman specification test.
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Table 4.1: Financial development and the share of renewable energy resources
in total net electricity generation in non-OECD countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A
Dep’t variable
is reshare
logfindep −4.43∗∗∗ −4.36∗∗∗
(0.76) (0.76)
logprivcred −0.87∗∗∗ −0.85∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.31)
logcommbank −7.45∗∗∗ −7.52∗∗∗
(1.21) (1.33)
logfinunder 1.19∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.39)
logfdi −0.67∗∗∗ −0.64∗∗∗ −1.06∗∗∗ −0.86∗∗∗ −0.912∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.23) (0.24) (0.18)
devind −9.95∗∗∗ −8.48∗∗ −8.85∗∗ −10.71∗∗ −9.08∗∗
(3.63) (3.98) (3.73) (4.22) (4.25)
eefsudummy −24.13∗∗∗ −22.77∗∗∗ −20.89∗∗∗ −20.08∗∗ −13.98∗ −14.14∗
(-24.13) (8.16) (8.14) (8.86) (8.26) (8.33)
oilprice 0.02 0.01 −0.04 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
R2 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.14 0.14
N 1541 1541 1883 1883 1203 1031 2077 1629
Panel B
Dep’t variable
is geoshare
logfindep 0.52∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17)
logprivcred 0.22∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗
(0.08) (0.08)
logcommbank 0.49∗∗ 0.42∗∗
(0.22) (0.2)
logfinunder −0.13∗ −0.13∗
(0.08) (0.08)
psreform 0.54∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.44 0.45∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗
(0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.27) (0.2) (0.18) (0.19)
logoda 0.27∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
devind -0.18 −0.21
(0.54) (0.5)
eefsudummy −2.47∗∗ −2.44∗∗ −3.15 −2.52∗∗ −2.543∗∗∗
(1.02) (1.02) (2.15) (0.99) (0.97)
oilprice 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.13
N 1125 1125 1053 1053 1118 1352 1346 1346
Notes: All regressions are random-effects GLS on full sample panel of 118 non-OECD countries from 1980-
2003 with 1-year-lags in financial indicators. Regressions were also performed for 4-year average data,
which yielded very similar results and are not reported here. Other control variables are not listed as
they proved insignificant. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ statistically significant at 10, 5, and
1 percent levels, respectively. Joint significance tests strongly reject hypothesis of no difference between
covariates in all estimations. For detailed variable descriptions and sources see the Appendix, Table 4.3.
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in panel A.17 If it is true that development banks in the past favored large
hydro projects, then we would indeed expect to find a negative relationship
between economic development and the overall RE share. The economic de-
velopment effect loses significance when considering only non-hydro RE (panel
B).
Regarding the other variables in Table 4.1, we find a significant and robust
positive effect of power sector reforms on the share of non-hydro RE (panel
B), confirming the hypothesis that policies aimed at leveling the playing field
for all energy types encourage the development of RETs (other than large
hydropower projects). For a certain institutional framework in the power
sector, the financial development coefficients consistently show the expected
signs with a high level of significance.
It is also interesting to note the effect of including regional dummies in
the estimations (with Asia and Oceania being the omitted regional dummy).
Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries (eefsudummy) have a
consistently lower share of all types of RE, especially of non-hydro RE. This
can be explained by the decades of socialist energy policy favoring the use
of fossil fuels in electricity generation and energy production in general. The
other regional dummies were not statistically significant. Last but not least,
the inclusion of oil prices had no significant effect on the magnitude or error
margin of the other variables. With one exception, oil prices had the expected
positive sign, but proved statistically insignificant in both estimation series.
World oil price fluctuations do not appear to have had a noticeable influence
on RE development during the time period observed.
In sum, the results of the empirical analysis support the basic hypothesis
from the theoretical model that financial intermediary development encour-
ages the growth of the RE sector, especially when limiting the estimations
to non-hydro RETs. The findings are also quite robust to the inclusion of
other covariates which could influence RE sector development. But further
17 Initial real GDP per capita had a similar effect. For simplicity, only the results using
the economic development indicator are shown.
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empirical research is needed to corroborate these results, as they very likely
suffer from measurement errors due to the quality of the available RE data.
4.5 Conclusions
The paper examines the determinants of credit allocation to renewable en-
ergy firms in developing and transition countries. It develops a multi-sector
endogenous growth model to explain the financing problems of renewable en-
ergy (RE) projects in these countries. Growth in the model stems from the
diversification of the primary RE production sector, i.e. the use of a more
varied range of renewable energy technologies (RETs) in energy production.
Energy production today relies on exhaustible and polluting conventional fos-
sil fuels, and a larger share of alternative energy sources in primary energy
production would not only have positive environmental effects, but would also
bring greater energy security for future generations, as RETs exploit domes-
tic renewable energy resources. Diversification in the use of RETs is hence
assumed to be beneficial for a sustainable energy sector.
Energy firms in less developed economies are largely dependent on ex-
ternal financing to realize new projects; in turn, external financing in these
countries relies on the banking sector, as stock markets and venture capital-
ism are not well enough established to provide large-scale funding. However,
the underdevelopment of the banking sector, in addition to specific RE-sector
problems such as high up-front and information costs and long lead times,
hamper the emergence of RE entrepreneurs. The steady-state equilibrium
solution yields several results: less banking sector distortion and lower eval-
uation costs to potential creditors will increase growth rates, while higher
external financing needs by the RE firm will lower growth rates.
Several policy recommendations for the emergence of RETs are derived:
general banking sector development through creating better legal and insti-
tutional frameworks, as well as the more targeted provision of information
on new energy technologies. Specific measures aimed at reducing the relative
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price of RE production through taxes or fixed feed-in prices (to include pos-
itive externalities) are also considered, as well as the merit of public-private
partnerships to lower project costs for generators and the perceived risk for
financiers. In short, there are many ways of leveling the playing field for
new energy technologies. The subsidy option should however be a temporary
instrument to boost the development of a sustainable energy sector and fu-
ture energy security. As new energy technologies take off, scale and learning
effects will ensure their market success.
The positive effect of financial sector development on the development of
RETs found in the theoretical model is tested empirically. The results are
encouraging: all four variables measuring financial intermediary development
are significant and have the expected signs. In addition, energy sector reforms
also have a significant positive effect. The results are fairly robust to the
addition of other control variables – including world oil prices, which appear
to have no impact on RE sector development.
The approach is a first attempt at modeling and empirically verifying the
financing difficulties facing the renewable energy industry. The availability of
quality data on RE development and investment has so far hampered empiri-
cal studies in this area; further work is needed to corroborate the results. An
interesting extension for future research is the role that financial intermedi-
aries play in the substitution of fossil fuels in favor of RE.
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4.6 Appendix
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of main variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
reshare 2497 47.53 34.67 0.01 100
geoshare 2497 1.21 4.08 0 40.18
findep 2726 37.41 24.71 0.00 168.85
privcred 2607 25.55 22.56 0.00 151.77
commbank 3008 74.07 23.68 2.98 136.59
finunder 3069 26.55 128.44 −13.24 5017.639
psreform 115 2.04 2.09 0 6
oilprice 24 22.62 6.46 12.72 35.69
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Table 4.3: Variables and sources
All data were collected for non-OECD countries (as of 1980 – the recent OECD mem-
bers Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, Poland, and Slovakia were included in the
estimations) for the years 1980-2003 (where available).
Variable Definition Source
reshare Share of renewable energies – including hydro, wood and waste,
geothermal, solar, and wind – in net total electricity generation
EIA
geoshare Share of non-hydro renewable energies – including geothermal,
wind, solar, and wood and waste – in net total electricity genera-
tion
EIA
findep Financial depth measured by 100∗(0.5∗(M2i(t) + M2i(t −
1))/GDP (t)) whereM2 is liquid liabilities (lines 34+35) and GDP
is line 99b
IFS
privcred Credit by financial institutions to the private sector as share
of GDP, measured by 100∗(0.5∗(CREDIT (t) + CREDIT (t −
1)))/GDP ) with CREDIT being total private sector credit al-
locations by deposit money banks and other financial institutions
(lines 22d+42d) and GDP line 99b
IFS
commbank Commercial bank asset share versus central bank, measured by
100∗(DBA(t)/(DBA(t) + CBA(t))) where DBA is assets of de-
posit money banks (lines 22a-d) and CBA is assets of the central
bank (lines 12a-d)
IFS
finunder Financial underdevelopment or repression measured by
100∗(COMM(t)/M2(t)) where COMM is commercial bank
reserves (line 20) and M2 is liquid liabilities (lines 34+35)
IFS
oda Official development assistance and official aid – disbursements by
multilaterals
OECD
fdi Foreign direct investment (line 78bed) IFS
inv Net sum investment in economy, including direct investment, port-
folio investment, financial derivatives, and other investment (line
78bjd)
IFS
cgdp Per capita real GDP in 1980 PWT 6.1
devind Development indicator based on the World Bank classification of
countries by income (2003 GNI) from low (1) to high income (4)
World Bank
psreform Qualitative power sector reform indicator for 1998, ranging from
0 (no reforms) to 6 (all relevant reforms implemented in all areas)
ESMAP(1999)
oilprice Crude oil prices measured in USD per barrel, in current dollars,
from 1980-2003
British
Petroleum
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